Judicial Rulings

Illinois Supreme Court

Eminent domain for land but not for interest income

THE ILLINOIS Supreme Court January 23 ruled unconstitutional portions of the Illinois law, which allows counties to collect interest on compensatory award money they deposit during condemnation suits. The high court ruled a Chicago bank is entitled to nearly $100,000 in interest earned while the bank appealed a $1 million compensatory award for land condemned by a Cook County park district. The court said the statutes (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 36, sec. 22.1 and sec. 17) create a "windfall" for counties by allowing them to take private property for public use. But the court said the decision is not retroactive.

In the case, Morton Grove Park District v. American National Bank and Trust Company, the Supreme Court overturned the First District Illinois Appellate Court and the Cook County Circuit Court, returning the matter to the lower court. That will mark the third time the case has gone through the courts.

The first round started when the park district condemned bank land in 1972, and a jury in 1974 set the fair market value at $1 million plus $15,478.06 in interest earned by the time the park district actually deposited the money with the Cook County treasurer, as required by law. The bank appealed, but the appellate court in 1976 upheld the circuit court and the Supreme Court refused further appeal.

The second round of litigation ensued when the bank sought a court order requiring the Cook County treasurer to pay the $1 million compensatory award, the $15,000 interest, plus another $92,375.08 in interest earned in the two-year period during the appeal. The circuit court ordered payment of the $1,015,000, but not the additional interest. The bank again appealed. The appellate court upheld the circuit court, but the Supreme Court allowed further appeal.

The issue was whether the county was entitled to the additional $92,000 interest earned during the two-year appeal process. The bank argued the law awarding the interest to the county was unconstitutional because it jeopardized the bank's right to appeal. The court agreed.

In delivering the high court's opinion, Justice Howard C. Ryan said, "Under the interpretation given to this statutory scheme by the appellate court, a government entity is entitled to condemn private property and then pay the awarded just compensation into the hands of another government entity for the benefit of the public while the private individual exercises his constitutional right to appeal what he may feel to be an unjust award.

"It is not just that the loss of income should be cast on the owner [bank] and the public be granted a windfall."

The bank also argued that the law allows taking of private property for public use, and the court agreed:

"The condemnees [bank] are seeking to recover only the amount earned by the county through the use of this deposit which belongs to them [bank]. . . .

"[T]he money that was deposited with the county treasurer belonged to the condemnees [bank] and at no time did the county have a legitimate claim to it or and interest in it. The use of the award money by the county treasurer, to earn interest which is not paid to the owner but to the county, is clearly a taking of private property for public use."

Judicial review for those not guilty by insanity

ILLINOIS courts have the right of judicial review of the care of those found not guilty by reason of insanity, the Illinois Supreme Court ruled February 1.

In the case, The People v. Miguel Valdez, the Supreme Court upheld one part of the ruling by the Cook County Circuit Court, but overturned another.

In 1978, a Cook County Circuit Court found Valdez not guilty by reason of insanity of two 1977 murders. When he later requested release or transfer from a short term care to a long-term care facility, the circuit court held an Illinois evidentiary hearing, ordering the Department of Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities to follow a new court-prescribed treatment plan. In addition, the court ordered the department to set a specific policy for treating all such patients. Valdez and the department, in the name of Director Robert A. deVito appealed directly to the high court.

The issue was the courts' right to judicial review. The department argued the courts lacked jurisdiction because such power would violate separation of powers; the courts' rights are limited to determining release; and the legislature gave only the department the right to set policy.

In delivering the high court's opinion,

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Justice Joseph H. Goldenhersh said that while Illinois' old 1870 Constitution did not extend courts' jurisdiction to the care of the insane, the new 1970 Constitution does. And he said the Unified Code of Corrections allows courts to impose conditions on release of the insane. That provision in the statutes (Ill. Rev. Slat. 1977, ch. 38, sec. 1005-24 (i) shows the legislature intended the courts to have the right of judicial review.

However, Goldenhersh agreed that courts do not have the right to order the department to set a specific policy for the treatment of all such patients. "The issue before the circuit court was the adequacy of the course of treatment furnished the defendant [Valdez]. The scope of the inquiry, as delineated by the statue, extends only to this defendant and not to the general practices and procedures of the Department."

