A few years ago Pac-man of video game fame was an instant success. Today a PAC of a different sort — the political action committee — has caught everyone's attention, not in the video arcades, but in the intricate game of state and national politics where it is playing a dominant role. These committees quietly crept into the political scene, continue to grow and prosper in number and influence and seem assured a long lifespan.

What do we know about those creatures commonly referred to as PACs? Where did they come from? What role do they play in Illinois politics today — specifically in financing campaigns?

Simply stated, a PAC is a group of individuals who have associated for the purpose of raising and dispensing money to influence the outcome of elections and the course of legislation. A PAC usually represents a fairly narrow or specific interest or point of view — whether it be handgun control, protecting the environment, promoting business opportunities for a particular segment of the economy or whatever.

Everyone knows that PACs have grown dramatically during the last decade. The Federal Election Commission reports that the number of PACs in federal campaigns has increased 684 percent in 10 years: from 608 in 1974 to 4,157 in 1986. Coupled with this growth is an even more dramatic increase in PAC contributions to federal campaigns. These expenditures have skyrocketed 1,155 percent in 10 years: from $21 million to $266 million.

This startling increase in PAC activity nationally has prompted great concern among political observers and participants alike. The criticism is not how much money is spent in campaigns but the way it is raised. It is argued that this large influx of "special interest" money, much of which is actively solicited by the candidate, places severe pressures on legislators by making them more beholden to these PACs than to the general public.

Table 1. Growth rate of statewide political action committees, 1976-86, Illinois

Table 2. Contributions to Illinois legislative campaigns, six top PACs

Those seeking federal reform are supporting Senate bill 2, sponsored by Sen. David Boren (D-Okla.). The Boren bill adopts the premise that there is too much special interest money in congressional campaigns which, among other effects, is driving up the cost of campaigns. The solution is to restrict PAC contributions, by using two different types of caps, and by totally excluding PAC money in Senate general elections, relying instead on taxpayer dollars supplemented by small individual contributions.

The debate promises to be long and acrimonious, and the issues are the same at the state level. PAC supporters contend that PACs encourage individuals to become active in politics and that our pluralistic system requires and even encourages special interests to compete vigorously with one another in the political marketplace. Conversely, PAC opponents argue that the "common man" is being squeezed out in favor of special interests, that incumbents get most of the PAC money and that our system of financing elections is seriously flawed.

While there is much attention directed at PACs at the federal level, there is little on the states, whose laws and regulations on campaign financing vary greatly. Without comparative analysis of state trends, it is difficult to draw any firm conclusions. It is possible, however, to assess the situation for a given state.

In Illinois, PACs have experienced remarkable growth, even though, unlike federal elections, corporations and labor unions can make unlimited direct contributions to candidates in state elections. Nevertheless, corporations, unions and many other associations have chosen PACs as the vehicle through which to contribute to Illinois candidates.

There has been a dramatic increase in Illinois PACs since the enactment of the Illinois Campaign Finance Act in 1974 (see table 1). According to the State Board of Elections' data, there were 445 active Illinois PACs at the end of 1986. This is a whopping 1,171 percent increase from the 38 PACs in 1974. The number of PACs has more than tripled since 1979 and more than doubled since 1981. In 1986 alone 108 new PACs were created.

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How much money are these PACs contributing to candidates in Illinois? Does one party enjoy a favored status? Does PAC money flow to incumbents and challengers alike? Does PAC money generally go to the winners? Does PAC money influence state legislative campaigns in Illinois to the same extent that it appears to be influencing congressional races? Some preliminary answers to these questions can be found by focusing on the contributions to state legislative campaigns by six of the most influential Illinois PACs. These six PACs are among the largest contributors to legislative races, they employ highly effective and respected lobbyists, and they deal with issues that strongly affect the people of Illinois.

