By HARRY T. BOSTICK and JOHN G. MARTIN

Illinois Supreme Court

Commitment of a juvenile to the Department of Corrections

A JUVENILE who commits a crime before he reaches age 13 is not necessarily exempt from commitment to the Department of Corrections, if for some reason dispositional orders for the juvenile are delayed past his thirteenth birthday.

In the case, In re John Griffin, Griffin was adjudicated a juvenile delinquent for armed robbery and aggravated battery at age 12, but because of a continuance to explore the possibility of placing him in a mental health program, his case was not disposed of until after his thirteenth birthday. The circuit court then committed Griffin to the Department of Corrections. The Juvenile Court Act Provides for such commitment of a delinquent minor "if he is 13 years of age or older. . . (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1977, ch. 37, sec. 705 — 2(l)(a)(5))." The appellate court agreed with the circuit court, saying the statutory age requirement was met because Griffin had turned 13 before the entry of the dispositional order.

Griffin appealed, arguing that "the only minors eligible for the Department of Corrections are those who were 13 years old when they committed the offenses upon which the findings of delinquency are based." But the high court upheld the judgment of the appellate court. Justice Daniel P. Ward noted that although several sections of the Juvenile Court Act use the minor's age at the time of the offense as a benchmark, the section in question does not."One can reasonably assume that if the legislature had intended in the section we are examining that the minor's age at a stage other than the disposition stage was to be controlling, it would have expressed that intent as it did [in other sections]."

Ward disagreed that the court's ruling would result in prosecutorial ploys aimed at delaying trial until a juvenile is over age 13 simply so he can be committed to the Department of Corrections. "An adequate safeguard against such delays, of course, will be the trial court's sophisticated scrutiny of the ground for requests for continuous. . . . We can deal with problems of this character when and if they arise."

Interest on payment for property condemned under eminent domain

A LANDOWNER whose land is condemned under the state's Eminent Domain Act is entitled to interest accrued on payment for the land during an unsuccessful appeal of the condemnation judgment, unless the property has been condemned under the "quick-take" provisions of the act. This holds true even when the landowner retains possession of the land during the time of appeal.

In the case, Lake County Forest Preserve District v. Vernon Hills Development Corporation, the Supreme Court interpreted section 3 of the Interest Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1978, Supp., ch. 74, sec. 3) and upheld the judgment of the appellate court. Delivering the high court's ruling, Justice Daniel P. Ward said: "A condemnee obviously sustains a very real and substantial interference with his property rights whenever a petition to condemn is filed. The interference persists even though he remains in possession during the appeal."

Loss of spouse intangible, but of monetary value

A JURY may consider "loss of consortium," i.e., loss of a spouse's society, guidance, companionship, felicity and sexual relations, in determining the amount of compensation for "pecuniary injuries" in lawsuits brought under the Wrongful Death Act, the Supreme Court ruled in October.

In the case, Ronald Elliot ex'rs v. Hilda Willis, the trial court jury had been specifically instructed under civil rule No. 31.07 of Illinois Pattern Jury Instruction to exclude "[t]he loss of decedent's society by the widow and next of kin," from its reckoning of pecuniary injuries suffered when Elliot was killed in an auto accident.

In delivering the high court's ruling, Justice William G. Clark noted that in previous cases the court had found the term "pecuniary injuries" sufficiently broad to cover such intangibles as destruction of the family unit and loss of a father's guidance, felicity and care. "[W]e are compelled to conclude that the companionship and conjugal relationship of a spouse are equally compensable as 'pecuniary injuries,'" Clark said. "All of the elements that comprise. . . loss of consortium may not be the most tangible items, but a jury is capable of putting a monetary worth on them. . . . The language of [the pattern jury instruction civil rule No. 31.07]. . . is no longer valid."

Disbarment of attorney involved in cement truck bribery scheme

ON OCTOBER 29, 1976, Peter V. Pappas, an attorney and former adminstrative assistant to the secretary of state, was convicted of mail fraud, conspiracy to commit mail fraud, and causing an individual to travel in interstate commerce with the intent to promote an unlawful activity (bribery). Pappas had acted as a conduit for $30,000 in bribes a cement company paid to state legislators to pass a bill increasing the amount of cement that trucks could carry on state highways (see Illinois Issues, December 1976).

After his conviction, Pappas was suspended from the practice of law, and the hearing pannel of the Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission unanimously recommended disbarment. The Review Board concurred. Giving the high court's assent to the panel's recommendation in In re Pappas, Justice William G. Clark noted: "While we are clearly not bound by recommendations of the hearing panel, its findings are entitled to considerable weight. . . .The facts of this case demand disbarment."

34 | December 1982 | Illinois Issues