Chicago By MILTON RAKOVE

Arrangement in bad times

THERE IS an old arrangement in Illinois politics which is never talked about publicly by the political participants who are the beneficiaries of the deal, but which is understood and generally acquiesced to in silence by Illinois politicians of both parties.

The arrangement is a collaborative relationship between Republican governors of Illinois with Democratic mayors of Chicago on matters of public policy which affect their own toriunes and their constituencies.

The rationale behind the arrangement is as old as the process of politics itself and is rooted in the instinctive behavior patterns of politicians who hold public office. Successful politics ifor them has always been based on compromise, and on the subordination of ideology and philosophy to the practical requirements of getting into office, staying there as long as possible and getting as much out of office personally as they can.

In Illinois, the cooperative relationship is based on the political, economic and demographic realities of the existing framework of the state. Politically, the state's largest city, Chicago, is heavily Democratic, downstate is solidly Republican and the suburbs of Chicago in Cook County, which were traditionally Republican, have become something of a no-man's land in statewide elections. Economically, the state's industrial driving force was Chicago, with subsidiary industrial centers in the state's downstate industrial area providing a secondary but important addition to the economic prosperity of Illinois. But, that, too, has begun to change as Chicago moves steadily into an economic decline. Downstate industrial areas are being similary affected by the current recession and by national and international competition which Illinois' aging industrial plant has been unable to meet. Meanwhile suburban Cook County and the collar counties have generally grown in economic strength and viability. Demographically, the picture is similar.

Two basic questions which have always concerned politicians who have been elected public officials are, first, who is going to benefit from their actions and second, who is going to pay for the policies they pursue. The answer to those questions is directly relevant to the ambitions of those politicians who want to gain office or who want to stay in office. That can best be done by convincing one's constituency that they have benefited from what the public official has done without having had to pay for it.

In Illinois, the problem has been generally worked out in a deal between a powerful Democratic mayor of Chicago and a politically astute Republican governor of Illinois. The Democratic mayor and machine boss delivers his Chicago Democratic legislators in the General Assembly and the Republican governor delivers downstate Republicans, with help from other powerful downstate Republican legislators. The mayor gets what he wants for Chicago and the Republican governor assuages his downstate constituency. The deal is further consummated by the Democrats running a weak candidate for governor and the Republicans never seriously challenging the Democratic mayor in his bid for reelection.

The arrangement generally worked well in the Mayor Richard J. Daley years in Chicago. Daley and Republican Governors William G. Stratton and Richard B. Ogilvie, collaborated on matters of public policy which were mutually beneficial to their respective constituencies and to their own needs as party politicians and incumbent public officials. Daley gave Stratton needed support for a sales tax in return for a percentage of the tax for Chicago. Stratton helped Daley take control of Chicago's budget. Daley also gave Ogilvie support for a state income tax while giving him all the credit for passing the tax. Daley slated weak gubernatorial candidates, and Stratton and Ogilvie did nothing to support Republican mayoral candidates in Chicago.

Democratic Mayor Jane Byrne and Republican Gov. James R. Thompson have attempted to carry on the tradition of collaboration and the arrangement. They struck a deal on sharing federal mass transit funds from the aborted Crosstown Expressway and the Franklin Street Subway to share money for downstate roads and RTA and CTA needs in Chicago and its suburbs. But the deal has come apart with new federal policies under President Ronald Reagan. There is little money for downstate roads and Chicago and suburban mass transit needs. Byrne and Thompson then split publicly over school and transit funds for Chicago. They then came together in the last session of the General Assembly in a deal to postpone their mutual financial problems in Chicago and Illinois until after their respective campaigns for reelection as mayor and governor. And it has become increasingly clear that Byrne will do little for Adlai Stevenson and Thompson will do little to help any Byrne potential opponents.

There are several differences this year, however, in the underlying dynamics of the arrangement. This is not a year in which an aroused electorate can be safely controlled. Taxpayers are up in arms and economic conditions all over the state are abominable. The combination of these two factors could lead to an explosion directed at incumbent public officials such as mayors and governors. The political machine in Chicago cannot be relied on to deliver the electorate. The suburban electorate is uncontrollable by politicians. The media has turned on Thompson and could turn on Byrne. In a period of failing Reaganomics, even downstate may not be safely Republican. It is clear that Byrne's or Thompson's open support means little to other candidates, and could be worth even less at a clandestine level. And, finally, this arrangement, unlike successful earlier ones, has not resolved any major problems of concern to the various constituencies in Chicago, the suburbs and downstate; it has merely postponed the day of reckoning with unpredictable consequences for incumbents.

September 1982 | Illinois Issues | 41