WITH videotapes, a 24-hour business hotline and a theme song, "Discover the Magnificent Miles of Illinois," the State of Illinois is courting high technology companies. Like most other older industrial states, Illinois has fallen under the spell of the mystical growth powers of high tech and is courting these firms with the same unabashed enthusiasm that the Sunbelt pursued smokestacks a few years ago. The nation's industrial heartland would appear to have no choice. The speed with which the number of jobs in traditional manufacturing industries has declined has stunned the Midwest. Employment in automobiles and steel is barely half its level a decade ago. Manufacturing now accounts for less than one job in five — compared with one in three in 1960. High technology is the nation's one certifiable growth industry — and if the announcement by Atari that it was shifting 1,700 jobs overseas caused consternation in California, it has done little to slow the proliferation of advisory councils, governor's commissions, task forces and other highly visible state initiatives to make these firms welcome.

Attractive as it seems, the pursuit of high tech will not solve the economic problems of Illinois or of the Midwest. This approach to state development rests upon a fundamentally mistaken view of how economic development occurs and of the role played by state government in the complex process.

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Illinois, and all states, must realize that most of their growth will come through the birth of new firms — most started by entrepreneurs already living in the area — and from the expansion of existing firms — mostly those employing less than 100 people. Expanding economic opportunities will result from policies that remove the barriers to birth and expansion, not from industrial recruitment.

Change and crisis in state economies
A period of rapid economic change is always difficult to comprehend. We interpret what is happening around us by referring to our own mental maps - maps formed by our own experience, our economic education and by the narrow interpretation of events imposed upon us through the media.

Since these maps are based upon the past, we are reluctant to admit to change. When reality does not match our inner vision, we claim that the economy is in crisis and demand political action to reverse events.

The present crisis of "deindustrialization" has precedent in this century. In the 1950s and 1960s, central city populations poured into the suburbs, aided by mortgage subsidies and the construction of freeways. In the 1970s, the federal government officially declared an urban crisis and attempted to reverse the flow with ill-conceived subsidies for downtown development. Cities recovered but not around the subsidized convention centers and hotels. They rebuilt around gentrified neighborhoods and the expansion of the service industry, spontaneous developments that occurred in spite of federal and state "urban" policies.

In the 1920s and 1930s the mechanization of agriculture started the process that shrunk agriculture from 20 percent of the work force in 1920 to less than 4 percent today. Those displaced from the family farm eventually found jobs in rapidly growing manufacturing industries. Although the federal government had fewer instruments with which to delay this adjustment, the shift has left us a legacy of a heavily subsidized farm sector.

As much as we resist major changes and predict dire consequences from them, they occur. For the most part, they are associated with long-term growth in economic opportunity and personal income that far outweigh the short-term costs. But those who bear the short-run costs — through loss of jobs or of profits — are increasingly able to mobilize political support for policies that protect their jobs and incomes through explicit and implicit public subsidies. These policies delay change. The result is that the process of change has become more and more difficult for the entire nation. In an increasingly competitive world economy, the consequences of resisting change for our economic future are very serious, especially for those least able to organize and who cannot afford to learn new skills or to relocate to new jobs.

There are many very human reasons for resisting change. It is not easy for the steelworker who earned $35,000 to admit that his job can be done by a South Korean earning much less. It is not easy for top management in the rubber industry to admit that the bias ply tire was inferior to the radial. The steel industry, shipbuilders, farmers and thousands of other well-organized groups have lobbied successfully for federal protection from foreign competition and for government subsidies that permit not only their survival, but the continuation of much higher wages and profits than would result from a more competitive environment.

In each case, these industries have successfully argued that, in the absence of special treatment, U.S. jobs will be exported abroad.

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Protection does preserve some of the jobs, but the cost is enormous. These industries use resources that would be more valuably employed in growing industries that are competitive in world markets. Consumers — of all income groups — are forced to pay a higher price for the protected commodity as well as higher taxes to provide the subsidy.

The desire to return to the past rather than to profit from change is reflected in the host of programs that have been advanced by economists and politicians to deal with our economic malaise. The president called his 1981 budget "A Program for Economic Recovery." Others have called for reindustrialization, renewal or renaissance.

