Public works building boom PICK UP a copy of a daily newspaper in Chicago and you can see that there is a building boom in Chicago — not a real estate building boom as homeowners think of it, but a public works building boom. The late Mayor Richard J. Daley was often called a "brick and mortar" mayor because of his skill at channelling governmental revenues into public works projects and attracting private capital into the Loop and surrounding downtown area to develop large, corporate complexes. If anyone thought for a minute that the passing of Mayor Daley would reduce blueprints of the city's future, they were mistaken. In fact, the Crosstown — the new expressway on the drawing boards for years, designed to link the Kennedy Expressway southbound to Interstate 57 — became a reality only after the mayor's death and the succession of Mayor Michael J. Bilandic, who struck a deal with Gov. James R. Thompson for state approval of the project. The Crosstown The Crosstown is only one of a number of public construction projects in the Chicago area which are expensive, require large sums of federal and state aid and are surrounded by controversy. More importantly, the projects involve such a complicated array of state and federal rules and regulations before actual funding can begin that it will be years before Chicagoans will benefit from such programs. Unfortunately, John Q. Taxpayer is not aware of the obstacles stalling approval and construction of such projects. In their original presentations to the media on these projects, state and local leaders oversimplified the process by which federal and state dollars are acquired and designs approved by federal agencies. The process is horrendously complicated. In the case of the Crosstown, news releases and photos of Gov. Thompson and Mayor Bilandic shaking hands over the "Crosstown deal" gave the impression that motorists in Chicago could soon expect the new expressway. But, the federal government decided to require up-to-date environmental impact statements (rather than the five-year-old studies offered by the city of Chicago) which could mean a delay of the project for several years. Finally, there is still disagreement over just what neighborhoods the Crosstown will traverse. Although the Crosstown deal was portrayed as a victory for Chicago, it also gave generous revenues to improve suburban and downstate roads in order to obtain legislative support for the Crosstown. Ironically, this had the effect of stalling an important mass transit project — the rapid transit extension to O'Hare Airport. The plan to extend the "L" to O'Hare was predicated on the transfer of funds from the north half of the Crosstown to the "L" project. Because these funds were committed to downstate and suburban highway projects instead, they were not available for the "L" extension. An attempt to obtain an additional $38 million in federal grants for the project failed. As projects get stalled in the labyrinths of bureaucracy at local, state and federal levels of government, inflation takes its toll and in the end, eats up even more taxpayer dollars. Chicago's attempt to turn State Street into a mall is an example of a project whose costs have skyrocketed because of delays at City Hall. In one month, estimates of the total cost of the project released by the city jumped from $12 million to $17 million. The cost overrun will require an extra $1.2 million bond issue to be financed by an increase in citywide property taxes. About the only advantage to some of these delays is that they allow for careful review of the projects. For example, the Crosstown agreement provided funds for the submerging of the historic Loop "L." Since the delay in funding, some architects have criticized the new subway plan and proposed a less expensive renovation and historic preservation of the Loop "L" and its stations. The plan would preserve the last one of its kind in this country and continue to give a geographic definition of the Loop. The Deep Tunnel The latest and greatest of Chicago's public works feats is the Chicago Metropolitan Sanitary District's (MSD) Deep Tunnel and Reservoir Plan. The "Deep Tunnel" project will build 132 miles of tunnels more than 200 feet below the Chicago area to trap water and sewage flows after rainstorms. With the project already under construction, homeowners have begun to file for relief because of cracked foundations resulting from blasting to construct the deep tunnels. Originally pegged by the MSD as a $2 billion project, some federal agencies now predict costs may escalate to $8 billion. The Deep Tunnel project" is divided into two phases: the first phase is designed to eliminate the pollution of Chicago's waterways and the second phase is aimed at alleviating flooding of basements and streets after rainstorms. Federal officials have recently announced that phase two, which probably rates highest in the minds of most Chicago homeowners, will have to be redesigned before any federal dollars are committed to the project. Proponents of the massive project compare it to the reversal of the Chicago River at the turn of the century, but critics such as the Better Government Association and Chicago Tribune reporters who uncovered the escalation of funding contend that it will not solve problems as intended, that it is not cost-effective and that it simply rewards politically connected contractors with lucrative contracts. Regardless of who is right, the Deep Tunnel project cannot be completed before 1990 and as the studies continue, the prices soar. The taxpayers The city of Chicago and many of its neighboring suburbs are burdened with outmoded physical landscapes and plants. If the Chicago area is to tackle the problems of its urban environment, it must invest in new and improved public works. The questions that taxpayers must ask of their elected officials is whether the proposed projects are cost-effective, especially if financed through local property taxes. To date, public officials have a poor record of proving their cases. About all taxpayers can be assured of is that projects will take twice as long as promised and probably cost twice as much as originally proposed. Some public works proposals have been staged as media events and used as symbols of elected officials' leadership in government. Under such conditions, projects will not always be well-conceived and will therefore require time-consuming corrective measures. Voter confidence in government cannot be expected to improve until results are shown. Unfortunately, results in major public works projects in the Chicago area are a long way off and many tax dollars in the future. 34/June 1978/Illinois Issues
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