Judicial Rulings

KEY FEATURES of the medical malpractice legislation enacted by the General Assembly in 1975 (Public Act 79-960) were ruled invalid by the court in an opinion by Justice Goldenhersh. (See also: "Doctors, lawyers, patients, state: Conflict views of the malpractice problem," Feb. 1976, p. 3ff.)

The act's provision for medical review panels was held invalid because such panels were given judicial functions, whereas the Constitution (Art. VI, sec. 1) "vests the exclusive and entire judicial power in the courts." The panels were to be made up of a circuit judge, a lawyer, and a physician, and by terms of the law "the lawyer and physician members were vested with authority equal to that of the judge, to determine and apply the 'substantive law'." This, the court said, was a judicial function. Since the panel procedure was a prerequisite to jury trial, the court additionally found the procedure was "an impermissible restriction on the right to trial by jury" (guaranteed by Art. I, sec. 13). But, the court added, "In so holding, however, we do not imply that a valid pretrial panel procedure cannot be devised," thus leaving the door open for the legislature to rework the panel provisions.

The court also held invalid the $500,000 limit on recoveries in malpractice cases, agreeing that this discriminated against "the most seriously injured victims of medical malpractice." The constitutional basis here was the prohibition against special laws (Art. IV, sec. 13). Justices Underwood and Ryan filed partial dissents disagreeing with this part of the majority opinion.

A provision forbidding increases in malpractice insurance rates existing on June 10, 1975, without approval of the state director was also found unconstitutional because the court said it was special legislation. The court's objection here was that this rate-regulating provision did not apply to new policies written after June 10, 1975.

Tax on leased equipment
Telco Leasing, Inc., v. Robert H. Allphin, director of Department of Revenue, et al., decided May 14, 1976

In an opinion by Justice Crebs the court upheld the constitutionality of a provision of the Use Tax Act and a departmental rule based on the provision requiring leasing companies to pay the use tax when they lease medical and scientific equipment and computers to hospitals, universities, laboratories and other nonprofit institutions, even though the tax is not imposed when such property is sold to a nonprofit charitable, religious or educational institution.