By PETER W. COLBY and PAUL MICHAEL GREEN Outlook good for Republican president in 1980 Vote power: suburbs up, cities down FAST-GROWING DuPage County in Illinois and Oakland County in Michigan may soon become as powerful as Orange County in California in their ability to put their states in the Republican column in presidential elections. Gerald Ford's Orange County vote total easily surpassed Jimmy Carter's Los Angeles County plurality, and this fact alone made it nearly impossible for the Georgian to carry the state. The same thing could happen in Illinois and Michigan. Michigan's Oakland and Illinois' DuPage are growing rapidly in population, and these new Republican voters in the suburbs are offsetting the strength of Democratic Chicago and Detroit more and more in each presidential election. Already in Illinois, Republicans in DuPage, combined with the suburban area of Cook County plus four other collar counties around Cook, have reached parity with Democratic strength in the city of Chicago (see "Downstate holds the key to victory" in February, pp. 7-11).
The 1960 and 1976 presidential races are crucial in understanding the changing political and demographic realities of presidential politics. Suburbanization of American life has weakened traditional big city Democratic bailiwicks in state politics. Detroit in Wayne County and Chicago in Cook can no longer produce large enough vote margins to allow Democratic presidential candidates to carry their states. This phenomenon has already occurred in California, and New York is heading in that direction. These four states are "big county" industrial states, and an analysis of voting trends in presidential elections indicates a gloomy future for Democrats. Massachusetts, which goes against this trend, is included in this analysis but remains an anomaly.
The following interstate study will compare presidential results county by county in California, Michigan, New York, Massachusetts and Illinois from 1956 to 1976. Democratic presidential candidates have been successful in northern industrial states when vote margins in the state's largest county or counties out-voted the rest of the state. Traditionally the big county or counties contained a state's largest cities which produced the bulk of Democratic votes. When these heavily Democratic cities turned out, they could pull the entire state into the Democratic column. In the five states under study only Massachusetts and New York still have large counties containing big Democratic cities with the vote margin muscle to carry for Democratic presidential candidates. Table 1 shows how these five states have voted for president since 1956. The five-state total splits evenly between Republicans and Democrats. But, as seen in table 2, Republican presidential candidates from 1956 to 1976 have more than a 2-to-1 margin in total counties carried in the five states. This huge gap appears despite the incredible 1964 landslide election of Democrat Lyndon B. Johnson, who won 288 (over 90%) of the 319 total counties in the five states. Eliminating 1964, the Democratic winning county percentage is reduced to 17.61 percent since the 1956 presidential election. California LBJ's landslide 1964 victory stands as the sole Democratic triumph in California in presidential races since 1956. He carried 53 of 58 counties and won by over 1,290,000 votes or a 59 per cent plurality. Democratic candidates in the five other presidential contests have carried only 31.72 per cent of California's counties. California has been the most Republican of the five states in recent presidential elections even though it has the second highest percentage of Democratic county victories. (see table 3). The key question to be asked about California (as will be asked about the other states) is not only how many counties were won but which ones. For example, three counties — Plumas,
PETER W. COLBY PAUL MICHAEL GREEN 16/November 1978/Illinois Issues Shasta and Yolo — with a combined population of 186,035 have supported every Democratic presidential candidate since 1956, while five counties (Alpine, Mono, Orange, San Diego and Sutler), with a combined population of 2,824,675, have supported every Republican presidential candidate. This population disparity is reflected in the vote margins. Whereas the three Democratic counties have a combined edge of 53,027 for their candidates, the five Republican counties have an edge of 1,295,902 votes for GOP standard bearers. These figures translate into a simple fact: the steady Republican counties are vastly bigger and produce larger vote margins than their Democratic counterparts. Looking at the whole state, the Democrats have 21 out of 58 counties with better than a 50 per cent voting average for their party's presidential candidates. Most of them are clustered in the mid-north central part of the state and in California's sparsely populated far northern region. The combined population of these 21 Democratic counties is 4,427,576, which is less than two-thirds of the population of Los Angeles County. The large Los Angeles County suburbs which are around the city of L.A. prevent this county from being a strong Democratic bastion.
