By DAVID H. EVERSON The Mondale win in Illinois: a salvage operation

The Illinois delegates to the Democratic National Convention July 16-20 in San Francisco are not going as a solid bloc. Mondale has the most committed delegates, but Hart has 40 and Mayor Harold Washington has 35. There are also 23 uncommitted delegates. The Illinois Democratic primary on March 20 was the key to Mondale's edge in the state delegation, and it was a significant win for Mondale in the early part of the presidential primary season. Looking at the campaign and the vote in Illinois' primary, David Everson suggests Mondale would have a tough time winning the state in November. Everson also analyzes how the Democratic rule changes affected delegate selection.

IN JANUARY of 1984 political pundits were asking if anyone could stop Walter Mondale's well-oiled presidential nomination machine. In the scenario then being written the March 20th Illinois primary might prove to be the psychological clincher in his drive to the Democratic nomination. The growing sense of the inevitability of Mondale had several components: his well-tuned campaign organization; his superior financial resources; his endorsement by key interest groups such as NOW, the AFL-CIO and the National Education Association; and the growing evidence that the campaign of his chief opponent, Sen. John Glenn of Ohio, did not have the "right stuff." In addition, the Democratic party had stacked the rules of the nomination game in favor of well-established and well-financed candidates and against dark horses. In 1972 and in 1976 George McGovern and Jimmy Carter had used the early nomination contests to emerge from obscurity and to go on to capture the party's nod, much to the consternation of many party regulars. The Democrats tried to prevent a similar result in 1984.

Predictions about the course of presidential nominating politics are always hazardous, and this time was no exception. By March 14th, the day after the round of primaries called "Super Tuesday," the significance of the Illinois contest had shifted psychologically from all but guaranteeing Mondale's ultimate triumph to a test of whether he could revive his sagging candidacy. Mondale knew that stumbling front-runners such as Edmund Muskie in 1972 had failed to recover. On the other hand Ronald Reagan's comeback after his 1980 defeat by George Bush in the Iowa caucuses gave Mondale some solace.

The significance of the Illinois Democratic presidential primary in 1984 stemmed from the coincidence of three factors. The first was the change in the Democratic nomination rules, which resulted in the "frontloading" of the delegate selection process. The second was the timing of the Illinois primary near the end of the first round of nomination contests. The last was the unexpected direction that the race had taken up to that point. Despite the best efforts of the party, two dark-horse candidates had emerged and John Glenn was out of the picture. Mondale's victory in the Illinois primary did ultimately signal a rebirth of his chances. At the same time, it raised questions about his ability to carry the state in November.

The first task of this article is to describe the changes in the Democratic party rules and their effects on Illinois. Next the campaign up to Illinois will be described briefly. Then the Illinois campaign and results will be analyzed. Finally some conclusions will be drawn about the significance of the Illinois primary for the general election.

Democratic rules

Since the major reforms of the national nominating rules by the Democratic party in 1972 the party has tinkered with them for each successive election. Like generals preparing for the last war the party has reacted to the problems of the last nomination round and vowed to "get it right this time." The 1972 changes had opened up the nomination process to more mass participation through new rules making

10/June 1984/Illinois Issues

the delegate selection process more orderly and fair. They had also mandated increased representation of women, blacks and young people in state delegations. These changes unintentionally increased the number of states holding primaries since many states decided to conform to the new party rules by holding primaries instead of caucuses or conventions. By 1980 more than 30 states were holding primaries compared to 18 in 1968. (The number dropped back to 26 in 1984.)

One major result of these changes was the increased influence of early contests, especially the Iowa caucuses and the New Hampshire primary. They were seized upon by the media as crucial tests of candidate strength. The attention lavished on Iowa and New Hampshire, solely because they were first, ignored both the unrepresentativeness of these states and, in the case of the Democratic party, the fact that neither was particularly likely to be in the Democratic column in the general election.

The undue attention to Iowa and New Hampshire illustrated another new fact of presidential nominating politics. The media would now interpret the meaning of the complex set of primary and caucus results. The media in 1972 had postulated that Edmund Muskie had to get better than 50 percent of the vote in new Hampshire. When he received 46 percent of the vote to George McGovern's 37 percent he "lost" and never recovered.

Along with the heightened impact of the media came a decline of the role of the conventions in determining the party's nominee. The more open process had allowed the nomination of dark horse Democratic candidates in 1972 and 1976 and had permitted a strong challenge to incumbent President Jimmy Carter in 1980 by Ted Kennedy. (That the Republicans were not immune to the effects of these changes is indicated by Ronald Reagan's strong challenge to incumbent President Gerald Ford in 1976. Both Ford and Carter went on to lose the general election, suggesting that the costs of the new process for the party in power could be high indeed.)

