By LUIS M. SALCES AND PETER W. COLBY

Mañana will be better: Spanish-American politics in Chicago

Geographic dispersion, nationality fragmentation, lack of education and economic resources are four of the reasons why Chicago's Spanish Americans lack political power. Another is that they don't vote (because they are not citizens, are not registered or like many young voters, just don't go). Many more could be registered, but the Democratic organization prefers to register certified loyalists.

THE SPANISH-American population of Chicago is estimated to be 450,000 to 870,000, or 15 to 28 percent of the city's residents. Yet, there are no Spanish-American ward committeemen, aldermen or state legislators and few city employees. A 1974 Chicago Reporter study revealed that only 1.7 percent of full-time city employees and only 1.2 percent of city officials were Hispanics. In fact, the only elected Spanish-American officials from Chicago are Cook County Commissioner Irene Hernandez, University of Illinois Trustee Arturo Velazquez Jr. and Circuit Court Judges David Cerda and Jose Vazquez. What accounts for the present powerlessness of Hispanics in electoral politics, and what does the future hold for this very sizable portion of Chicago's population?

Nonparticipation

The primary reason for the political weakness of Spanish Americans in Chicago is that so few of them participate in elections. There are a number of reasons for this. Most Spanish Americans are very recent immigrants to the city, having arrived in the 1960's and 1970's. Like other immigrant groups in American history, they are going through the process of learning about politics and how it can benefit them. Their difficulties are compounded by a language problem and the fact that many of them are not citizens and, therefore, are not eligible to vote. Puerto Ricans are citizens by law, but a recent study indicated that about 70 percent of Mexican Americans and Cubans in Chicago are foreign citizens. Not surprisingly, Puerto Ricans have much higher rates of electoral participation than Mexicans or Cubans. The Hispanic population

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has a lower average age than either the Black or white population of Chicago, which means that fewer Spanish Americans are old enough to vote while many others fall into the young adult category, a group which tends to vote in lower numbers. Spanish Americans are less educated and work mainly in lower paying jobs. The net result is that Spanish Americans account for only about 5.1 percent of the registered voters in Chicago. Approximately 80,000 of the city's 1,400,000 registered voters are Hispanic.

Spanish Americans are not concentrated in any one part of the city. Mexican Americans are most prominent in the Near West Side, Lower West Side (Pilsen), South Lawndale (Little Village), Brighton Park, McKinley Park, Bridgeport and New City (Back of the Yards), and South Chicago community areas. Puerto Ricans have generally settled north of the Mexican neighborhoods in West Town, Humboldt Park, Logan Square, Lincoln Park and Lake View. Cubans live north of the Puerto Ricans in areas like Uptown, Rogers Park and Albany Park. In sum, these three nationalities and other Central and South American peoples are scattered throughout the city.

Perhaps the most interesting feature of this residential pattern is that Spanish Americans are much more integrated with whites than are Blacks. Furthermore, Mexican Americans, Puerto Ricans and Cubans are about equally or better integrated with whites than they are with each other.

The political geography of Spanish-American voters in Chicago shows the wide dispersion of Spanish surnamed voters (see map). They constitute 5 percent or more of the electorate in 17 wards. In these 17 wards, there are nine wards where Spanish surnamed voters are at least 10 percent of the ward, and in these nine, there are only two wards where they number over 30 percent of the voters. Hispanics do not comprise a majority of the electorate in any ward, although their percentage of registered voters is growing rapidly in most of the nine wards where they have at least 10 percent of the voting population (see table 1).

The chief reasons why there are no wards with a majority of Spanish surnamed voters are 1) the small number of such voters and 2) their dispersed residential pattern. It should be noted, however, that ward boundaries have been altered on occasion in a manner that served to further divide the Hispanic population. For instance, Mexican Americans residing in the 10th Ward prior to 1971 were split into the 7th, 8th and 10th wards after redistricting. At the same time, the 31st Ward western boundary was moved to include an area not yet populated by Puerto Ricans while a heavily Puerto Rican section was shifted from the 31st to the 26th Ward.

Mobilization

Table 1 Spanish surnamed registered voters in nine leading Spanish-American wards (1979)
Ward	Percent of ward voters	Number	Percent increase 1972-1979
31	41.8%	8,8831	17%
33	29.9	7,0771	136
26	27.5	5,4951	-9
32	24.5	5,1431	30
22	22.4	4,4922	58
25	20.8	3,5982	40
30	17.2	4,6951	290
1	15.5	3,3772	17
7	11.8	3,1212	66
1Predominantly Puerto Rican 2Predominantly Mexican American

To be effective in politics, organized effort is crucial. Spanish Americans face two major obstacles in their efforts to mobilize politically: their internal heterogeneity and the split focus of their organizations. What are sometimes lumped together as Spanish-American organizations are in reality separate organizations serving different national groups: Mexicans, Puerto Ricans and Cubans. The other problem is that most groups are more concerned with service, social and recreational needs than with forging political power. A study of 130 Spanish-American organizations sponsored by the Center for Urban Affairs at Northwestern University found that the typical organization in Chicago had been in existence for less than five years, had 48 members, was staffed by volunteers and had an annual budget of $2,500. Lack of participation and money weakens many of these groups. The combination of limited resources and division along national lines has prevented the growth of strong, citywide political organizations representing the interests of Spanish Americans.