The 1970 census shows that the six largest California counties (see table 4) comprise 63.4 per cent of the state's population. If a Democratic candidate is going to be successful in California, he must do well in the "big six." An analysis of the presidential vote since 1956 in these counties shows the Democratic problem in the nation's largest state. Averaging the Democratic presidential candidate's vote for every county since 1956 shows that Orange County, the state's 2nd largest, is the worst Democratic county in California. This burgeoning county south of Los Angeles has given Democratic presidential candidates only 35 per cent of its vote. San Diego County, south of Orange and the state's 3rd largest county, is the 6th best GOP county supporting the Democratic candidates with only a 40.48 per cent average.
On the other hand, two of the other big six — San Francisco (6th) and Alameda (4th) in the northern part of the state — are the 2nd and 5th best Democratic counties. San Francisco has given Democratic candidates over 58 per cent of its vote while next door Alameda (Oakland) County's Democratic percentage is 56.41 per cent. Below Alameda County is Santa Clara County, the 5th largest. Santa Clara has supported Democratic presidential candidates just under 50 per cent of the time and is the 24th best Democratic county in California. Los Angeles County is the state's monster county. Its overall Democratic percentage is only 48.78 per cent, and it was carried by only half of the Democratic candidates in the last six presidential elections (Kennedy, Johnson and Carter). Johnson did not need his heavy L.A. County plurality (57.5%) in his landslide win, but JFK needed more than 50.4 per cent, and Carter's 51 per cent was not enough to offset Ford's strength elsewhere in the state. Both Kennedy and Carter lost California. Carter's 1976 defeat in California illustrates well how suburbanization and collar county growth is working against the Democrats. Carter carried 27 counties — the second best Democratic performance since 1956. He lost the vote in the other 52 counties to Ford by only 20,603. It was in the big six that Carter lost California. Carter carried Los Angeles, Alameda and San Francisco counties with a combined vote margin of 157,842. Ford carried Orange, San Diego and Santa Clara counties with a combined vote margin of 277,199. In other words, Ford outpolled Carter in the big six by 119,357 votes, which made up the bulk of his total state plurality of 139,960. The future looks ominous for Democrats in California. Orange and San Diego counties. Republican bailiwicks, are growing at a rapid clip and should continue to produce heavy GOP vote margins. Democratic strength will remain solid in liberal San Francisco County, in heavily minority Alameda County and in the black and chicano districts of Los Angeles County. But these areas, plus the smaller north central Democratic counties, cannot produce enough votes to defeat typical Republican candidates. Democrats must cut into suburban L.A. and the large southern California counties in order to carry the state.
A key to the future of California and perhaps national politics will be the outcome of Gov. Jerry Brown's reelection bid this November. A Brown victory can come about only if he slices into traditional Republican county territory. If he does, he could become a formidable challenger to Carter in the 1980 Democratic primaries. Massachusetts Massachusetts is the most Democratic state in the union when it comes to recent presidential politics. In 1972 it was the only state to vote for McGovern, and in 1976 it gave Jimmy Carter over 58 per cent of the major party vote. November 1978/Illinois Issues/17 Unlike the four other states in this study, an overwhelming majority of Massachusetts counties (65.47%) have supported Democratic presidential candidates. This general Democratic dominance can best be illustrated by examining the suburban growth around Boston. Suffolk County, which basically is Boston, has had its population drop from 896,615 in 1950 to735,190 in 1970. However, unlike the other four states no Republican collar is surrounding the big city county in Massachusetts. In fact, Norfolk County, south of Suffolk, has had a 65 per cent increase in population since 1950 and has turned from a Republican to a Democratic county. Like the rest of the state, Norfolk in the last six elections has supported every Democrat except Stevenson in 1956. Why is Massachusetts so different from the other four states? First, Massachusetts is the most urbanized state in the study. Its big six counties account for almost 80 per cent of the state's population. In Massachusetts Democrats do well in these populated counties, while what little Republican strength there is in the state is found in the Cape Cod and island counties and in Franklin County in the northwestern part of the state. Four of the top five Democratic counties are among the biggest in the state. Suffolk County's average Democratic vote for president since 1956 is over 70 percent. Middlesex County, the state's biggest, has almost a 60 per cent Democratic average for the same elections. Moreover, nine of the state's 14 counties, with a combined population of 5,190,099 have supported Democratic presidential candidates since 1956 with averages ranging from 70.1 per cent for Suffolk to 54.26 per cent for Norfolk. On the other hand, the state's remaining five counties with a combined population of 499,071 have supported Republican presidential candidates since 1956 with averages ranging from 61.19 per cent for Barnstable to 50.19 per cent for Plymouth.
