FIRST IN A SERIES OF FOUR ARTICLES By BRITTA B. HARRIS
A Lincoln housewife, and mother of five, Ms. Harris followed and researched the events of the Oakley Dam controversy for seven years in order to write her master's thesis in public administration for the University of Illinois at Urbana. She has also taught political science at Lincoln College.

The drama of Oakley Dam: To build or not to build, that was the question

A struggle spanning three decades pitted the Army Corps of Engineers and the City of Decatur against conservationists and farmers with the U of I in the middle. When the curtain fell, there was no dam, but the way we make decisions had been exposed

ONE OF THE BITTEREST and most protracted controversies in the recent history of Illinois is finally over. Although the debate over Oakley Dam has stretched on for more than 30 years, the majority of the state's citizens outside of east central Illinois have never heard of it, and the few who have did not understand the baroque complexity of the largest public works project ever proposed for central Illinois. Four U.S. senators, Republicans Charles Percy and Everett Dirksen and Democrats Paul Douglas and Adlai Stevenson, two governors, Democrat Otto Kerner and Republican Richard Ogilvie, and two congressmen, William Springer and Edward Madigan, both Republicans, gave it strong support. But in spite of this powerful official approval, combined with the determined promotion of the U.S. Corps of Engineers, this Sangamon River project was ultimately, and perhaps inevitably, doomed.

Since 1945, dozens of government agencies, the University of Illinois, many private organizations and lobby groups and countless private individuals argued fiercely over the proposed dam and reservoir complex to be built near the rural Oakley area north of Decatur. Proposed in 1945 as a modest flood control reservoir on the Sangamon River costing about $4.8 million. Oakley mushroomed into a huge, multi-purpose project with two reservoirs and a price tag of $120 million before it was finally cancelled after an investigation by the federal General Accounting Office in 1975. This report and the persistent efforts of a cadre of citizens concerned that the proposed reservoir would flood Allerton Park near Monticello caused the Corps to withdraw from the project it had championed so vigorously for over three decades.

No one simple reason can be given for the Oakley debacle, but a cluster of failures in communication, research and coordination can be discerned by following the threads of controversy and litigation over the years. If poor coordination caused the failure, the next question is whether our society, our institutions, are organized in such a way that any proper planning for such a project could have taken place. It may be that the competing interests involved were so diverse and inherently antagonistic that the comprehensive effort required was and is quite beyond the capabilities of any governmental entity or private consortium. But Americans have always been able to organize for almost anything — if the proper incentives were there — and the more likely reason for Oakley's failure is that the project was ill conceived from the start. The determination of the Corps to undertake an ambitious public works project like Oakley matched the desire of the city of Decatur to increase its water supply and save Lake Decatur, but neither reason, in the final analysis, outweighed the environmental, economic and agricultural drawbacks so loudly proclaimed by Oakley's detractors.

Because water is a migratory resource, flowing across political boundaries, a special set of requirements is necessary for purposes such as water supply, water quality, flood control, farm and municipal drainage and recreation, as well as for growing demands to preserve natural resources. Illinois is water-rich, but many areas in the state are short of water because of geologic conditions and changing demographic patterns. The state has more water miles than most states, a high rate of replenishment through rainfall and has twice the national percentage of flooding. Consequently, flood control has become a major government activity, as has the use of surface water for water supply and recreation. Large water projects benefit some communities while others suffer adverse impacts. Cooperation between communities competing for water use and control is rare. Furthermore, water resource planning has been complicated by confrontations between developers and conservationists. Another difficulty is that the time-honored use of water management tools such as channelization and multi-purpose reservoirs is more often challenged by citizens equipped with the engineering, hydrological and ecological expertise to support their objections. Finally, the ultimate problem in water resource

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First proposed for flood control, the dam was changed by the Corps with Decatur support to include water supply, recreation and pollution control

development is to find a common ground where all these interests can agree and public responsibilities can still be met.

For more than 30 years, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers worked on the development of a dam and reservoir system on the Sangamon River as part of a comprehensive flood control plan for the entire Illinois River watershed. The Oakley Project evolved from a dry basin for flood control to a pair of multipurpose reservoirs providing flood control, water supply for the city of Decatur, recreation and, at one time, water quality for pollution control. In 1966, when the proposed project was expanded for recreation and pollution control, there were angry protests from many area citizens. Sufficient water storage for the four "benefits" required a high dam, which would have backed reservoir waters upstream to a point where thousands of acres of rich farmland, as well as forests in Allerton Park, would have been flooded. Allerton Park, located in Piatt County near Monticello, is a 1,500-acre estate given to the University of Illinois by the late Robert Allerton, wealthy landowner and son of a midwest tycoon. The sacrifice of any part of the park, which is used for educational, scientific and cultural purposes, was considered unthinkable by many people. A coalition of citizens led by university faculty members and Champaign conservationists was organized to save the park. Their dedicated campaign initiated an incredibly complex chain of events which eventually put the brakes on project planning. After more than 30 years of human effort and public expenditure, all that remains of the Oakley mirage is some lingering bitterness and a classic public administration case study in the pitfalls of narrow, project-oriented planning.