The more open process in the Democratic party had produced candidates who had suffered landslide defeats in 1972 and 1980 and had achieved only the one narrow victory in 1976. The process was not the only reason for the Democratic party's failures. The party has often been bitterly divided, and the process has merely exposed the divisions. Nevertheless the track record of the reformed process was dismal, and a consensus developed that the reforms had gone too far.

One more in a long series of Democratic party reform commissions was chaired by Gov. James B. Hunt of North Carolina. It sought to remedy the situation. In order to increase the influence of party regulars, the commission recommended that a substantial percentage of the convention seats be reserved for party and elected officials. The actual number was 566 (out of 3,933). One hundred and sixty-four were chosen from the ranks of the U.S. House Democrats by the Democratic caucus of that body in January; another 27 were chosen from the U.S. Senate in a similar manner in March. The remainder were to be chosen in state conventions. These delegates were to be formally "uncommitted" (although in truth they might have preferences among the candidates) and might give the convention some flexibility in choosing the party's nominee if the primaries and caucuses did not produce a consensus.

The Hunt Commission also recommended shortening the delegate selection period. By limiting the race for delegates to a three-month period from early March to early June the commission hoped to reduce both the costs and the tediousness of the campaign. Recognizing the influence of the early contests, several states moved their delegate selection to the front of the schedule. In the jargon of nominating politics, delegate selection had become "frontloaded." Almost half of the delegates would be chosen in the first five weeks. Many conjectured that this would reduce the impact of Iowa and New Hampshire and would limit the chances of dark-horse candidates who would not have time to develop the national name recognition necessary to compete for the nomination. One of the factors which upset these calculations was the national Democratic party's surrender to Iowa and New Hampshire, allowing them to hold their contests outside the three-month "window."

One other change in the rules was that delegates who are elected as pledged to a candidate are no longer bound by party rules to support that candidate at the national convention. This change grew out of the criticism of the "bound delegate" rule by Kennedy supporters in 1980.

Finally the commission softened its rules for proportional representation of delegates from states. Proportional representation is a system that spreads delegates among candidates. After achieving a minimum percentage of the vote in the primary, a presidential candidate would capture delegates in proportion to the percentage of vote received. In 1984, the traditional system of selecting delegates on a plurality basis was again permitted in the primaries provided delegates were chosen at the congressional district level and not statewide. This meant that if a district selected three delegates and all three of the delegates pledged to a given candidate received more votes than any of the others, they won, allowing that candidate to sweep the district. It was surmised that this change would benefit the established candidates because of the potential for a frontrunner to capture all the delegates in districts by getting a plurality of the vote.

The changes in Democratic party rules since 1972 have had a great impact on the role of Illinois in the nomination process. Three factors account for this. The first is that primaries, even the preference type in Illinois, have become more important both to candidates and the media. The second is that Illinois holds its primary at which it elects most of the delegates relatively early in the game. Because of the psychological impact of the early contests, the earlier a state party selects its delegates the more influence it is likely to have. Finally, Illinois is significant because of its reputation as a bellwether state, a "microcosm of the nation," and its vote is assessed to predict what might happen in the general election.

June 1984/Illinois Issues/11

In 1984, with the frontloading of the process, Illinois' position in the schedule was even more significant. The Illinois primary would be the first in the nation's industrial and agricultural heartland (Michigan would hold caucuses on March 17th), a region which is vital to both parties in the general election. By the time the Illinois primary was over — only one month into the season — 40 percent of the delegates would be chosen.

The 1984 rules also allowed Illinois to continue its practice of electing delegates by congressional districts on a possible "winner take all" basis. In 1980, Illinois had been granted an exemption from the proportional representation rule.

The race prior to Illinois

Most observers believed from the start that Illinois would play a central role in the Democratic party's 1984 presidential nomination. At first the Illinois primary loomed as possibly decisive in the race shaping up between former Vice President Mondale and Senator Glenn. The Rev. Jesse Jackson's entry into the fray merely added spice, with speculation focusing on how much Jackson might siphon off black voter support from Mondale, thus aiding Glenn. But even prior to Glenn's poor showing in the Iowa caucuses his candidacy seemed to fade. A different scenario emerged, one which hinted that the Hunt Commission had done its work too well. Mondale's nomination began to seem inevitable.