Obviously there are other factors that have made Massachusetts a Democratic fortress. One can point to the state's large number of influential universities, a heavy concentration of Catholics, a lackluster Republican organization and the identification of so many with the Kennedy name. According to J. Joseph Huthmacher, noted historian of Massachusetts politics. Democrat Al Smith's 1928 win over Republican Herbert Hoover by 17,192 votes brought a "revolution" to the state's politics because it joined the old Irish Democratic power structure with the newer immigrants (Jews, Poles, French- Canadians, to a lesser degree Italians, and finally Negroes). Huthmacher states, "The union of those two elements constituted the backbone of the new Democratic coalition which, with the aid of its labor, liberal and disaffected old-stock Republican components, was on the verge of reshaping the Commonwealth's politics." [Massachusetts People and Politics (New York: Atheneum, 1969) p. 189.] Michigan Michigan is a political battleground (see table 5). Since 1956 it has divided its support evenly for Democratic and Republican presidential candidates. However, suburbanization and recent voting trends suggest that Michigan, like California, will become more Republican in future presidential contests. Wayne County (Detroit) is the big county in Michigan. The 1970 census showed that it contained 30 per cent of the state's population. Wayne County has traditionally been the backbone of the state's Democratic vote. In 1960 Kennedy carried only 13 of the state's 83 counties, but his vote margin in Wayne County was 378,842 (66.2%). This county landslide gave JFK enough votes to overcome Nixon's margin in the rest of Michigan.
Wayne County's population grew from 2,435,235 in 1950 to 2,666,751 in 1970, an increase of less than 10 per cent. At the same time Detroit, which makes up the bulk of Wayne County, has had its population drop from 1,850,000 in 1950 to 1,511,000 in 1970, a decrease of a little less than 20 per cent. In other words, Detroit in 1950 made up 75.96 per cent of Wayne County, but by 1970 the city's percentage of the county total was 56.66 per cent. Moreover, inside Detroit, rapid racial changes occurred during this period. From 1950 to 1970 the black percentage of Detroit's population rose from 16.2 to 43.7 per cent. There is little doubt that this trend will continue. The 1980 census will undoubtedly show that Detroit has less of the county's total population; inside the city, black percentage of population will have grown.
Like big city counties in California, Illinois and New York, Michigan's Wayne County is feeling the power of surrounding collar counties. Oakland County, Michigan's 2nd biggest, borders on Wayne County to the northwest. It had 396,001 residents in 1950. By 1970 its population had risen to 907,871, a 130 per cent increase. Oakland County's population in 1980 should be well over one million. Oakland is a wealthy county. Its residents are predominantly white and many are college educated. A 1974 study showed Oakland County had the nation's
18/November 1978/Illinois Issues highest average household income. Obviously, many economically mobile whites fleeing Detroit have ended up in Oakland County. These population shifts have dramatically altered vote margins between the state's two biggest counties and thus have changed the complexion of presidential politics in Michigan. In 1960 Kennedy had a plus of 352,347 votes coming out of Wayne and Oakland counties; in 1976 Carter had a plus of only 120,174. Clearly Ford, a native son, was a stronger candidate in Michigan than Nixon was in 1960. Ford received 273,314 more votes than Nixon while Carter received only 9,445 more votes than Kennedy. Nevertheless, the 231,516 drop-off in vote margins shows how the combination of a fast growing Oakland County and a reduced Detroit population has cut into the Democratic strength of Wayne County. Sixteen of Michigan's 83 counties have voting averages over 50 per cent for Democratic presidential candidates (since 1956. Unfortunately for Michigan Democrats, 10 of these counties are in the state's sparsely populated Upper Peninsula. These 10 counties, making up two-thirds of the UP counties, have a population of only 213,045. Besides Wayne County, Lower Peninsula Democratic counties include Macomb, Monroe, Genesee, Lake and Bay. The population of these six counties brings the 16-county total to 4,190,925 or a sizable 47.22 per cent of the total state population. Thus, despite the fact since 1956 (except for the 1964 election) no Democratic presidential candidate has carried more than 18 counties, the Democrats have remained competitive in Michigan presidential politics.