But any successful economic program must address two quite different issues. First, we must try to identify what is really happening to the economy; and, second, we must try to understand the forces that will resist the changes through which we are rapidly passing. We have a natural urge to protect jobs that are threatened in our community unless the harmful consequences of such protection are understood. Yet standard economics — as it is taught in most schools and as it is reflected in the way economic issues are discussed in the press and on television — is deeply flawed. Like a camera out of focus, economic theory does not help us to "see" what is happening to our economic environment clearly enough to react effectively.

How the economy works: the traditional view

We view the economy as a set of abstract aggregates — investment, consumption, the unemployment rate, the capacity utilization rate, the index of stock prices, etc. — that are somehow linked to our everyday experiences with finding a job, getting a pay raise or purchasing a bag of groceries. If the economy is doing well by these abstract measures, we feel that we are likely to be more successful than if it isn't doing well. We believe that the economy marches along a secular growth path, interrupted by cyclical downturns.

According to this simple view, the role of the government is to manage the economy so that it doesn't march too fast and suffer from inflation, and doesn't falter so that we experience a recession. In inflationary times, the government raises taxes, and during recessions it runs a deficit. And in this view, all a state government can really do to increase its share of the national economic pie is to steal companies from other states by offering generous tax abatements and exemptions.

This world view has profoundly shaped the way we understand what is happening around us and the way we judge the performance of elected officials. It is also wrong.

The process of economic development is far more complex than this economic growth model depicts. It is also far more complex than most economists seem prepared to admit. In interpreting what is happening around us we have been using the wrong map. And, just as Columbus persisted in believing he had landed in the Indies in spite of overwhelming evidence to the contrary, we persist in believing that there is "an economy" that exists in some mysterious aggregate form that can be successfully manipulated through fiscal and monetary policy.

The first clue to the faults of the map was the persistence of high unemployment with high inflation during the second half of the 1970s. According to the economists, prolonged unemployment above its "natural rate" would inevitably bring down inflation. When it did not, instead of throwing out the concept of a natural rate (surely one of the most artificial constructs ever), economists invented new explanations. One school of thought attributed the problem to short-sighted management in major corporations. Corporate managers, in turn, blamed the declining work ethic, increased government regulation or both. Another school blamed the government for not directing the economy as wisely as it was believed the Japanese economy was managed. Unions blamed imports, the Snowbelt blamed the Sunbelt, Republicans blamed Democrats, state governments blamed Washington, and the unemployed blamed everyone else.

Policies derived from such an inaccurate map are subject to sudden and destructive changes in direction. In the last two years, the conventional wisdom that deficit spending could pull the economy out of a recession was replaced with astounding ease by the belief that a balanced budget was the key to ending the recession. It is difficult to blame the discouraged voter for not believing that a trip to the polls is a civic duty.

Another view of the economy

In spite of our belief in the virtues of growth, we have persisted in a static view of the economy. The "macroeconomy," outlined above, is a myth. The whole is no different from the sum of the millions of parts, and those parts are constantly changing in response to the ebbs and flows of many forces — from shifts in world trade patterns and changes in consumer tastes to new inventions and new directions in federal expenditures. The national economy has not been moving sluggishly for the past decade, in spite of the picture portrayed by aggregate economic data. The national economy has been responding to a rapid succession of profound shocks — and has responded with considerable success despite the economic policies pursued in Washington, and in state capitals.

Even in a year when employment expands by two million jobs — a feat accomplished almost every year during the past decade contrary to the popular image of an ailing giant economy — this expansion is the net result of the loss of two million jobs in firms that cease existing, another loss of two million jobs in companies that reduce their work forces, offset by the creation of three million jobs in brand-new companies and a further three million new jobs in companies increasing their payrolls. Nearly half a million new firms will be born and a quarter of a million firms will go out of existence. Fifteen million workers will experience a spell of unemployment and another 10 million will change jobs. About four million people will enter the work force for the first time or after a prolonged spell away, and over two million people will retire.

The picture is one of dynamic change that is almost totally masked by the aggregate statistic that employment grew by 2 percent.

The last decade has been characterized not by industrial stagnation but by extraordinarily rapid adjustment to profound shocks. In 1970, a 1 percent increase in GNP was associated with a 1 percent increase in energy use. Today, that ratio has fallen from 1-to-1 to 1-to-one-third in response to a tenfold increase in energy costs.

