Attorney
    General
        Opinions

Home rule and gambling casinos

A home-rule unit may not enact an ordinance authorizing the establishment and operation of a gambling casino within its boundaries. Passing such an ordinance would exceed the powers granted to home-rule units by the Illinois Constitution. It is the sole responsibility of the state to regulate or completely prohibit all forms of gambling.

The state has enacted, as part of its uniform criminal code, a comprehensive regulatory scheme which prohibits gambling activities. The operation of a gambling casino would be in violation of sections 28-1 and 28-3 of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch.38, sec. 28-3). In the case, People v. Valentine (1977), the Illinois appellate court addressed the issue of a home-rule municipality's ordinance conflicting with a provision of the state's statutes pertaining to criminal law. The court stated that, "If such an ordinance does exist it must yield to the supremacy of State law. . . ." (File No. 82-036)

Open meetings and committee meetings

The Open Meetings Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 102, sec. 41 et seq.) applies to committees and subcommittees of public bodies in the same manner as it would to the basic public body.

Section 1.02 of the Open Meetings Act defines the term "meeting" as "any gathering of a majority of a quorum of the members of a public body held for the purpose of discussing public business." A "public body" includes all legislative, executive, administrative or advisory bodies of the state or local governments, and any subsidiary bodies of any of the foregoing.

An example of the act's application is best drawn by reference to a seven-member principal public body. A majority of the quorum of such a body is three and thus, two members could discuss the body's business without complying with the requirements of the Open Meetings Act. However, if the two members are members of a committee or other subsidiary of the principal public body, and if the committee consists of five or fewer members, the act would apply to their discussion of the committee's business. Thus, the creation of two-member committees by a seven-member public body does not operate to circumvent the provisions of the Open Meetings Act. (File No. 82-030)

Collective bargaining for school employees

The regional superintendent of schools is responsible for any costs that are incurred for an election to determine an exclusive bargaining representative for collective bargaining purposes. The names of individuals appearing on petitions requesting such an election may be kept confidential by the regional superintendent unless there is a compelling public interest in opening them to public inspection.

Costs of the election are to be absorbed on the local level by the office of the regional superintendent (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 122, sec. 3-14.24). Though there is no state legislation on the subject, public disclosure of the signature sheets could, in fact, "chill" the right of employees to express union sentiments and could effectively eliminate the privacy which is secured by the secret ballot required in such elections. (File No. 82-029)

Consolidated elections and county clerks

The consolidation of Illinois elections increased the workload of county clerks and chief clerks of county boards of election commissioners. Public Act 82-961 requires the State Board of Elections to pay these officials a lump sum of $3,500 at the end of the state fiscal year for the additional duties they perform. The sum is not payable in advance.

Since more than one person may serve as county clerk or chief clerk of the county board of election commissioners, the $3,500 payment would be prorated, based upon the time of service, among the persons holding the office during the state fiscal year. The payment is taxable income, and the State Board of Elections has the obligation to withold for state and federal income tax, contributions to the Illinois Municipal Retirement Fund and the Social Security tax. (File No. 82-034).

Authority to 'pull' a traffic ticket

Under Supreme Court rules, the issuance of a traffic ticket marks the start of prosecution for the offense; once the ticket is written, a police officer has no authority to "pull" it or otherwise dispose of the citation prior to trial. The only persons having such authority are the judge, the prosecuting attorney and (in cases where the defendant pleads guilty) the clerk of the circuit court. (File No. 82-016)□

January 1983 | Illinois Issues | 36