Judicial Rulings

Illinois Supreme Court

Under Illinois law cocaine is a narcotic

ALTHOUGH cocaine is neither medically nor pharmacologically defined as a narcotic, classification of the drug under the Illinois Controlled Substances Act as a Schedule II narcotic is appropriate because of cocaine's potential for harm, the Illinois Supreme Court ruled September 30.

In the case, The State of Illinois v. Danny Joe McCarty, McCarty, who had been convicted of delivery of less than 30 grams of cocaine and sentenced to three years in prison, appealed on the grounds that cocaine should be reclassified as a Schedule II non-narcotic, with a lesser penalty attached to its delivery. The appellate court agreed, reducing McCarty's felony conviction from Class 2 to Class 3 and directing the circuit court to resentence. The state's attorney appealed to the Supreme Count which agreed to hear the case.

Justice Thomas J. Moran, in delivering the high court's ruling, noted that even though the state legislature's definition of cocaine as a narcotic does not agree with scientific or medical definitions, a legislative body "is not legally bound to follow previously existing definitions of terms created by persons in other fields." Legislative redefinitions "commonly create a narrower or broader meaning of terms for the purposes of the statute than would other definitions commonly used," Moran said.

In addition, the court agreed with the state's contention that cocaine, as one of the most expensive and profitable of illicit drugs, attracts the "criminal element" of society, and dealings in it therefore lead to violent crime. Moran also pointed to the correlation between cocaine and heroin use, and the fact that cocaine, especially when used as "freebase," is at least psychologically addicting. These facts, Moran said, provide "a rational basis for treating cocaine more severely than substances in Schedule II which are pharmacologically classified as nonnarcotic."

Inconvenient trial location can be grounds for dismissing a suit

A SUIT for damages under the Federal Employers' Liability Act which is tried in a different state from the plaintiff's residence and the site of the accident, requiring most

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witnesses to travel hundreds of miles to the trial site, can be dismissed on the grounds of inconvenient location (forum non conviens), the Supreme Court noted in a September 30 decision. The court chose, however, not to dismiss the suit and upheld circuit and appellate court rulings awarding damages to the plaintiff.

Under the Federal Employees' Liability Act (FELA), employees of railroads, an interstate industry subject to federal regulation, can sue in state courts for damages caused by work-related injuries. In Jose A. Espinosa v. Norfolk and Western Railway Company, Espinosa was injured in a Detroit suburb while working. He underwent medical treatment in St. Louis and was referred by his union's representative to an attorney in East Alton in Madison County, where a suit against the railroad was filed. The ensuing trial resulted in a $275,000 judgment for Espinosa, even though the railroad renewed several motions for dismissal on forum non conviens grounds. The railroad appealed, first to the appellate court which upheld the ruling, then to the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court noted that the out-of-state caseload in the Madison County courts was extreme. Evidence showed that in 1976 through 1978, 156 out of 438 suits filed in Madison County against railroads under FELA involved injuries which occurred outside of Illinois, and'in 83 of these 156 suits, the plaintiffs were not Illinois residents. Justice Robert C. Underwood stated, "the plaintiff's right to select the forum [for trial] is a substantial one. . . .But those rights. . .cannot be permitted to override the public interest in, and need for, an orderly, efficiently operated judicial system."

However, because there was no question as to liability and amount of damages in the case and no evidence available to the trial judge of the increasing delays in disposition of Madison County law jury cases, the Supreme Court allowed the rulings of the lower courts to stand.

Dismissing a suit on its merits and class action certification

THE DECISION to dismiss a suit on its merits can be made before the complaint has been certified as a "class action" suit, the Supreme Court ruled September 30.

The case, Shirley Schlessinger et al., v. Sidney R. Olsen, Recorder of Deeds, et al., involved a suit challenging the constitutionality of an amended version of the Illinois Real Estate Transfer Act. The plaintiffs asked the circuit court of Cook County to grant a temporary restraining order against the act and to certify their suit as a class action representing all Illinois taxpayers. In agreeing with the defendent's contention that the necessary evidence for certification was not complete, the circuit court denied the plaintiff's class action motion and subsequently dismissed the entire complaint. The appellate court reversed, ordering the circuit court to determine whether the complaint was in­deed a class action suit before making a final decision on the merits of the case. The Supreme Court granted the plaintiffs' request to appeal.

Justice William C. Clark, in delivering the high court's ruling, said, "The issue. . .is whether a trial court must decide the class-certification question before it may entertain a motion to dismiss. Our primary concerns with regard to this issue are to conserve judicial resources, to prevent piecemeal litigation, and to provide for the smooth functioning of class actions." While conceding that a motion to certify a class action should be made as soon as practicable, Clark said that in this case, "a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action is not dependent on a decision on the class-certification issue, since no class action can proceed unless a cause of action is stated. . . .Rather, the trial judge decided a motion raised by the defendant. It was appropriate to do so because it would be expensive and wasteful of time and effort" to permit proceedings on the certification issue "if the trail judge was of the opinion that no valid cause of action had been stated."

Double jeopardy

A PERSON convicted of a lesser offense cannot later be resentenced for committing a Class X felony for the same crime, the Supreme Court ruled September 30. In The People ex rel. Richard M. Daley, State's Attorney, v. John J. Limperis, Judge, et. al., Daley filed an action for mandamus to Judge John J. Limperis and Judge Frank B. Machala, both of the Cook County cir­cuit court, directing that they "expunge their orders. . .sentencing. . .Douglas A. Davis, Robert Mais and Paul Draper. . .to terms of probation where the stipulated evidence demonstrated that each defendant had committed a Class X non-probational felony by delivering over 30 grams of a substance containing cocaine."

All three defendants had been charged with selling more than 30 grams of cocaine but were found guilty of selling less than 30 grams of cocaine, a Class 2 offense which allows probation. The defendants contended that they could not be further prosecuted, and that to do so would violate the double jeopardy clause of the U.S. Constitution. The court agreed, stating that conviction on a lesser offense operates as an acquittal of a greater offense and that the 1970 Illinois Constitution prohibits appeals in criminal cases with an acquittal judgment. Asking the high court to correct erroneous resolutions arrived at by the trial judges "would violate Federal and Illinois constitutional guarantees against double jeopardy," said Chief Justice Joseph H. Goldenhersh.

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