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Small claims fees

Some circuit courts in the First Judicial Circuit have been imposing mailing fees in small claims cases under both the Civil Practice Act, Supreme Court Rule 284 (. Rev. Stat. 1977, Ch. 110, sec. 1 et seq), and the "Act to revise the law in relation to clerks of courts (. Rev. Stat. 1977, Ch. 25, sec. 27 (o) (2)). This practice amounted to double charging a small claims plaintiff for the cost of postage. The attorney general found this practice in conflict with the purpose of the small claims procedure to keep costs low and concluded that circuit court clerks should impose only the fees called for in Supreme Court Rule 284 which specifically provides for service of process in small claims cases and fixes the clerk's fees for this (S-1394).

Open meetings, NP-1387: The Katherine Shaw Bethea Hospital in Dixon is not required to keep its board meetings open to the public. Even though the city appropriates $500 annually for the hospital and appoints its board of directors, the hospital is not a subsidiary body of the city, and thus, does not fall under the provisions of the Open Meetings Act.

Annexation and sales tax revenues, S-l 389: The city of Belleville does not have the authority to enter into an agreement with St. Clair County which stipulates the two would share sales tax revenues from annexed municipalities. The attorney general concluded that home rule powers granted in the Illinois Constitution (Article VII, section 6 (a)) are limited to local affairs and are not to involve other municipalities, the county or the state (City of Highland Park v. County of Cook (1915), 37 111. App. 3d 15, 25).

Interim financing, S-1392: Home rule municipalities and counties may incur debt for interim financing purposes. The interim financing power is not, however, legally available to townships, fire protection districts or library districts. The law is not clear on the ability of non-home rule municipalities and counties to incur short-term debt without a referendum, the issuance of bonds, or the levying of taxes.

Fingerprinting, S-l395: Persons given notice to appear in court are not subject to the criminal process of fingerprinting (Rev. Stat. 1977, Ch. 38, sec. 206-5). Only those persons arrested, i.e., "taken into custody" (Rev. Stat. 1977, Ch. 38, sec. 107-5) for felony offenses or Class A or B misdemeanors are to be fingerprinted. If a person fails to appear in court, a warrant may then be issued for his arrest.

County board authority, S-1396: County boards may not set compensation for employees of the county health department. That authority belongs to the board of health(Rev. Stat. 1977, Ch. lll'/2, sec. 20cl3). Deputies under the jurisdiction of the sheriffs merit commission must have their compensation approved by the county board. Thus while the county board may not directly formulate the deputies' pay plan, it may influence the plan by withholding or granting its approval.

U.S. Supreme Court Property rights, privacy rights

The U.S. Supreme Court ruled December 5 that a criminal defendant does not have a legal right to challenge a search of an automobile which produces evidence against him unless he has a "possessory interest" in the vehicle. The 5-4 decision split the court into its liberal and conservative camps and holds that property rights are the key factor in determining personal privacy rights.

The high court's opinion upheld the decisions of the Circuit Court of Kankakee and the 3rd District Illinois Appellate Court. The circuit court would not allow suppression of evidence seized in a warrantless search which the defense called a violation of 4th and 14th Amendment rights. The Appellate Court affirmed the lower court's denial saying that "without a proprietary or other similar interest in an automobile, a mere passenger therein lacks standing to challenge the legality of the search of the vehicle."(46 111. App. 3d569,360 NE2d 1252 (1977)). The Illinois Supreme Court refused to review the case.

Justice William Rehnquist, writing for the majority, said the defendants did not show a violation of a legitimate expectation of privacy. Rehnquist cited Alderman v. U.S. ((1969), 394 U.S. 165,89 S. Ct. 961,22L Ed. 2d 176) in stating the defendants did not establish their right to privacy, "They wrongly seek to establish prejudice only through the use of evidence gathered as a consequence of a search and seizure directed at someone else and fail to prove an invasion of their own privacy."

Rehnquist also used the Alderman case to illustrate what he termed "practical matters" of such cases. In Alderman, Justice John Harlan said a broadening of the 4th Amendment's exclusionary rule would create administrative difficulties — as in a situation where the police would set up electronic surveillance on one individual but with an expectation that they could gain leads to a number of crimes involving other individuals. Harlan said any marginal increase in the protection of the 4th Amendment would not be worth added administrative burdens.

Justice Byron White, in the dissenting opinion wrote, "The court today holds that the Fourth Amendment protects property, not people . . . ." White said that if "protected zones of privacy can only be purchased or obtained by possession of property, then much of our daily lives will be unshielded from unreasonable governmental prying . . . ." And he added a prediction that the decision will make it easier for police "to engage in patently unreasonable searches every time an automobile contains more than one occupant. Should something be found, only the owner of the vehicle, or of the item, will have standing to seek suppression, and the evidence will presumably be usable against the other occupants."

The case, Rakas v. The People of the State of Illinois, involved Frank Rakas and Lonnie King who were convicted of robbing a clothing store in Bourbonnais, Illinois. They challenged a warrantless search of a suspected getaway car which resulted in the seizure of a sawed-off shotgun and a box of rifle shells. Justice Rehnquist was joined in the majority opinion by Justices Burger, Stewart, Powell and Blackmun. Justice White was joined in the dissenting opinion by Justices Brennan, Marshall and Stevens.

Circuit Court FEPC backlog

A Cook County Circuit judge ruled October 31 that the Illinois Fair Employment Practices Commission (FEPC) cannot delay investigation or action on complaints of employment discrimination. After hearing the case, Rafael Vergil v. Fair Employment Practices Commission, Judge Richard L. Curry ordered the agency to begin immediately to process more than 3,000 backlogged charges of employment discrimination in accordance with the Illinois Fair Employment Act (III. Rev. Stat. 1977, Ch. 48, sec. 851 et seq).

In addition, the judge called two bills passed by the General Assembly in June 1978 "a bail-out tactic." H.B. 3202 allows persons with complaints to bring circuit court action if their claims are not resolved within the act's statutory limit. A companion bill, H.B. 2875, extends from 180 to 300 the number of days the FEPC has to investigate and act on a complaint. The judge said, "It's no answer to the elaborate statutory scheme for handling these important and extensive complaints, that the volume is just too great. The individual rights to the benefit of the agent can't be lost because the Agency has been unable to meet its mission as prescribed by the General Assembly."

February 1979/Illinois Issues/29


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