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The U.S. economy accommodated a 25 percent increase in the work force. The much vaunted Japanese economy managed to increase its number of jobs by 12 percent, Germany by 4 percent, and in Britain and France the number of jobs increased scarcely at all. If the growth rate of labor productivity in the U.S. failed to keep pace with the rate in other developed countries, it is more a reflection of the abundance of labor than of the inefficiency or idleness of the U.S. worker.

The dismal performance of the stock exchange is often cited as a symptom of our decline. An index of shares traded on the New York Stock Exchange staggered from 100 in 1973 to a miserable 109 by the end of 1982, at current prices. Although 1983 has driven the Dow to new highs, the 1973 investment would have declined by about 35 percent in real terms during the past decade. By the end of 1982, the steel industry was operating at little more than one-third of its total capacity. Automobile production was at half its record level. The Fortune 500 have vied for record losses, layoffs and bankruptcies.

Yet should we expect our mature corporations to be the engine of economic growth? An index compiled by Venture Economics magazine of the stock value of 100 new corporations rose from 100 in 1973 to 480 today — a highly respectable 7 percent annual growth in real terms. In the midst of the 1982 recession, INC magazine had no difficulty finding 100 companies with sales growth rates that had exceeded 60 percent annually for the previous five years. The computer industry has grown from being one quarter of the size of the auto industry in 1970 (measured in terms of employment) to 50 percent larger than the auto industry today. The annual birth rate of new firms has risen from 250,000 in 1970 to nearly 600,000 in 1982.

To those trying to find their way through these conflicting statistics with an old map of the economy, these are trying times. Yet if economic development is understood as a dynamic process, they can be reconciled. Nearly half a century ago, economist Joseph Schumpeter described economic development as a "perennial gale of destruction" in which innovation and change lead to the devaluation of old resources and the revaluation of new ones. Those fortunate or able enough to develop a better mousetrap or a better way of building mousetraps will earn high profits — at least until competitors overtake them. As the forces compelling change accelerate, the more rapidly will some firms fail while others leap ahead. And few would disagree that these are rapidly changing times.

To describe the closed steel mills and declining automobile sales as the consequences of a "recession" is to deny the process of change. These industries will not and should not "bounce back" as the mythical, aggregate economy recovers. They are symptoms of imperfect adjustment to change, not a sign that the government should enact a jobs bill.

The process of adjustment to change is complex and involves millions of investment decisions — from major modernization plans by giant corporations to remodeling by a local restaurateur, from a new high technology firm investing in research to an individual deciding what discipline to major in at college. The process will scarcely be affected by the attempts by Illinois to attract a few high technology assembly facilities. Industrial recruitment programs can influence only a few decisions. They do little to change the social and economic environment that helps shape the millions of decisions that are ultimately reflected in the success or failure of the state's economy. The symptoms of decline — the closing of large plants, the erosion of whole industries and the unemployment in "company towns" — are much more visible than the signs of renewal. If a plant closing in East Chicago is offset by the jobs created in thousands of tiny new firms in downtown Chicago, in the more affluent suburbs and even in more distant townships, the two forces are not equally visible. Established businesses are larger, more familiar and have a more developed political constituency than the dispersed independent entrepreneurs and would-be entrepreneurs. We react to what we can easily see and to what we are led to understand by the news media.

The costs of job loss and company bankruptcy have become well-publicized. They have also become well-politicized. Auto workers and steelworkers have lobbied successfully for protection from foreign competition. Yet protecting industries which are no longer internationally competitive not only raises the price of products for millions of U.S. consumers, it also blocks the movement of these workers and capital into higher productivity jobs such as making automated machine tools. We lose two ways — in higher prices and less output. Meanwhile the delay has cost the users of steel and auto purchasers billions of dollars.

At the state level, major corporations have persuaded state and local governments to offer them enormous tax breaks under the threat of closing the plant or moving to a more amenable jurisdiction. States seem powerless to resist this lobbying and persist in the futile and fiscally suicidal competition for major plants. But if they do not pursue aggressive recruitment programs, how should they focus their economic development efforts?

