Legislative Action

How broad is conflict of interest?

THE CONFLICT of interest charge that was raised during the spring legislative session when Rep. Eugene F. Schlickman (R., Arlington Heights) sought to reprimand Rep. Gerald F. Shea (D., Riverside), the Democratic floor leader, for "unbecoming conduct" (H.R. 777) deserves to be studied carefully in view of a constitutional amendment that may be on the ballot in November. This amendment would require a legislator who has "a conflict of interest as a result of a personal, family, or financial interest in a bill" to disclose the same and refrain from voting on the bill. The amendment is one of three being placed on the ballot by popular petition if the petitions survive a court test and scrutiny of the sufficiency of the signatures.

At the outset it should be made clear that the House of Representatives, after an investigation and report by a special committee, exonerated Shea by a vote of 153 to 7. This lopsided vote indicates the strong feeling aroused against Schlickman's action. The reason for this feeling was twofold: (1) the importance in legislative procedure of minimizing personalities and (2) the need to safeguard the reputations of the members. Legislators in debate do not speak of each other by name; they refer to "the gentleman from Cook," etc. Because disagreements are real and feelings can run deep, if it were not for a strong tradition of civility and mutual respect, legislative sessions would end in fisticuffs. And when one member charges another has violated the code of ethics, this is a very serious personal affront. In addition, there is the potential damage to the good name of the accused legislator, damage which, in some circumstances, could result in his defeat for re-election. (Shea had announced months before the dispute that he was not going to seek re-election.)

As for Schlickman, he had no alternative but to offer a resolution of reprimand if he wanted official consideration of his charges against Shea, because a 1971 amendment to the Governmental Ethics Act had abolished a Board of Ethics created to inquire into such situations.

Shea was never charged with any violation of a criminal law. What Schlickman charged was a violation of "rules of conduct for legislators" set out in the ethics act (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1975, ch. 127, sec. 606-101ff). "Suspected violations . . . shall be inquired into by the Board of Ethics.... However, disciplinary action against any person found in violation shall be administered only by the house . . . of which the person is a member," the law said. But the board, as noted, no longer exists.

The House created a special committee to consider the charges (H.R. 833). The gist of these, as restated by the committee, was that Shea had conducted himself in a manner which created the appearance to two improprieties; (1) that his appearance before state agencies, acting as an attorney for private interests, was unethical; and (2) that his legislative actions in support of bills on the subject of medical malpractice constituted a conflict of interest." In particular, Schlickman's resolution had said that Shea, after handling bills on medical malpractice sought by the state medical society, had assisted in organizing a medical malpractice insurance plan for the society's members and had appeared before the state insurance department in this connection. For this latter activity, he had been compensated as a lawyer. He had not been compensated, of course, for handling the medical malpractice bills (such compensation clearly would have been unlawful). There was no disagreement on the basic facts of Shea's actions, but the committee found "no evidence that Mr. Shea's conduct in this context gave any appearance that his legislative actions were motivated by anything other than an honorable judgment of the public interest." Shea's interest in the malpractice legislation, the committee noted, was prior to his representation of the case before the insurance department.

The House has now amended its rules to provide for disciplinary proceedings (Rules 80 through 86, in H.R. 902); as follows. Following filing with the speaker of a confidential petition containing "suggested charges," a special investigating committee is named by the speaker. It would meet in closed sessions like a grand jury, and if charges are warranted, the speaker next names a select committee on discipline which reviews the evidence in an adversary proceeding, using the rules of evidence applicable to criminal proceedings. This committee reports its findings to the House. A vote of 107 members (three-fifths of the membership) is required to adopt a finding of fault; a vote of 118 (two-thirds) to expel a member.

The pending constitutional amendment would afford a much broader field for raising conflict of interest questions than the Shea situation where a lawyer-legislator appeared before a state agency on a topic where he had previously sponsored legislation. The areas of conflict of interest are exceedingly broad —"personal, family, or financial" are the proposed words that may bar a legislator from voting.

The practice in the British House of Commons, the fountain-head for our legislative procedure, is to bar a member from voting where the member's interest is "direct and personal," but not even then where the interests of a class or state policy are involved, according to Bradshaw and Pring in Parliament & Congress. The pending amendment in Illinois is so broadly drawn that it could bar Illinois legislators from voting on statewide matters, if the subject is in any way connected to the legislator.

Some will point to the Shea case as showing the need for the pending amendment. Others will use it to argue that the legislature can deal with such problems under existing provisions, since the House has now evolved a procedure to deal with such situations in the future./ W.L.D.

September 1976 / Illinois Issues / 27


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