The big county vote (see table 6) has been good to the Democrats in Michigan. Wayne County residents have given the last six Democratic presidential candidates an average of 63.15 per cent of their vote. Macomb and Genesee (Flint), the 3rd and 4th biggest Michigan counties, have also been Democratic areas. Macomb County is next to Oakland, just north of Wayne, and is the fastest growing county in the Detroit area. Macomb did not support either McGovern or Carter. The fact that Macomb was one of the three Michigan counties to support Stevenson 1956 and every Democrat until McGovern may show growing suburban Republican voting power. The GOP strength among Michigan's big six is in Oakland County, Kent (Grand Rapids) and Ingham (Lansing) counties. Although these three have been politically no match for the Democrats, Michigan Republicans have made up the difference in their strength in other counties. Sixty-seven of Michigan's 83 counties have voting averages over 50 per cent for Republican presidential candidates since 1956. More importantly, 36 of these counties or 43 per cent have given GOP candidates over 60 percent of their vote. The strong GOP dominance in these counties points up the reliance of the Democrats on Wayne County and the big six. The Carter-Ford race is a perfect example of the big six theory. Ford nearly broke even in Michigan's six largest counties. He received a huge vote from his home, Kent County, which — combined with a solid effort in Oakland and Carter's drop-off in Wayne — meant that Ford lost the big six by only 31,170 votes. The rest of Michigan went Republican as usual (even though Carter carried two more counties than Kennedy did in 1960) thus giving Ford a comfortable 200,000-vote plurality. In the past, Democratic presidential candidates in Michigan have relied on a large Detroit turnout, the strong backing of organized labor in this heavily unionized state, and whatever they could pick up in their small Upper Peninsula counties. This strategy, which has given the Democrats an even split in presidential contests since 1956, will no longer work. Detroit is losing its potential to produce winning statewide vote margins. Wayne County is becoming suburbanized, and this is reducing the giant county's Democratic margins. White union members are leaving the cities, especially Detroit, and are moving to collar counties and becoming more independent. Union leadership in Michigan as in other states can no longer guarantee delivery of its membership.