But the experts were wrong again. The fascination of the media with the early tests in Iowa and New Hampshire could not be legislated out of existence. Mondale's solid win in the Iowa caucuses was expected and was therefore not "news." Colorado Sen. Gary Hart's second place finish, with 15 percent of the caucus vote and with just a few thousand votes more than the next place finisher, was unexpected and therefore was "news." As Jimmy Carter had done in 1976 in Iowa, where he finished second to "uncommitted," Hart parlayed the media attention generated by Iowa into a major upset in the New Hampshire primary. Despite the Hunt Commission's efforts, Iowa, New Hampshire and media ballyhoo again played a major role in the presidential nomination process.

The next big round of primaries, "Super Tuesday" with 375 delegates at stake, was a standoff. Hart won in Massachusetts, Rhode Island and Florida while Mondale carried Alabama and Georgia. These latter two wins gave Mondale a much needed boost going into Illinois.

Nevertheless Mondale seemed in deep touble. Hart's victories had attracted volunteers and financial support. His youth and good looks, his claim to speak for a new generation and his advocacy of new ideas contrasted with Mondale's slightly shopworn image. A Mondale loss in Illinois could turn him into a second Muskie.

The Illinois primary

Illinois' 1984 Democratic delegates to the national convention would be a major plum, the nation's fifth largest delegation. One hundred and sixteen delegates would be at stake in the March 20th primary. Of the remaining 78, 23 were the unpledged: nine congressional Democrats chosen by party caucuses in January and March and 14 to be chosen by the state convention May 8. The other 55 would also be chosen at the state convention in May and allocated to the candidates according to the percentages of delegates won in the primary.

The Illinois presidential primary includes both a preference poll and a separate delegate selection process. The preference poll is a "beauty contest" among presidential candidates; no delegates were at stake when a voter marked his ballot for Mondale or Hart, for example. The votes that counted on the March 20 ballot were the ones for delegates. Delegates were on the ballot in each congressional district pledged to a particular candidate or listed as uncommitted. Although each congressional district had its own list of delegates on the ballot, the number of delegates at stake in each district in the Democratic primary was dependent upon previous Democratic voting in the districts: Those districts with higher levels of Democratic support would have more delegates. Whether a presidential candidate had delegates running in each of the 22 districts was up to the candidate and his success at securing slates to fill the ballot in time for the primary.

There are several forms of primaries, but Illinois holds neither of the major forms: open primary or closed primary. In an open primary, the voter may select in secret which party's primary to vote in. (Wisconsin has long had an open primary.) In a closed primary the voter must be registered with a party to vote in that party's primary. The national Democratic party has banned the use of open primaries for the selection of delegates to its national nominating convention, and the U.S. Supreme Court has upheld that ban in a case involving Wisconsin.

Illinois has a hybrid system often called a "crossover" primary. It is not an open primary because party preference must be declared. But it is not much of a closed primary because the voter can choose which party's primary to vote in on the day of the primary, and voters can switch party preferences willy-nilly from election to election. It remains to be seen if the national Democratic party will continue to tolerate the crossover primary.

The campaign

Other things being equal, Illinois should have been a good state for Mondale: a state which had not fully participated in the economic recovery, a state which had ample numbers of traditional Democratic voters and a state in which Mondale had the party endorsement in Cook County. Yet even prior to Hart's surprising emergence as a challenger Mondale had problems in Illinois. The problems were created by that very endorsement by the Cook County Democrats. That

12/June 1984/Illinois Issues

endorsement could not conceal the split in the party between the forces led by county chairman Ed Vrdolyak and those led by Chicago Mayor Harold Washington. Mondale was caught in the middle of a local power struggle. He attempted to get Washington's support but it was not forthcoming. Washington ran a separate slate of delegates in Chicago pledged to himself. There remained also the question of the effect on Mondale's vote of Jesse Jackson's presence on the preference ballot.

The major story of the 1984 Illinois Democratic presidential primary campaign was the comeback of Walter Mondale, aided by the stumbles of Gary Hart. The polls showed that Hart held a slight lead going into the week of the Illinois primary but his support was soft. An aroused Mondale had gone on the offensive against Hart in the week prior to "Super Tuesday." He questioned the substance of Hart's "new ideas," attacked positions that Hart had taken as a senator and doubted Hart's steadiness and judgment.

Hart's inability to articulate his ideas convincingly, his own blunders and Mondale's counterattacks were sufficient to wipe out the fragile lead that Hart had enjoyed. None of Hart's gaffes was major but in combination they took some of the luster off his candidacy. The first misstep came when his aides informed him that Mondale was preparing commercials attacking Hart for changing his name, for fudging on his age and for altering his signature. This information was incorrect; Hart reacted angrily only to discover that the commercials did not exist, and he was forced to apologize for his outburst. Next came the confusion over Hart's attempt to make capital out of the endorsement Mondale got from the Cook County Democrats. A Hart commercial suggested that Mondale was a puppet of party bosses. Hart ordered the commercial withdrawn but it ran on some stations anyway. This gave Mondale the opening he needed: "Here's a person who says he wants to be president of the United States because he says he can run the federal government and he can't get an ad off TV that he's paying for in 48 hours." Hart's error was not in attacking Mondale's connection with the Cook County organization; Jesse Jackson was doing the same. It was in appearing indecisive and ineffective.