During the course of the Oakley mirage, several attempts were made to establish comprehensive land and water resource planning with coordination and communication between local, state and federal agencies. Most of these efforts failed because of secrecy, misunderstanding, a lack of shared goals, motivation and sufficient authority. Timing also played a part in Oakley's failure. The struggle between the Oakley and Allerton forces peaked at a time when debate over environmental issues was developing. Citizens were more aware of the value of irreplaceable natural resources such as Allerton Park. Environmentalists insisted on wide consultation to balance information presented by public agencies to promote projects such as Oakley.

The Corps' methods
Many issues came and went while Oakley remained on the drawing board, but sustained throughout were questions related to the methods used by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to advance its project. Specifically, detractors disagreed with the Corps' methods of estimating future benefits, especially those for flood control. The Corps is one of the oldest and most powerful bureaucracies in the nation and is skilled in the art of political manipulation. It has had many powerful critics. In 1955 the Hoover Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of Government said the Corps' benefits were frequently overstated. The Hoover Commission said national policy led to the authorization of many projects of questionable merit, and it offered suggestions for the transfer of the Corps' civil functions to another agency. Water resources development, the report said, should be on a regional watershed basis rather than on a project basis which might favor local interests.

The recommendations made by the Hoover Commission failed, and the Corps continued to exercise its vast power over the development of water management programs in the country. In 1975, the Corps' powers were again being reviewed, but this time from the point of view of increasing that power. Under study in 1975 was a plan to expand the Corps' jurisdiction of waterway authority to cover every body of water in the nation. All lakes and streams, even irrigation ditches and marshes, could, under current proposals, come under the authority and supervision of the Corps. An examination of the Corps' espousal of the Oakley project can provide some insight into how it has worked in the past and perhaps some notion of whether its power should be enlarged in the future.

The COAP
As the Oakley drama unfolded. individuals and groups adhering to policies expressed by the Corps and the city of Decatur were opposed by those sharing views shaped by the Committee On Allerton Park (COAP), the coalition which was dedicated to save the park from permanent flood damage. Between these polarized positions there were important interests whose positions shifted during the course of the struggle.

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Piatt County, designated by the Corps' Oakley design plan as the area to accommodate the backup of Oakley floodwaters, became a major arena of political strife. Many Piatt citizens objected strenuously to plans for flooding; others played with the idea of bringing in even more water to encourage the development of a recreation-based tourist economy. Others in the county appealed to state and local officials for comprehensive valley planning.

Throughout the years of conflict, the University of Illinois had trouble establishing a policy towards the project. Torn between its legal responsibilities for the Allerton property and its desire to maintain popular good will for the university, the University Board of Trustees first bowed to the project's inevitability and then retreated, claiming the need for further study and review. The board agreed to a compromise proposed by the state, but when the Corps forced compromise changes, there was displeasure and distrust. After more studies, the board withdrew university support for the project.

State government
The policies of the state government, shaped by three successive administrations, were basically political, and the ambitions of individuals sometimes conflicted with objective professional standards. Because of this and the differences between several sets of standards involved in the state's administration of natural resources, the state's Oakley policies were often inept and confused. State officials successively promoted the project, offered compromises, and sought neutrality. The project was never considered solely from the broad vantage point of regional planning where a wide range of interests in the Sangamon River Valley could be reviewed.

Decatur, anxious to augment its municipal water supplies with water from Oakley, became the Corps' earliest and most dedicated ally. City leaders used their political influence to persuade slate and federal support of Oakley. The project, which had been on the Corps' drawing boards since 1937, languished for many years until the influence of Decatur overwhelmed former objections to the project. Decatur city officials had worried about the city's future water supply for many years, and it was natural that they would look to the federal project as a likely solution to their problem. Located just a few miles north of Decatur, the project had the potential to serve many purposes for a growing population.

