Judicial Rulings

Illinois Supreme Court

Court upholds death penalty

THE ILLINOIS Supreme Court upheld imposition of the death penalty for the first time under the 1977 law, ordering a convicted murderer to be executed in May. In the case, People v. Cornelius Lewis, Lewis had mounted a variety of arguments against the constitutionality of the 1977 death penalty law, under which he was sentenced after his conviction for the murder of a security guard during a bank robbery in 1978. Justice Robert C. Underwood, delivering the high court's ruling in November, held that the law was applied constitutionally, stating that, "Our responsibilities . . . neither require nor permit reversal where no reasonable doubt of guilt exists, no reversible error has occurred, and there is no indication that the jury imposed the penalty on other than a reasoned basis."

But Justice Seymour Simon, in the only dissenting opinion, stated, "A firm foundation for the constitutionality of the death penalty [in Illinois] has not yet been established. . . . Upholding the death penalty statute, with the standardless and unguided discretion granted to the 102 prosecutors who each hold the death penalty in their hands, is what makes for a government of men instead of law."

Illinois' original capital punishment law, as well as those of other states, was struck down by the U.S. Supreme Court as unconstitutional in 1972. A later statute was found unconstitutional by the Illinois Supreme Court in 1975. The current law (Ill. Rev. Stat.. 1977, ch. 38, sec. 9-1) was signed by Gov. James R. Thompson June 21, 1977.

Admission of polygraph evidence 'plain error'

LIE-DETECTOR test results and examiner testimony cannot be admitted into evidence, even if both defendant and prosecutor sign a prior agreement to allow it, the Illinois Supreme Court ruled December 4. In the case, People v. Baynes, the court said that the admission of such evidence in Baynes' trial for burglary "rose to the level of plain error," even though Baynes did not object to admission of the polygraph evidence either during or after his trial.

In handing down the high court's ruling Justice William G. Clark noted that because the reliability of polygraph evidence in determining guilt or innocence has not been sufficiently demonstrated such evidence is barred from Illinois courts under any circumstances, including a prior "stipulation" between prosecutor and defendant that it be admitted.

The court conceded that a stipulation would normally foreclose review, but not, it maintained, when the effect would be to change existing law.

Clark said, "By what logic should stipulated polygraph evidence be admitted if the same evidence, absent a stipulation barred? . . . The law is that polygraph evidence is not admissible in the State of Illinois. The stipulation attempts to change the legal standard for admissibility. This court cannot accept such a result." The high court reversed both the circuit and the appellate court, which had also missed the "plain error," and set aside Baynes' five-year sentence and remanded the case for a new trial.

(According to a lengthy analysis by Jeneth L. Pemberton entitled "Polygraghy: Modern Rules and Videotape Technology to Promote the 'Search for Truth' in Criminal Trials." in The National Journal fo Criminal Defense, Spring, 1981, a defendant's rights vis a vis the polygraph depend entirely on the particular court and the particular state. Pemberton calls for federal court action to achieve uniformity with respect to treatment by state and federal courts of polygraph evidence and expert examiner testimony.)

March 1982/Illinois Issues/34

Court says no to commercial lumbering in state parks

According to Justice Seymour Simon, who delievered the court's ruling, "in 1978, following a change in Department of Conservation policy, the Division of forestry proposed that, for the first time in any Illinois State park, a commercial timber harvest and sale be carried out in the burn area "The department gave four reasons for the logging proposal: salvage of usable wood, protection of the area from insect infestation, habitat improvement and rehabilitation to ensure visitor safety.

But the high court, in analyzing the differing legislative mandates governing state parks and state forests, concluded that the purpose of state parks is "recreation and preservation," while that of state forests is "commercial production and recreation." ". . . Pere Marquette is a State park, not a state forest, and the techniques developed to encourage productivity and growth in state forests ... are inappropriate in State parks" Simon said. The other reasons offered by DOC for logging the area were judged by the court to "bear little relationship to the recreational, aesthetic or cultural uses of a State park," since there was no proven danger to park visitors from falling trees or to living trees from insects. Simon said ". . . all that is required for the forest to regain its original vigor is time."

While the court granted the Sierra Club's request for an injunction against the logging operation in Pere Marquette, it reversed an appellate court injunction againsi logging of any kind in state parks. "While the proposed logging [at Pere Marquette] does not comply with the statutes, another selective removal of trees might. An area might have lo be opened up for a hiking trail, picnic area or campground, in such a case the recreational use of the park would take priority over the desire for preservation. It is only when the logging does not serve the recreational or preservation purposes of the park that it must be enjoined. "□

March 1982/Illinois Issues/35