To cap his bad week in Illinois, Hart made an off-the-cuff statement, during the Illinois debate, that raised questions about his judgment. Answering a hypothetical question about ordering the shooting down of a Russian plane in American airspace, Hart said it would depend upon whether the crew was in military garb. In combination, this series of minor flubs slowed the momentum Hart had enjoyed since Iowa.

Sensing that his campaign was slipping, Hart went to his base of support, the university communities. In an effort to capture the anti-war vote he attempted to link Mondale's positions on Central America with Reagan's, and he reminded audiences that Mondale had been slow to criticize the Vietnam War.

Mondale's campaign concentrated on generating support among the basic constituencies of the Democratic party. For example, in downstate cities with economic problems he attacked Hart's opposition to domestic content legislation that would restrict the use of non-American materials in construction and industry.

The results

The Illinois preference vote spelled a clear victory for Mondale. Statewide, he received 41 percent of the preference vote as opposed to Hart's 35 percent and Jackson's 21 percent.

In the delegate voting Mondale was also the clear winner. He was the only surviving candidate to field a full set of 116 delegates. Hart had only 42 delegates pledged to him on the ballot. In the wake of his New Hampshire victory, however, he picked up the support of 35 other Illinois delegate candidates formerly pledged to others who had fallen by the wayside. Mayor Washington fielded a slate of 42 delegates in six Chicago area congressional districts (1st, 2nd, 5th, 7th, 8th and 9th). Thirty other delegates were pledged to the candidacy of Jesse Jackson.

As a result of the March 20th primary, Mondale won 65 delegates, Hart 27 and Harold Washington 24. Jesse Jackson won no delegates for two reasons: the absence of proportional representation and the fact that Jackson did not field delegate slates in those districts contested by Washington.

At the state convention in May, additional delegates supporting Mondale, Hart and Washington would be selected. The 55 delegate slots, to be allocated to the candidates on the basis of delegates won in the primary, would give Mondale another 31, Hart 13 and Washington 11. (Jackson is expected to make a bid for some of these delegates, arguing that the rules are unfair.)

As for Illinois' 23 uncommitted delegates, the nine selected in Democratic congressional caucuses in January (House) and March (Senate) are Sen. Alan J. Dixon from Belleville and U.S. Reps. Charles Hayes (D-l, Chicago), Cardiss Collins (D-7, Chicago), William Lipinski (D-5, Chicago), Melvin Price (D-21, East St. Louis), Dan Rostenkowski (D-8, Chicago), Gus Savage (D-2, Chicago), Marty Russo (D-3, South Holland) and Frank Annunzio (D-ll, Chicago). An additional 14 uncommitted delegates were to be selected at the state convention.

Chicago dominates the uncommitted congressional delegates from Illinois with seven of the nine from the Chicago area. Four of the nine are black (Hayes, Collins, Price and Savage). Added to the Washington delegation, the voice of black Illinois Democrats will be strong at the 1984 national Democratic Convention.

The final breakdown of the Illinois delegation at the Democratic National Convention will probably be: Mondale 96, Hart 40, Washington 35 and uncommitted 23. Many of the uncommitted have stated preferences for particular candidates.

As for the expectation that candidates would sweep the districts, a district-by-district analysis of the delegate winners March 20 shows that in 16 of the congressional districts one candidate won all of the delegates. In the absence of proportional representation this is what many expected would happen in all the districts. In the other six congressional districts, however, Mondale and Hart divided the delegates (these were the 9th, 15th, 17th, 20th, 21st and 22nd). Indeed, Hart won 16 of

June 1984/Illinois Issues/13

his 27 delegates in divided districts. These results show that although there is a general tendency for the winner-take-all principle to work in the absence of mandated proportional representation, such an outcome is not inevitable.