Like many cities in Illinois, Decatur had a municipal water supply reservoir, but unlike others, it was constructed on the main stem of the river. In 1921, the reservoir. Lake Decatur, was placed on the Sangamon River to accommodate growing water needs of the A. E. Staley Company, one of the city's chief industries and destined to become one of the nation's largest grain processors. Considering the tons of sediment, which poured through the river's channels from thousands of acres of highly cultivated upstream areas, a mainstream reservoir was a risky venture. Lake Springfield, further downstream, and also a combined water supply and recreational reservoir, had been placed on a tributary of the Sangamon River where siltation rates were considerably lower. The extent of Decatur's gamble was soon obvious. Between 1922 and 1936, the lake lost 14 per cent of its storage capacity. Thousands of tons of silt, carried by swift Sangamon flood- waters during the rainy season, settled in Lake Decatur. In 1946 the sediment was two feet deep near the dam and three feet deep in the upper part of the reservoir, up to the spillway level in some places. Large volumes of silt resulted from the intensified cultivation in the upstream drainage areas. In Piatt County, land planted with intertilled row crops such as corn and soy beans was increasing at a high rate. In 1953 and 1954 worries about a shrinking water supply were intensified by a drought which caused Lake Decatur to drop alarmingly. Future droughts were predicted by the Corps and concern developed over the city's ability to provide water for peak industrial demands. City leaders organized a search for more water and were advised by engineers that the most feasible plan was the construction of an upstream reservoir to serve as a silt trap. Decatur lobbyists Decatur concentrated its efforts on obtaining congressional approval of the Corps' Oakley plan. Until Decatur began lobbying, the plans of the Corps for development on the Sangamon River had been turned down by Congress because of strong opposition from area conservationists and farmers. Conservationists fought any engineering projects on the Sangamon, especially channelization — the dredging of the river channel for faster water flow. They opposed any change, which would alter or destroy fish and wildlife habitats. Many downstream farmers, long adjusted to the risks of farming rich bottomland soil along the river, were sensitive to any water management , which might interfere with their use of the land. Farmers in upstream regions also objected to the dam since there was the risk of reservoir water backing up and being held at high levels. Upstream farmers were joined by residents in Monticello, the Piatt County seat. In Monticello there were objections to the Corps' plans because of fears that a dam on the Oakley site would cause flooding

Cast of Characters Act I U.S. Corps of Engineers: one of the nation's oldest and most powerful bureaucracies, the Corps first put the Oakley Dam on its drawing board in 1937 and pushed vigorously for its construction until the project was scrapped in 1975 City of Decatur: worried about the future of its water supply because of the siltation of Lake Decatur and the needs of a burgeoning population and its vital grain processing industry, the city was the Corps' strongest ally throughout the Oakley drama Committee On Allerton Park (COAP): dedicated to the preservation of the University of Illinois' priceless 1,500-acre park, the coalition entered the drama's action at a crucial point and proved to be Oakley's most vociferous and effective opponent Citizens of Piatt County: upstream from the proposed site of the dam, area residents feared that the backup of Oakley waters would flood farmland and damage the municipal sewage system of Monticello, Piatt County seat State of Illinois: divided over the merits of Oakley, officials and agencies of the state were left out of early planning efforts and played only cameo roles until forced to take sides late in the action University of Illinois: torn between the desire to save its own Allerton Park and the fear of alienating the university's powerful supporters, the U of I Board of Trustees vacillated until the drama's final act U.S. Congress: responding to the strong support of the powerful Illinois delegation, the Congress approved each increase in the cost of Oakley until a General Accounting Office report showed the dam's costs would far outweigh its benefits

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Conservationists fought the dam to save Allerton Park and found an ally in farmers who felt their land was more threatened by the dam than by floods

near the city and damage the municipal sewage system. There was little confidence that the Corps could manage the reservoir to prevent floodwater backups. Congressman William Springer (R., Champaign), after considering the strong opposition, told Decatur's leaders that it would take a miracle to get Oakley started.

The push for Oakley had more going for it in 1954. Economic conditions were changing in Illinois, and agricultural interests were overshadowed by the compelling demands for industrial expansion. Decatur was regarded by some as the industrial gateway to central Illinois, and its needs in a growing state economy assumed greater importance. Primarily interested in its own problems, Decatur lobbied for federal approval of a water supply function in Oakley's design. This time, there was strong congressional support for Oakley. The late U.S. Sen. Everett Dirksen (R., Pekin) never doubted the Corps claims for Oakley or Decatur's need, and U.S. Sen. Paul Douglas (D., Chicago) agreed that with some changes there could be a reservoir. Planners in the Chicago district office of the Corps, which had jurisdiction over the Sangamon River development, were very receptive to Decatur's overtures, especially since the Chicago office had yet to build a major reservoir project.