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The involvement of state governments in economic development has a relatively recent history — but what it lacks in tradition it has more than made up for in growth. The State of Maine recently purchased a $20 million dry dock for Bath Iron Works — requiring neither repayment nor a guarantee of increased jobs. In 1981, New York State gave a multi-year tax abatement to Tiffany's to encourage it to retain back office operations of billing and shipping by upgrading its property at 57th and Fifth avenues — probably the most valuable real estate in the country. New York has now seen the error of its decision and has abolished the program. Pennsylvania spent at least $40 million in its bidding war with Ohio to attract Volkswagen — a plant that is barely able to continue operating today. Since only two states keep track of the cost of these types of tax expenditures, we have no real idea how much states and localities are spending to attract or retain jobs — but educated guesses put the total at between $5 and $10 billion annually.

At the very least, these policies have been a zero sum game. At worst, they have led to the wrong type of development — subsidies to weak and slow-growing firms that raise the tax burden on other firms and that attract the type of routinized assembly operations that are most likely to shift abroad over time. And, since these firms bring their own capital, machine tools and long-term contracts with out-of-state suppliers, they contribute little to developing the local economy.

Perhaps the best way to characterize these state efforts is that they are anti-entrepreneurial. They focus upon major corporate relocations and ignore the much larger role in economic development played by indigenous business and indigenous business people. They are predicated on the mistaken belief that the only way to feed these entrepreneurial "sparrows" is to feed the multinational corporate "horses."

Is there an alternative? Can the state develop policies that create a climate that encourages the evolution of new enterprises, products and processes rather than one that preserves existing institutions? And, a still more difficult question: Can a political constituency be built to enact and carry out these policies?

Designing state development policies

Once the dynamic process of development is understood, designing state economic policies revolves around identifying the barriers to economic adjustment — finding out why the changes that are necessary are not made as quickly or as smoothly as the speed of change dictates. Why is a large share of the labor force apparently ill-trained for the growing number of technical jobs? Why did the steel industry wait so long to invest in modern production techniques? Why has the unemployment rate climbed secularly during the last decade?

It is easy, but ultimately irresponsible, to attribute economic problems to sudden and mysterious forces such as a loss of the work ethic, the absence of Japanese management techniques or Japanese government institutions (which we never had anyway) or monopoly capitalism. These "explanations" beg the question of why these factors have suddenly become important and why we seem less able to cope with change today than we were in previous periods of transition. It is difficult but more rewarding to seek the cause in the changing structure of public policies and to understand the subtle changes in public policy in terms of the ability of those groups downwind of Schumpeter's perennial gale to seek recourse for storm damages through the manipulation of public policy.

The process of developing effective state economic policies can be illustrated by examining capital markets. The shifting economy requires continual changes in the flows of different types of capital if it is to adjust quickly. Economists like to regard capital markets as a clear example of the virtues of the market system — after all capital would appear to be fungible, one dollar looks very like another dollar. They argue that the money flows quickly to where it earns the highest reward. Unfortunately, in the real world, capital markets do not operate perfectly. The institutions that control investment decisions do not have perfect knowledge and do not operate in a competitive industry. Federal and state regulations restrict investment choices and shape decisions. The enormously complex and fluid federal and state tax codes create artificial differences in the rates of return on different types of investment.

The ingenuity of Congress and state legislatures has perforated tax codes with preferential treatment for politically powerful lobbying groups — from horse breeding in Kentucky to worm farms (for fishing bait) in Virginia. A thorough examination of the biases that are implicit in tax and regulatory policies would run to many volumes. The net result is that the availability of "risk capital" — essential for the birth and growth of new enterprises — is constrained. A few examples illustrate the distortions in capital markets that work together to protect existing enterprises and make it more difficult for viable new businesses to compete.

• Bank regulators classify risky loans — a procedure that makes it expensive for banks to lend to smaller and newer enterprises. The purpose is to protect depositors, a function that is already performed by deposit insurance. The Glass-Steagel Act prevents banks from making equity investments which denies small firms an obvious and low cost source of equity.

• Prohibition of branch banking in Illinois has left its banks in noncompetitive markets with the result that they are more likely to invest in safe government securities than in riskier loans to small local businesses.

• The federal personal income tax code treats gains and losses asymmetrically — losses can only be written off at the rate of $3,000 a year while gains are fully taxable when realized.

• Illinois' public pension systems have been, until recently, precluded from making equity investments in new ventures.

