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Illinois Supreme Court

Game bird fights

THE Illinois Supreme Court ruled unanimously March 14 that subsections of a state law (III. Rev. Slat. 1975, ch. 110, sec. 4.01) barring sports fighting between animals are constitutional. The decision in Illinois Gamefowl Breeders Association v. John Block, reversed a Bureau County Circuit Court which had ruled that subsections (a) and (c) of the statute are unconstitutional.

The subsections outlaw people from knowingly breeding, training, owning, selling or shipping fighting animals, and the lower court found them unconstitutional because they violate the due process clause guarantees of the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Article I, section 2 of the Illinois Constitution. Subsection (b) of the act, which bans animal fights, was not challenged.

The opinion delivered by Justice Robert C. Underwood, however, found "the legislature intended to strengthen the ban on animal fighting by making it illegal to knowingly engage in the supporting activities which make animal fighting possible, and the prohibitions contained in subsections (a) and (c) were intended to insure that those who wish to stage such exhibitions will not be able to procure the needed animals from local breeders." The court held the due process clauses of the federal and state constitutions protect only against "arbitrary or unreasonable use" of police power, which was not presented by the subsections.

Home rule taxes

A home rule unit of government may increase taxes above statutory limitations, if the limits were enacted prior to adoption of the 1970 Illinois Constitution, the Illinois Supreme Court ruled March 20. The court held in a unanimous decision that since there was no constitutional provision for home rule units to exist prior to the 1970 Constitution, a 1965 tax limit law could not restrict the powers of home rule units. The decision upheld prior court precedent, in declaring"it is manifestly impossible to find a legislative intention to limit the city's home rule powers of taxation in a statute that pre-dates the 1970 Constitution because . . . the concept of home rule was 'totally foreign' to pre-1970 legislative contemplation."

At question was a 1976 Rockford city ordinance, setting a 16.4 cents per $100 tax levy for library purposes — a levy which exceeded the 1965 Illinois Local Library Act (///. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 81, sec. 3-1) tax limit of 15 cents per $100. In the case of Rockford v. Gill, Winnebago County Clerk Paul P. Gill sued the city of Rockford to prevent the higher tax levy. The suit alleged that, besides violating the 1965 law, the increased tax was void "because the city had failed to allow 10 days to elapse between the publication of the appropriation ordinance and the passage of the tax-levy ordinance, as required by section 1-2-4 for the Illinois Municipal Code (III. Rev. Slat. 1975, ch. 24, sec. 1-2-4)." The justices found, however, that Gill "has no standing to raise this issue" as a county clerk since "the ordinance was designed for the protection of taxpayers."

The ruling would affect only home rule units of government, not special purpose districts. At issue was a Rockford city ordinance, raising the tax levy for the library board.

Massage parlor closed

The Illinois Supreme Court upheld March 14 a Cook County Circuit Court ruling which closed a Chicago massage parlor because prostitution at the parlor was a public nuisance. In Chicago v. Cecola, the circuit court had ruled for a permanent injunction against the Harem Leisure Spa on the grounds that numerous arrests at the spa had failed to halt prostitution there. Prostitution is a violation of Chicago city ordinance (sec. 192-19) and state law (///. Rn Stat. 1975, ch. 100l/2, sec. 1). The owner of the health spa appealed the closing, claiming that his due process rights had been violated. The Illinois Third Appellate Court agreed and reversed the order closing the spa. Illinois Supreme Court Justice Joseph H. Goldenhersh

30 / May 1979 / Illinois Issues

wrote the decision reversing the appellate court, saying, "It is reasonable to conclude that the imposition of even the maximum fine of $200 a day may not be enough to dissuade defendants from this enterprise [prostitution], and the circuit court did not err in permanently enjoining defendants' activities."

Annulment over fraud

A Roman Catholic man, who married a woman who falsely swore that her former husband was dead, is entitled to an annulment, the Illinois Supreme Court held March 14.

Although James Wolfe and Judith Wolfe lived together for eight years and had one child, the court ruled that Mrs. Wolfe had fraudulently gained Mr. Wolfe's consent to marriage by falsely certifying her ex-husband's death. The court held "that the fraud goes to the essentials of the marital relationship, defendant's knowledge of which has rendered it impossible for him to continue to perform the duties and obligations of his marriage." The couple was married in March 1965 and separated in November 1973. The opinion written by Justice Thomas J. Moran upheld a circuit court ruling in this case of Wolfe v. Wolfe.

Savings and loan relocation notice

The Illinois Supreme Court ruled March 20 that a savings and loan association which relocated its business office from Downers Grove to Waukegan improperly published notice of the planned move in a Chicago newspaper, instead of in newspapers locally. The court cited requirements of the Ilinois Savings and Loan Act (///. Rev. Slat. 1975, ch.32, sec. 701), which says relocation must be "published at least once both in the community of the proposed new location and in the community of the present location." The justices rejected arguments that there was insufficient evidence concerning where the Chicago newspaper was first printed and issued. Justice Robert C. Underwood wrote the opinion in the case of North Shore Savings and Loan Association v. Griffin, and Justice Thomas J. Moran took no part in the consideration or decision.

Conflict of interest

The Illinois Supreme Court on March 20 overturned an appellate court judgment which ordered a new trial for a man found guilty of theft. The new trial for William Franklin had been ordered because his court-appointed counsel had successfully prosecuted him on different charges four and a half years earlier. Franklin's attorney, Peoria County Assistant Public Defender Donald Courson, testified he had no recollection of Franklin's earlier case and had been falsely informed by Franklin that it had been a different man whom he prosecuted in 1972. When Courson learned the truth, he asked for a new trial for Franklin, alleging a conflict of interest on Courson's part. The court ruled, however, that a conflict did not exist, since Courson did not remember Franklin's earlier case. Illinois v. Franklin.

31 / May 1979 / Illinois Issues