Judicial Rulings

' Smoke -in' convictions overturned: interference was not proved

FIVE MEN were wrongly arrested for criminal trespass during a 1978 marijuana "smoke-in" on the State Capitol grounds, the Illinois Supreme Court ruled in a 5-2 decision March 31.

In the case, People v. Donald Duda et al., Chief Justice Joseph H. Goldenhersh said the five were not guilty of trespassing on state-supported land because they did not meet all three elements required in the statute (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1977 ch. 38, sec. 21-5). Goldenhersh, in speaking for the majority, admitted that the demonstrators remained on the Capitol grounds after being ordered to leave, but noted that they did not interfere with another person's "lawful use or enjoyment" of the land.

". . . the record shows no interference .... There is no evidence that grounds keepers or other personnel were delayed or interfered with in the performance of their duties," he said. He also noted that "encouraging" the crowd to remain on the grounds by linking arms with the others did not constitute proof of interference.

Justice Robert C. Underwood, joined by Justice Howard C. Ryan, dissented from the majority. Noting that some of the demonstrators were drinking, littering the grounds and sitting in trees, Underwood said, "It seems to me, however, quite clear that the conduct of these defendants constituted a plain and immediate interference with the duty of the Secretary of State to preserve and protect the Capitol grounds."

Different states, different taxes — airline must pay both

PAYING BOTH the Indiana gross income and the Illinois use taxes does not represent double taxation, the Illinois Supreme Court said in a March 31 decision.

In the case, United Air Lines v. J. Thomas Johnson, Director of Revenue, the Illinois high court noted that the company had entered into a voluntary agreement with Shell Oil of Indiana to pay the oil company's gross receipts tax liability. The airline claimed that paying the Indiana tax should exempt it from paying the Illinois tax. The court did not agree, however, noting that the Indiana tax did not represent a tax on the sale of the oil (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 120 sec. 439.3 (c)).

"... the gross income tax applies to the receipt of all income and is levied upon the person [Shell Oil] receiving it," Justice Howard C. Ryan pointed out in speaking for the high court. He said, "The Indiana gross income tax is not a tax on the sales transaction."

He also noted that the Illinois use tax is imposed "upon the privilege of using personal property within the State," regardless of where that property was acquired.

In affirming the decision of the Cook County Circuit Court and reversing that of the 1st District Appellate Court, Ryan said, "The Illinois use tax and the Indiana gross income tax . . . both have been levied upon separate and distinct taxable events and do not constitute an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce."

Statute of limitations on personal injury compensation

THE STATUTE of limitations on receiving compensation for injuries begins to run when two conditions have been met: the injured person knows that the injury occurred and realizes the possibility exists that it was wrongfully caused, the Illinois Supreme Court ruled on February 20.

The case, Billie Irene Nolan, v. Johns-Manville Asbestos, involved a man who had worked for an asbestos company since 1941 and claimed that his lung problems were caused by prolonged exposure to the asbestos. Nolan claimed that although he was first aware of his lung problem in 1957, it was not until 1973 that he was told its cause was work-related. At issue was whether or not the two-year statute of limitations had expired when Nolan filed suit in 1975.

In speaking for the high court, Justice William G. Clark said that although 18 years had passed between the time Nolan had first noticed problems and the filing of the suit, the problems created by this passage of time are "outweighed by the hardship to [Nolan] who neither knows nor can reasonably suspect that he is being injured. . . . Additionally, in a case such as this, it is difficult to pinpoint a precise time when an injury occurred. ..."

Further, the court said, "... where the injury occurred over a long period of time and not as a result of one sudden traumatic event, the preferred rule is that the cause of action accrues when the plaintiff knows or should know of an injury and that the injury was probably caused by the wrongful acts of another. ..."

The decision overturned the Cook County Circuit Court and affirmed the decision of the 1st District Appellate Court. □

28/June 1981/Illinois Issues