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Each of these policies — considered individually — is relatively unimportant. But they are reinforced by dozens of provisions and practices with the same thrust. The result is a deterrence to risk-taking and a consequent dampening of entrepreneurial activity. The venture capital industry, the principal institutional source of risk capital, has recovered from the depths of the mid-1970s but is still concentrated in a few areas and in a few industries. Some measure of the scarcity of venture capital is the extraordinary rates of return earned by venture portfolios during the last decade — an average of 25 percent annually.

Last year, one-sixth of all venture capital placements were made in Santa Clara County, Calif. — site of famed Silicon Valley. It is difficult to believe that one in six of all the enterprising entrepreneurs in the U.S. were living in Silicon Valley. Illinois has few venture capitalists actively seeking profitable deals locally. The combination of an undeveloped venture industry and an overregulated banking sector means that new and risky enterprises in Illinois will have difficulty finding capital. Therefore one objective of state development policy should be to increase the supply of venture capital and to encourage more aggressive lending by banks. This could be done through tax incentives. A number of states have experimented with different types of credits and exemptions, although the initiatives are too recent to be able to judge their effectiveness. For example, California and New York excluded capital gains earned from investments in new enterprises from taxation (if the investments are held for at least five years). Indiana, Maine and Wisconsin provide tax credits for private investments in venture capital corporations.

Other states are developing ways of encouraging banks to increase their lending to small and middle market firms by setting up risk-pooling mechanisms and secondary markets for small loan participations. What all these initiatives have in common is the goal of changing the behavior of the thousands of private financial institutions by changing the incentive structure within which they operate. This is a very different approach than that of industrial recruitment.

It would be a mistake to argue that the barriers to aggressive investment all lie in tax and regulatory policies. The behavior of financial institutions is profoundly influenced by tradition as well as by the tax code. This places the old industrial region at a disadvantage compared with states whose industrial development is more recent. Banks in Illinois have developed close ties with their clientele of large corporations. They have been able to make a large volume of investments with relatively few customers. They have had no need to aggressively seek out smaller and newer customers.

By the same token, the large corporations that have dominated the mid-western economy have traditionally been engaged in managing large-scale production, not in inventing new products, in developing new processes or in seeking out new markets. The type of institutional structure that manages operations well seems less effective at innovation and invention. While large U.S. corporations were protected by a de facto monopoly in world trade because of the underdevelopment of our trading partners, their relative inflexibility was not a problem. World War II aided the U.S. in developing its industry but destroyed the industrial base of its competitors. But as the pace of change has accelerated, U.S. industrial leaders failed to maneuver fast enough to compete with more entrepreneurial businesses abroad. Their slow adjustment has cost the nation's industrial heartland thousands of jobs.

But government policies cannot be manipulated to change the behavior of these institutions directly. If policies are directed at exposing them to the rigors of an unprotected environment, they will adapt more rapidly than if their quiet life is perpetuated through state or federal intervention.

The same types of barriers to adaption and change that have permeated capital markets are even more visible in labor markets. Organized labor has been able to gain massive federal and state income maintenance programs for the unemployed. It has resisted programs to provide funds for retraining or relocation even though there is ample evidence that one of the most significant barriers to employment is inadequate education or skills. Their resistance is natural. A retrained worker may no longer be a member of the union. An unemployed one will be. Federal training programs such as the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA) — now replaced by the Job Training Partnership Act — have been halfhearted and wholly inadequate to provide the retraining resources that are needed.

Adjustment in the labor markets is also delayed by the slow response of publicly subsidized education and training institutions. Community colleges and vocational education institutions are slow to adopt new curricula or programs because they are protected from the consequences of poor management and poor quality training by their annual subsidies from state government. As economic growth depends more and more heavily on investments in human capital — a result of the adoption of new production technologies by all firms, not simply of the demands for technicians in high tech firms, the failure of the education sector to respond will impose increasingly binding constraints on growth. Some states are experimenting with new ways of funding education programs including increased emphasis on performance.

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Illinois urgently needs to develop policies to overcome these labor and capital market barriers if it is to compete successfully in a changing economic environment.