Democratic presidential candidates in Michigan must break into the white suburbs and collar counties surrounding Detroit. Like Chicago, Detroit's population is percentage-wise blacker and poorer than the rest of the state and is becoming more so each day. Successful Democratic candidates in Michigan will not allow themselves to be isolated with the big city image, but will diversify their appeal to attract the more economically and socially mobile suburban working people. New York New York presidential elections are classic examples of "big county vs. the rest of the state" politics. Since 1956 Democrats have won two-thirds of the races because the big counties making up most of New York City have given their candidates large enough vote margins to counter Republican votes in the rest of the state. GOP strength in western and upstate New York is undeniable. Leaving out the 1964 Johnson landslide. Democratic presidential candidates have won only 32 of 310.(10.32%) New York counties in the other five elections. Yet in three of these five races the Democratic candidates received enough big county votes to carry the state (see table 7). Kings (Brooklyn), New York (Manhattan) and Bronx counties are the 1st, 3rd and 4th biggest counties in New York state (see table 8). Their combined November 1978/Illinois Issues/19 population is 30.77 per cent of the state's total. In the last six presidential elections the average Democratic vote in these three counties was an astounding 65.56 per cent. All three have supported every Democratic presidential candidate since 1956 with Nixon's 49.1 per cent in Kings in 1972 being the best Republican showing. Three other counties have given Democratic presidential candidates an average of over 50 per cent of their votes. Albany, Queens and Erie (Buffalo) counties are the other Democratic strongholds in New York state. Again, these are big population counties — Albany (12th), Queens (2nd) and Erie (7th) — and when their residents are added to the top three Democratic counties, their aggregate population is 8,971,426 or 49.31 percent of the state's total. The Republican response to these big Democratic counties is limited to county landslides in the rest of the state. Nearly one-half (30) of New York's counties have given Republican presidential candidates an average of over 60 per cent. The total population of these 30 counties, however, is only 3,200,810 or 17.60 per cent of the state's total. Nassau and Suffolk counties on Long Island are the only big six Republican counties in New York state. Like suburban counties in other big county states, they have undergone tremendous population growth. From 1950 to 1970 Nassau's population grew from 672,000 to over 1,420,000, while Suffolk's increased from 276,000 to over 1,116,672. Yet these two massive suburban counties did not produce overwhelming Republican margins, and their combined GOP vote margins were less than half of the Democrats big county pluralities.
What has prevented Nassau, Suffolk and other booming counties around New York City from turning the state's politics more Republican? Part of the answer is the heavily ethnic migration to the Big Apple's suburbs. Many new suburbanites are Catholics and Jews who have stayed Democratic or joined the growing independent ranks. Other factors may be the state's liberal tradition, strong organized labor activity, a divided Republican party and the types of individuals running for high office. But New York has two additional and unique factors retarding Republican power within the state. First, many former New York City residents are moving to New Jersey or Connecticut. These individuals are mainly white, lower-middle to middle-class who are fleeing racially changing neighborhoods searching for security, educational opportunities for their children, and general upward mobility. Unable to afford Nassau, Suffolk or Westchester counties in New York, they move instead to places like Bergen County, N.J. Potential Republican converts or existing Republican voters are lost to a different state's GOP organization. This migration pattern may partially explain Carter's triumph in New York and Ford's win in New Jersey in the 1976 election. The other somewhat unique factor is the growth of Queens. This New York City county has acted as an urban safety valve — keeping potential Gotham escapees in the city. From 1950 to 1970 Queens population rose 21 per cent, from 1,550,849 to 1,973,708. The growth of Queens has cut the total population loss of New York City (not counting Richmond) to 128,085 since 1950. Though not as Democratic as New York, Bronx or Kings counties, Queens has supported every Democratic presidential candidate since 1956 except Stevenson and McGovern. It has kept many white middle-class residents involved with the problems of New York City and thus, has undoubtedly preserved Democratic voting strength within the state.