Decatur's lobbying efforts were successful, and Congressman Springer's doubtful miracle occurred. A revised Oakley project was launched in 1956 with a new price tag of $22.8 million and a Decatur agreement to pay a share ($5.4 million) of the cost. Rosy predictions for sudden wealth in central Illinois did not convince everyone, and objections continued to impede progress. The Korean War slowed down federal public works spending, but persistent political pressure overcame all obstacles. In 1962, a new Oakley design was approved, this time at a cost of $27.2 million. Recreation was added as a benefit at the insistence of Sen. Douglas. Jubilant about the prospect of Oakley's success, a Decatur city councilman said, "We've got a lake for about half the price we would have to pay for one of our own. The determination of the Decatur Association of Commerce and the City Council carried on through war, indifference and opposition." Throughout the entire Oakley controversy, Decatur's approach was characterized by this same tough single-mindedness. Even when the odds turned decisively against the project, city leaders refused to admit the possibility of defeat and fought to the very end.

More resentment
Following congressional approval, the 1962 version of Oakley was a reality for opposition forces to contend with. Voices of protest were again heard, but this time more technical arguments were offered. There was also resentment against a project designed solely for Decatur and Macon County, and there was criticism that the more costly project had not been put to the test of public hearings. Farmers and conservationists again advanced alternative proposals to provide cheaper and more efficient methods of flood control. Some critics thought the new dam should be located below Decatur, downstream where it would be more protected from siltation. There, they said, it would truly serve a flood control purpose by containing flood waters from the city. Most opponents were suspicious of the Corps' motives. They believed that the Chicago District, anxious to build its first major reservoir, selected the Oakley site because the combined benefits of water supply, flood control and recreation made the Oakley package more attractive. Critical of the Corps' decision, opponents claimed the Corps' attitude was not, "Where is the best place to put a dam?" but instead, "How can we put a dam here?"

More specific objections related to topography. The land, it was said, was too flat for water storage. With high rates of runoff, it was necessary to take the reservoir too far back into the watershed, using an excessive amount of highly developed agricultural land. Critics also said that Oakley's flood control function would be useless because Decatur's industrial needs required a full reservoir at all times. High water levels were also needed during summer months when there were peak demands for recreation. A full reservoir contradicted the flood control concept which required summer and fall drawdowns to lower water levels for the accommodation of late winter and spring floods. Furthermore, farmers claimed high reservoir levels would permanently damage farm drainage systems and keep the land soggy during critical periods of the growing season. Many downstream farmers were willing to take occasional losses from flooding because the losses were more than made up by high yields from rich bottomland soils. A dam at Oakley would curtail flooding, but farmers feared that the lower Sangamon River would be much too high during the planting season. Reservoir management was known to be difficult, and water releases often took longer than predicted. Downstream farmers feared the long period of soaking more than they feared floodwaters, which drained, away in a few weeks time each spring. Oakley opponents pointed out that agencies such as the Corps, which construct, operate and maintain multi-purpose resource projects are required to build only projects which yield public benefits. It was argued that since flood benefits alone could not justify Oakley, the Corps needed to count the benefits of water supply and recreation to bolster a sagging cost-benefit ratio.

Further enlargement
During 1964 and 1965, there were widespread rumors that the Corps, having difficulty with its cost-benefit ratio, was planning to add a new purpose and enlarge the reservoir. Officials from the University of Illinois,

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with little information about the possible effects of flooding in Allerton Park under the 1962 Oakley design, were alarmed that a larger dam would bring even more water. Objections were made to Congressman Springer that Oakley planning was proceeding too rapidly. The congressman gave assurances that the university would receive step-by-step notices of project development, but in spite of his assurances, Oakley planning continued to be secret.

Speculation about Oakley ended in 1966 when Congressman Springer announced that Oakley had been doubled in size at an estimated cost of $62.4 million. Corps officials described the changes as mere refinements. But by raising the dam 15 feet from 621 above mean sea level to 636 feet, adding a new feature as well as channelization, they had, in effect, given the project a major overhaul. The new feature, low flow augumentation, was the addition of more water to dilute polluted water downstream from Decatur, Since the impoundment of the Sangamon River by Lake Decatur in 1921, the river's flow immediately downstream from Decatur sometimes consisted of little more than effluent from Decatur's sanitary plant. This new purpose of dilution immediately became a target of Oakley opponents who regarded it as a crutch to support the project's weak economic structure.

The Corps' decision to redesign Oakley without the benefit of public hearings further aggravated opposition, and the stage was set for one of the longest political battles in Illinois history.

Subsequently, the struggle was carried into courtrooms, legislative chambers and council rooms at the federal, state and local levels. The Corps of Engineers, with everything to gain, resisted demands for changes. The Committee for Allerton Park (COAP), with nothing to lose, refused to give up its efforts to save the park. It is possible that if the compromise had stuck together, the Oakley Dam project would have been accepted. What is certain is that a small group of citizens, which used every lever of publicity and political power, finally succeeded in bringing the weight of public opinion and official sanction against the project and its powerful bureaucratic sponsor.

Next month — Oakley: the early years.

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