Building a constituency for change

Moving toward a state development strategy based on identifying and removing barriers to development will quickly attract opponents. Existing banks will resist measures to make their industry more competitive — however passionately they endorse the merits of the free market at business lunches. Bureaucrats in the education system will oppose any move to require them to perform effectively in order to gain state funds. Large corporations will fight to retain the discretionary tax incentives by liberal use of the threat to leave or to close.

The preferential treatment accorded to the politically organized has proliferated as the speed of economic change has accelerated. As technological progress and changing world trade patterns threaten more jobs (as well as opening more opportunities), protection has become a central focus of state and federal policy. It was precisely because development required this shift of profits and resources that Schumpeter believed that the free enterprise approach was doomed to be replaced by greater state control of the economy. His prediction has been born out by federal and state actions in the last two decades.

Protection of inefficient industry is short-sighted and harmful. It helps a minority of workers who keep their jobs temporarily. It hurts millions of other workers by blocking the creation of new and more efficient enterprises where they could be employed. Capital and savings bottled up in old plants cannot be poured into new plants. The real victims of this protectionism and government subsidization are those who are least politically organized and least able to bear the costs of slower growth and reduced economic opportunity — the 40 million citizens whose income rarely rises above the poverty level and for whom economic dislocation means a return to welfare and food stamps. In the intense media coverage of closed steel mills it is often forgotten that steelworkers earned an average of nearly $30,000 a year, and that during the last, inflation-ravaged decade managed to negotiate wage increases that gave them a real increase of 39 percent over 10 years — higher than the increases in any other industry. At the same time the share of national income earned by the poorest 40 percent of the nation declined from 12 percent to less than 9 percent. In our rush to protect the steelworker, we are ignoring the plight of those whom the president has infelicitously dubbed "the truly needy." In fact, the truly needy will be helping to pay for the steelworkers' shift to another well-paying job.

Perhaps the most serious economic problem confronting Illinois and the nation is not how to restore the steel and auto industries but how to ensure that the benefits and opportunities of economic growth are more widely shared. We can ill-afford the economic

Illinois' most serious task is not to restore the steel and auto industries but to ensure that the benefits and opportunities of economic growth are more widely shared

costs of excluding a growing number of Americans from productive employment. We cannot afford the fiscal costs of rising dependence, and we cannot afford the social costs of excluding so many potential workers from our labor force.

Many of the policies that can help the poor will also lead to a more efficient and faster rate of adjustment. Economists have traditionally argued that the goals of economic efficiency and economic equity involve painful trade-offs. But this is a false vision based upon an artificial construct of how the economy functions. We can pursue both goals simultaneously; in fact, we must inevitably pursue both goals simultaneously. If we improve the operation of capital markets so that institutions are encouraged to make riskier investments, the major beneficiaries will be "marginal entrepreneurs" and projects in marginal neighborhoods, because these are the investments that have been starved of capital through present capital markets.

The pace of economic change will accelerate in the next decade. Technological progress — propelled by dramatic reductions in the costs of processing, storing and communicating data — will change the ways we live and work more rapidly than did the first industrial revolution one hundred years ago. The expansion of world trade will guarantee that the consequences of failing to adapt rapidly will be reflected immediately in declining profits and employment.

The new alchemists who would solve all our economic problems with a spirited burst of high technology are ignoring reality. By the most generous estimates, high technology industry will be responsible for less than one new job out of 20 during the next decade. While high tech offers glittering prizes to scientists and venture capitalists, more than half of the jobs it creates will pay little more than the minimum wage and offer no opportunities for career ladders. Policies to aid high tech industry, also threaten the independence of the university system which some states seem prepared to offer as an extension of corporate laboratories.

The state must try to build a constituency for more entrepreneurial policies, but it is not clear that such a constituency can easily be forged. The state and the nation face a fundamental dilemma: Can policies be devised that compensate those that lose in the process of economic change without destroying the necessary incentives for adjustment? Can the institutions that increasingly clog the nation's economic arteries respond to the larger need to adapt or will they act only to preserve themselves and their view of reality? In the long run the changes will occur but perhaps too slowly to avoid a high cost in human suffering and social divisiveness. □

Roger J. Vaughan is senior fellow, Gallatin Institute, Washington, D. C. He was economic adviser to Gov. Hugh Carey of New York, 1980-1982, and is the author of several books, including Rebuilding America: Financing Public Works in the 1980s published in May by the Council of State Planning Agencies.

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