Carter beat Ford in New York because four of the state's big six counties gave him a 725,845-vote margin. Ford's victories in the remaining big six counties, Nassau and Suffolk, cut this margin to 658,893 votes. The other 56 counties gave Ford a 370,126-vote margin which was not nearly enough to offset Carter's big six plurality. Thus, the Georgian carried the state by 288,767 votes (52.2%). New York's 40 electoral votes insured Carter's victory. Kings, New York and Bronx counties all gave Carter more than two-thirds of their vote. In Queens, Carter's 60.6 per cent was almost six points higher than JFK's in 1960. Across the state Carter carried only three other counties: Albany, Erie and Sullivan. Carter's seven-county victory total was one less than Hubert Humphrey's in 1968 and four less than Kennedy's in 1960. The narrowing of the Democratic vote margins to fewer and fewer counties will make the party more and morel prisoner of New York City in presidential elections. Democratic presidential candidate in New York must break out of their NYC stronghold. In 1976 even though Carter carried only seven counties, his percentages were higher than JFK's in 45 of New York's 62 counties. Carter was also able to outpoll JFK percentage-wise in Bronx, Kings and New York counties. With all of this going for him the obvious question is: why did Carter's final vote margin fall almost 100,000 under Kennedy's 1960 totals? The answer is declining voter tun out and recent population shifts in the top three Democratic counties. Kennedy received 455,696 more votes than Carter in Bronx, Kings and New York counties. Even with Carter's increase percentage in each county, Kennedy's combined vote margin from these three counties was 133,807 higher than Carter's total. In 1976 overall, 6,534,170 New Yorkers voted compared 7,291,079 in 1960 — a 756,979 decrease, Nevertheless, the vote drop-off in the top three Democratic counties alone 20/November 1978/Illinois Issues was 775,283. Thus it was fortunate for Carter that he held his "little 56" county losses to only 370,126 votes. Poor people are less likely to vote than their wealthier counterparts. Population percentages between counties will become far less important if places like the Bronx become more black, brown and broke. Burnt-out neighborhoods are not fertile grounds to produce vote margins. The 1980 census will reveal how sharp a population loss has occurred in NYC. Before worrying about turnout, politicians must have voters to bring to the polls. Democratic hopes may ride on the raw numbers of people remaining in NYC. Republican fortunes in New York are necessarily on the upswing. Democratic woes about voter turnout and population losses from their good areas may be offset by dwindling GOP margins in suburbia. In 1960 Suffolk County gave Nixon a 52,611-vote margin over Kennedy. In 1976, despite a 62 per cent increase in voter turnout, it gave Ford only a 40,645-margin over Carter. New York Republicans can hardly compare Suffolk County to Orange County, Calif., or Oakland County, Mich. Finally, the liberal conservative split inside the New York GOP hierarchy may keep the country's second largest state in the Democratic column. Illinois Demographic shifts within the state have produced a balance of power between Democratic Chicago and the Republican Cook County suburbs and the five collar counties around Cook see table 9. To win Illinois, candidates must pull the winning margin from the other 96 counties. The 1970 census shows Cook County is almost 50 per cent of the state's population (see table 10). This figure is slightly less than the county's 1960 state percentage. The significant change, however, is that Chicago's portion of the Cook County population in 1970 dropped to 3,369,000 — more than a 5 per cent decrease. The 1980 census may show Chicago hovering around the million mark. While the big city was losing population, its suburbs in the county were gaining people at a rapid rate. Although Cook County still dominates the state in population, the Democrats no longer can dominate Cook County in presidential elections. Four of Illinois' big six counties — Cook and three of its collar counties, DuPage, Lake and Kane — are in the northeastern part of the state. DuPage, Lake and Kane are powerful GOP counties, and since 1956 DuPage has been the second best GOP county in the state percentage-wise (Kendall County is No. 1). The two other big six counties, St. Clair and Madison, are Democratic strongholds. Located in the southwestern part of the state near St. Louis, Mo., they are not growing at a rapid rate. Twelve of Illinois' 102 counties have given Democratic presidential candidates an average of over 50 per cent of their vote in the last six presidential contests. Of these only Cook (52.37%) and Rock Island (51.66%) counties are in the northern part of the state. The best Democratic counties by percentage are downstate; St. Clair County (58.15%) in southwestern Illinois is the top Democratic county. Leaving out Cook, the population of the other 11 Democratic counties is 1,037,200 or 9.3 per cent of the state's total. On the other hand, 36 Illinois counties with a population of 2,147,598, or 19.3 per cent of the state's total, have voted for Democratic presidential candidates less than 40 per cent since 1956. It was in these counties that Nixon in 1968 and Ford in 1976 found enough votes to overcome their opponents' Cook County margins and put Illinois in the Republican column.