Spanish Americans have hardly had a chance to gain anything from the regular Democratic organization in Chicago. The high centralization attained by the Democratic organization under the late Mayor Richard J. Daley not only reduced interparty competition, it also stifled the development of new political groups which might eventually challenge the party's hegemony. Under Daley, the Democratic Organization had a particularly debilitating effect on Spanish American as well as Black political activities because the organization had its greatest strength in the very wards where these minorities were the strongest. Therefore, the chances of Spanish-American candidates seeking election as independent Democrats or Republicans has been very slim. Every successful Hispanic candidate has been endorsed by the Democratic organization. In contrast, not one of the 13 Hispanics who have run for alderman as independent Democrats since 1963 has won.

The centralization attained by the Democratic party under Daley also reduced intraparty competition. Without true competition, the political clout of minorities such as Spanish Americans is limited because the small number of votes that a minority contributes rarely makes a difference in a monopolistic situation. If there were several competing political groups, a small number of votes could make the difference between winning and losing. The result is that regular Democrats often pursue the cautious strategy of registering Hispanic voters only when they are sure of their loyalty to the organization.

Recent election returns show little evidence of change (see table 2). In the nine wards with the largest concentration of Spanish-American registrants, there were only two contests in the last election for committeemen. If we look at the percentage of the vote obtained by the winning candidate, we must conclude that in only one ward was there evidence of real intraparty competition. In the 33rd Ward, Alderman Richard Mell achieved the rare distinction of defeating the incumbent

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Without true competition, the political clout of minorities such as Spanish Americans is limited because the small number of votes that a minority contributes rarely makes a difference in a monopolistic situation

committeeman, John B. Brandt. These nine wards had low turnouts, probably due in large measure to low registration and low voting among the Spanish population.

Results of the last three mayoral primary elections affirm the strong support that these nine wards have given the regular organization. For instance, Michael A. Bilandic carried seven of the nine wards even while losing to Jane M. Byrne in 1979. Because Hispanics comprise only a minority of the voters in these wards, it cannot be directly inferred that they support the regular organization. Survey evidence confirms, however, that most Hispanics are Democrats and tend to vote for candidates of the regular organization. But it seems obvious that Spanish Americans have few options in seeking their political fortunes in Chicago. They can try in the nine wards where the regular Democratic organization has very strong control or in the other 41 wards in which the Spanish Americans are less than 10 percent of the voters.

The Democratic organization is in the business of winning elections, and the 50 party leaders in the wards are in the business of retaining their power. Consequently, the political mobilization of Spanish Americans will occur only if it can help achieve these goals. But the aftermath of Jane Byrne's election and her controversial first months in office make the future of the party uncertain.

If the Democratic organization becomes less centralized, there will be an increase in intraparty competition. Decentralization of the party structure should produce two related, and important, changes in Spanish-American political power in Chicago. First, it will produce an increase in Spanish-American political participation, and second, it should accelerate the incorporation of Spanish Americans into the party's decisionmaking structure. Decentralization may also improve the success of "independent" or "quasi-independent" Democrats, giving minorities like Spanish Americans a strong political voice.

To the extent that the organization reduces its present turmoil by reestablishing the same, or a similar, organizational structure as the one developed under Daley, the next 10 years will be the same as the previous 20. That is, the party will give ground very slowly in those areas of public policy which are important to Spanish Americans and will gradually reallocate jobs and favors to the Hispanic community as its size and loyalty to the Democratic organization grows.

As long as the party or any of its leaders do not need to turn out the Hispanic voters in large numbers in order to win, anything beyond incremental improvements for them is unlikely. And there's not much hope that other political organizations will help much. At the present moment, independent and Republican organizations are either weak or nonexistent in Chicago's wards.

Fragmentation

In summary, our analysis of the political situation of Spanish Americans shows a group new to the city, lacking the numbers, the language, the citizenship status, and the educational and economic resources of other groups. It is a picture of a group fragmented along nationality lines and so dispersed that it makes up a minority in many wards rather than a majority in a few wards. Yet, the picture could change. For example, the rapid population growth of Spanish Americans makes it a larger group every day. Even if the pattern of residential dispersion continues, voter majorities could be built in wards such as the 31st and 33rd. Reapportionment after the 1980 census may speed or retard this process, depending on how ward boundaries change. As for education, evidence of rising achievements is already present. It will take time for this exceptionally youthful group, recently arrived in the city, to mature and sort out its political options, but the future looks considerably brighter than the present.

Luis M. Salces is research director of OMAR, Inc., Chicago, and has written several articles and papers on Spanish-American politics. Peter W. Colby is a professor of public service at Governors State University and a frequent contributor to Illinois Issues.

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