As for the preference vote for presidential candidate, exit polls revealed clear differences in the characteristics of Mondale and Hart supporters. For example, Hart won a majority of the vote of those 18 to 29 years old while Mondale captured the vote of those 60 and older. The generation split is not just rhetorical. As expected, Mondale did better among the traditional Democratic groups while Hart fared better among independents and those with more education. Mondale ran stronger among union members, Hart among college graduates. One surprise is that Mondale did better among conservative voters and Hart among liberals — this despite Mondale's identification as a New Deal Democrat. This anomaly can be explained by the fact that liberalism no longer has the clear meaning it did in the New Deal era when to be liberal meant to support the New Deal. While Jackson captured an overwhelming 79 percent of the black vote, matching his record in the earlier primaries, Mondale won a significant 17 percent, which contributed to his preference vote victory over Hart. Hart managed just 4 percent of the black vote, a weakness in his appeal which was to trouble his campaign in New York and Pennsylvania. In a continuation of the generational theme, Mondale's best showing among black voters came from those 60 and older. (These exit poll data are from the New York Times/CBS, News Poll published in the New York Times March 22, 1984, p. 14.)

These findings were repeated in the downstate voting patterns. Hart did well in the more suburban areas and especially in university communities. Mondale fared well in areas with depressed economies, unemployment, smokestack industries and a labor union tradition. Hart carried four of the five suburban collar counties around Cook. The only one he lost was Will, which contains industrialized Joliet. Hart received more votes in traditionally Republican DuPage County than in any other county of the state save Cook; DuPage is second most populous after Cook. Hart also carried several counties that contain the major public universities of the state: Champaign (University of Illinois), DeKalb (Northern Illinois University), Jackson (Southern Illinois University) and McLean (Illinois State University). Hart swept all five of the delegate slots in the 19th Congressional District, which contains the University of Illinois. Predictably, Hart also won Sangamon County, which contains the seat of state government and has many well educated white collar workers. Winnebago County (Rockford) was one county Hart carried which does not fit the profile, but Rockford also has a tradition of supporting candidates who might be considered party mavericks, such as Republican Congressman John B. Anderson, who was elected in the district 10 times from 1960 to 1978.

In the other urban, industrialized downstate counties, Mondale was the preference vote winner: Kankakee, Macon (Decatur), Peoria, Rock Island (Quad Cities), Madison (Alton, Granite City) and St. Clair (East St. Louis). Jackson ran best downstate in St. Clair County, finishing second behind Mondale.

Peter Colby and Paul Green have convincingly argued that "downstate holds the key to victory" in Illinois presidential elections. If so, the preference primary results could signal trouble for Mondale in the fall. He should expect to roll up heavy majorities in Chicago, but these votes are likely to be counterbalanced by equally heavy Reagan majorities in suburban Cook and the surrounding collar counties. Mondale carried only 18 of the 96 downstate counties. This suggests that Mondale has a major task to convince downstate independents and Democrats to support him in the general election.

Conclusions

At the outset of the presidential nomination season, the role of Illinois might have been expected to be that of kingmaker. The Democratic rules were thought to be stacked against longshots like Gary Hart. John Glenn was fading. But the rules could not prevent the emergence of Gary Hart nor could they anticipate the impact of Jesse Jackson.

Illinois shifted from kingmaker to salvage operation for Mondale.

The Democratic presidential race is still in doubt, but Walter Mondale has clearly reestablished himself as the favorite. Illinois was a turning point. Even with Jesse Jackson in the race, Illinois and Chicago provided Mondale with the blend of urban, industrial and agricultural interests congenial to his traditional New Deal liberalism. In the New York and Pennsylvania primaries that followed, Mondale was able to replicate his Illinois win. Illinois showed the way for Mondale to win the nomination — emphasis on his credentials as a traditional Democrat and as an experienced leader.

But winning the nomination is not the same as winning the general election. Illinois' significance in the general election lies both in the promise and the peril it holds for Mondale. The promise is that in a race against Ronald Reagan, that old New Deal Coalition is likely to come to life once again. Mondale should gain the overwhelming support of the working class, many of whom have been hurt by Reagan's economic policies. The black voters brought into the process by the candidacy of Jackson should, given the choice between Mondale and Reagan, have no hesitation to vote Democratic. If the labor union members, the blacks and the less advantaged turn out, it should be a close election in Illinois and the nation.

But the peril is Mondale's questionable appeal to weak Democrats, independents and even some Republicans who were attracted to Gary Hart. The issues on which such an appeal could be made include foreign policy, the environment and women's rights. Paradoxically, a presidential election whose main issues will be economic and whose main divisions will be class related could be decided on non-economic issues by the voting within a class — the middle class. In Illinois, the test for Mondale will be whether he can broaden his appeal to attract those suburban and downstate voters who cast nearly 300,000 votes for Hart in March.

David H. Everson is professor of public affairs in the Illinois Legislative Studies Center at Sangamon State University. He is the author of numerous Illinois Issues articles analyzing various legislative and political issues in the state.

14/June 1984/Illinois Issues