Access to OSHA unprivileged records

ILLINOIS citizens have access to non-privileged federal records, the Illinois Supreme Court ruled January 23. The high court granted a Chicago worker, who is suing for damages from a construction accident, access to portions of the federal Occupational Health and Safety Administration's (OSHA) investigatory file on the accident.

In the case, Ray Marshall, U.S. secretary of labor, v. Paul F. Elward, a Cook County Circuit judge, the higher court upheld the ruling by the lower court, but called for additional court supervision in release of the records.

The case stemmed from a 1979 explosion at the work site of the Metropolitan Sanitary District of Greater Chicago's so-called "Deep Tunnel Project." OSHA investigated and action was brought against the contractors. When the worker, Thomas Baumhardt, filed suit under the Illinois Structural Works Act, he subpeonaed OSHA's file. OSHA tried to quash the subpoena. Following an in camera inspection, Elward ordered OSHA to release the non-privileged portions of the public records to Baumhardt. OSHA appealed directly to the state high court.

OSHA argued that federal law, specifically the 1977 Freedom of Information Act and the 1970 OSHA law itself, were designed to limit release of public records and therefore preempted state laws which allow release. Justice Thomas J. Moran, in delivering the high court's opinion, pointed to OSHA regulations which specifically order release if the information subpoenaed is available. "Because of OSHA's regulations, we conclude that Illinois discovery procedures were anticipated and that they may properly be used to obtain Federal records . . .," Moran said.

OSHA further argued that common law precedent protects investigatory files and informers and that release of records Baumhardt subpoenaed would jeopardize action pending against the contractors.

"These [common law] privileges, however, are qualified privileges based upon the competing interests of the parties and cannot be used as an absolute bar to government disclosure," Moran said. "The bare assertion of a privilege by a government agency is insufficient to deny a party access to government records; rather, disputes as to privileged documents are to be resolved by the court. The in camera inspection is the proper procedure for the resolution of disputes as to which documents are privileged.

"We agree with petitioner [OSHA] that the records sought are subject to an investigatory file privilege and an informer's privilege," Moran said. "However, those portions of the investigatory file which consist of factual reports resulting from agency observation and investigation and which will not interfere with the enforcement proceedings may be ordered disclosed."

On search warrants

THE ILLINOIS Supreme Court handed down two decisions December 20 which apply to the execution of search warrants. In the cases People v. Lenora Conner and People v. Joseph V. Ouellette et al., the court ruled that only under certain circumstances can police officers forego the knock and announce rule before using a search warrant.

In Conner, the defendant claimed the police officers' failure to announce themselves violated her constitutional rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to be free from unreasonable searches. The Supreme Court, however, said "exigent circumstances" justified the officers' action.

Delivering the court's opinion, Justice Howard Ryan noted the defendant's residence was virtually impregnable due to a number of security devices and was guarded by a number of large dogs which she had previously turned loose on police officers. Ryan also said the police believed the defendant possessed narcotics she could dispose of at a moment's notice. The circumstances, said Ryan, allowed the action the police took. He cited a U. S. Supreme Court decision, Ker v. California, as authority for exceptions to the knock and announce rule.

The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the circuit court and reversed the ruling of the appellate court.

In Ouellette, however, the state's high court ruled 5-2 in favor of the defendants saying the police were not justified when they failed to knock and announce their presence and purpose.

The state argued where narcotics are involved exigent circumstances exist automatically because the contraband is disposed of so easily. The court, however, disagreed. Writing for the majority, Justice William Clark cited a California case, People v. Gastelo, in rejecting such a blanket rule, "Under the Fourth Amendment, a specific showing must always be made to justify any kind of police action tending to disturb the security of the people in their homes. Unannounced forcible entry is in itself a serious disturbance of that security and cannot be justified on a blanket basis." In its decision, the court upheld the rulings of the circuit and appellate courts. In unrelated narcotics cases, the circuit court granted the defendants, Joseph V. Ouellette and Thomas E. Smith, motions to suppress evidence. The appellate court affirmed the decision on a consolidated appeal.

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