Three Illinois counties have given Democratic presidential candidates less than a 30 per cent average vote since 1956. They are DuPage County, Ogle and Kendall counties, located in the heavily GOP area west of Cook and the collar counties. LBJ's 40.1 per cent DuPage County vote in 1964 is the best Democratic showing in any of the three since 1956. In 1976 these three counties alone slashed Carter's Cook County margin almost 60 per cent by giving Ford a 122,337-vote margin. Like their counterparts in New York City, Detroit and Los Angeles, Democratic voters in Chicago are surrounded by growing Republican suburban counties. This encirclement has cut down big city Democratic vote margins, and in the case of California and Illinois has made it difficult for Democratic presidential candidates to carry the state. The collar counties ringing Chicago — DuPage, Lake, Kane, Will and McHenry — are undergoing tremendous population growth. They grew from 1,091,188 in 1960 to 1,486,578 by 1970. The 1980 census figures will show almost two million people. Unless Democrats can change traditional voting patterns in these counties, they will find it almost impossible for their presidential candidates to carry Illinois. In 1964 LBJ carried Lake and Will counties, and those two victories represent the total Democratic presidential triumphs in the collar counties since 1956. In 1976 the five collar counties gave Ford a 193,623-vote margin over Carter. This figure was 307 votes more than Carter's Cook County total. In other words. Ford and Carter had to win in the other 96 counties to carry the state. Kennedy and Johnson have been the only Democratic presidential candidates to carry Illinois since 1956. Johnson's landslide in Illinois was similar to his crushing victories in other states, but Kennedy's 1960 victory is a very perfect example of how presidential politics has changed in the last two decades in Illinois. Kennedy won Illinois because Chicago Mayor Richard J. Daley's Democratic organization gave him a 456,312 (63.6%) vote margin in Chicago. The strong GOP Cook County suburbs reduced this total by 137,576, thereby giving Kennedy a 318,736 (56.5%) plurality coming out the state's biggest county. In 1976 Carter did better than Kennedy in Chicago by percentage; Carter received 67.7 per cent of the city vote, but Carter's 425,426-vote margin was 30,886 less than Kennedy's. Moreover, the Cook County suburbs cut Carter's total plurality by 232,110, thus giving him only a 193,316 (54.5%) margin in Cook. Carter ran ahead of Kennedy in the rest of the state, but his reduced Cook County plurality was too big an November 1978/Illinois Issues/21 obstacle to overcome. Kennedy left the Cook and collar county areas 202,360 votes ahead, but Carter was 307 votes behind. Kennedy lost the other 96 counties by 193,502 votes but won the state by a slim 8,858 votes. Carter lost the other 96 counties by only 92,667 votes, outdoing JFK by over 100,000 votes. But because of reduced Democratic vote margins in Cook and increased GOP vote margins in the collar counties. Carter lost Illinois by 92,974 votes. Democrats in Illinois have to move their campaigns out of the protective enclave of Chicago. Democratic presidential candidates have to campaign in the suburbs and — especially — downstate. Not only is this where they will find the people, but they may in fact come across many voters who have been taken for granted by unchallenged Republican organizations. It is a Democratic presidential candidate's challenge to appease Chicago while at the same time appealing to anti-big city voters in the rest of the state. Carter came fairly close to solving this dilemma in 1976, but Sen. Edward Kennedy (Mass.) is probably the only Democrat who could pull it off and carry Illinois in 1980. Since 1872 Illinois has supported the eventual presidential winner more times than the other four states (24 out of 27 or 89 per cent). Ford's Illinois victory in 1976 broke the state's string of backing the victor 14 straight times going back to Harding's 1920 election. Michigan's record (19 out of 27) in backing the winning candidate is not as good, but its 70 per cent average shows the remarkable consistency of these industrial states in supporting the successful candidate (or, perhaps, it shows that winning these states is the key to being successful). Are Illinois, Michigan and perhaps other northern industrial states becoming Republican territory in their presidential politics? Obviously many factors must be considered before any definitive answer can be given. Based on past county election results and current demographic shifts, however, there is no doubt that Democrats must do better in growing GOP enclaves. If these areas remain overwhelmingly Republican, GOP presidential candidates will receive vote margins large enough to muscle the state away from the Democrats — no matter how well the Democrat does in the state's largest city. 22/November 1978/Illinois Issues
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