By GARY ADKINS Can the coal industry dig itself out? ONE OF THE most ominous threats of a remarkably arctic winter ended with the spring thaw. The longest nationwide coal strike in history — 110 days — ended March 27, at least officially. In Illinois picketing by mine construction workers, who reached a separate settlement after the miners, kept an estimated 12,000 of the state's 15,000 miners off the job for three extra days after the United Mine Workers' (UMW) strike ended. The duration and intensity of the UMW strike, during which two new contracts were voted down by union membership, was unprecedented. Miners lost more than a third of their yearly salaries, and the public supply of coal dwindled to almost nothing. As the strike drew to a close, some manufacturing firms, including all Chrysler Corporation plants, were reportedly threatened with production shutdowns. And many power plants in Illinois underestimated their stockpiles severely. Yet the largest question raised by the strike was whether the coal industry, racked by serial labor disputes, can modernize operations to meet the states' growing and insatiable energy demands. The long-term animosity and distrust between miners and coal operators continue, despite the new 40-month contact. (The contract was approved by only 57 per cent of those voting in the UMW poll.) Long-term plans Coal plays a vital part in the nation's long-term energy plans. President Jimmy Carter's national energy plan, for example, calls for nearly doubling coal production by 1985, to 1.2 billion tons annually. But the declining productivity in coal mines, from 14 tons a worker day in 1965 to 8.5 tons a worker day in 1976, bodes badly for such plans. The U.S. Bureau of Mines estimates that 254 new mines and 157,000 new miners are needed to reach even a billion tons by 1985. Production has certainly been lessened by tightening of environmental laws against strip-mined (or "surface-mined" coal). And the miners' dissatisfaction with their own union leadership will also hurt the drive to increase productivity. Many miners expressed bitter unhappiness with the last (1974) union contract, and the new agreement almost tore the UMW to shreds. Members complained about reduced health benefits, more stringent pension qualification rules, and the disparity between pension benefits for older pensioners and those who have retired since improvements were negotiated in 1974. To a lot of miners such benefits are more important than the $2.40-an-hour raise they will receive over the next three years. As they know, inflation will eat up that raise. Federal officials have noted that the final contract contained none of the productivity incentives sought by management. And the wage agreement, considered generous by some private analysts, means higher prices for coal and electricity. Indeed, the day Illinois miners came back to work U.S. Steel, the nation's largest steel producer, announced a $10.50 per ton price increase (now reduced to $5.50 as a result of pressure from the Carter administration). "Coal is a primary source for much of the energy required in the melting, forming and finishing of steel mill products," U.S. Steel explained in its press release. "The higher costs now being encountered apply to both the company's own . . . produced and purchased coal and also other forms of energy." Most of the short-term effects of the strike, however, are expected to disappear quickly. Only about half of the nation's electricity is generated from coal, and only about 40 per cent of utility bills reflect fuel costs. Illinois probably has even a lower percentage due to this state's remarkably heavy reliance upon nuclear energy. And the strike's impact on employment will apparently prove slight. Carter administration predictions of three million unemployed never came true, even at the height of the strike. Aside from miners, only about 25,000 people were temporarily laid off because of the labor dispute. Economists say most business and manufacturing concerns hurt by the strike will recover before the end of the year. In Illinois, Gov. James R. Thompson's coal strike task force predicted that the UMW strike would not hurt the state. The panel said unemployment would have to double to force changes in state spending. Unemployment decreased in Illinois during the strike. (The state's 15,000 miners were not counted in these figures.) Long-term effects But long-term effects could be serious in Illinois. If the federal government decides against a massive switch to coal as a prime energy source, Illinois could stand to lose. Since most of the coal in the state is high in sulfur content, federal funding is desired to help industry convert it into clean-burning fuel. The coal strike is also likely to have a detrimental effect on coal conversion. "It has not helped, obviously," said conversion advocate U.S. Rep. Paul Simon (D., Carbondale). "It has been a boon to the nuclear advocates. It has had an adverse impact on coal," Simon said. One measure of just how big an impact the strike might have against coal conversion is the fact that coal is expected to rise in price nearly $4 a ton, to almost $25 as a result of the strike. With more than 60 mines producing 53.9 million tons of high sulfur coal in 1977, Illinois can hardly afford not to sell its coal. But the state may have a hard time competing with low sulfur coal from out West, which is cheaper to burn and carries no expensive environmental cleanup cost. The state's economy may suffer if coal conversion plants 2/May 1978/Illinois Issues aren't built. Gov. Thompson has submitted no comprehensive energy plan for Illinois, as some other governors have done and as President Carter has done. Sources in the Illinois Department of Business and Economic Development (BED) say privately that Illinois is drifting on long-range energy plans. Such indecisiveness may allow energy priorities to be set by special interests or the energy industry itself. Nearly every major Illinois coal company is owned by some major oil or steel company. For example, Amax Coal Company is owned by a metal company, Amax, Inc.; Consolidation Coal Company is owned by Continental Oil; Zeigler Coal Company is owned by Houston Natural Gas Corporation; and Old Ben Coal Company is owned by Sohio Petroleum; Peabody Coal Company is owned by a complex holding company, and Freeman United is owned by General Dynamics Corporation. The closest Gov. Thompson has come to developing an energy plan, is his recent executive order (number 1) that combined the Institute for Environmental Quality (IEQ) and the Division of Energy in BED. The new agency will be called the Institute for Energy and Environmental Resources, and it will "greatly enhance this state's ability to develop an energy program for its citizens that takes into account energy, environment and economic goals," Thompson says. That remains to be seen, but Thompson mentioned a key problem for Illinois' economy when he declared the merger: he talked about Commonwealth Edison's recent decision to stop using Illinois coal. "The utility is trying to meet the demands of environmentalists by burning a coal that meets standards at a reasonable cost. The decision may cost Illinois workers a loss of jobs." That problem should provide the first major test for the new institute. May 1978/ Illinois Issues/15
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