They are: Illinois Association of Realtors PAC (RPAC), Illinois Education Association PAC (IPACE), Illinois State Medical Society PAC (ISMS), Legislative Interest Committee of Illinois Dentists PAC (ILCID), Illinois Trial Lawyers Association PAC (ITLA) and the Illinois Manufacturers' Association PAC (IMPAC).

The author studied all contributions from these six PACs to Illinois House and Senate candidates and related organizations, such as the Illinois House Republican Campaign Committee and the Illinois Democratic Majority, over three election cycles: 1976, 1982 and 1986. (The only exception was the ITLA, which began operations in 1978). Each House or Senate candidate receiving a direct contribution was then identified by party, district and whether a winner or a loser in the subsequent election. Note that campaign finance laws in Illinois basically emphasize disclosure, with absolutely no limits on the amount of money that individuals or PACs may contribute to campaigns. In addition, no individuals or bodies are prohibited from contributing to candidates or PACs. Any individual, corporation, PAC or union may contribute as much and as often as desired without limit.

The overall trend is obvious in the total contributions to legislative campaigns by the six PACs (see table 2). With the exception of the Illinois Realtors (RPAC). the other five PACs have increased their contributions steadily over the three elections. In at least one case, the Trial Lawyers (ITLA), the increase from 1982 to 1986 is dramatic, from $73,860 to $287,776.

Looking at 1986 alone, these six PACs contributed roughly $1.5 million to legislative candidates in Illinois, which is approximately three times the amount contributed by these same PACs only 10 years earlier.

Table 3. Democrats v. Republicans, 1986 Illinois legislative races ($ in thousands)

Table 4. Incumbents v. challengers, 1986 Illinois legislative races ($ in thousands)

Table 5. Winning and losing PAC money, 1986 Illinois legislative races ($ in thousands)

Looking at the pattern of partisanship in contributions, the 1986 figures show that while some PACs divide their money rather equally, others strongly favor one party. For example, the Trial lawyers (ITLA) gave about 10 times as much to Democrats as Republicans (see table 3). In 1976 and 1982 the ITLA also favored Democrats but not to this extent. Also, the Education Association (IPACE) favored the Democrats by more than a 2:1 ratio. Not suprisingly the Manufacturers (IMPAC) contributed twice as much to Republicans, but that was drastically down from 1976 and 1982 when it had poured 90 percent of its money into Republican campaigns. The other three PACs, which include the Dentists (LICID), the Medical Society (ISMS) and the Realtors (RPAC), apportioned their 1986 dollars fairly equally between Republicans and Democrats. These three PACs showed slightly greater preferences to Republicans in 1976 and 1982.

This means that PAC money, at least from these six, has been moving toward Democrats and away from Republicans. In 1986 more PAC money went to Democrats than Republicans, in 1982 roughly equal amounts went to the two major parties, and in 1976 slightly more PAC money went to Republicans (table 3).

PAC money in 1986 was heavily weighted in favor of incumbents rather than challengers (see table 4). Every PAC strongly supported incumbents, with the ITLA and ISMS giving over 80 percent of their money to them. In fact, IMPAC had the lowest ratio of incumbent/challenger giving, but still favored incumbents by more than 2:1. Incumbents have been consistently favored by PACs since 1976, but the gap is becoming wider between PAC giving to incumbents and challengers (see tables 6 and 7).

PACs back winners, which means that their money is well spent. In 1986 all six PACs did an excellent job of keeping their "lost money" to a minimum. The ratio of successful money ranges from about 4:1 for both LICID and IMPAC to a whopping 7:1 for the ISMS (see table 5). In 1976 and 1982 these PACs directed more of their contributions to successful candidates than to losers, but in 1982 some PACs wound up with a larger porportion of their money going to losing candidates. For example, IMPAC's contributions to winning candidates were around $90,000 while it spent about $80,000 backing losers.

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What role do these PACs play in Illinois politics today — specifically in financing campaigns? First, it is clearly evident that the amount of special interest money in Illinois legislative campaigns has escalated during the past 10 years. All candidates contend that the cost of campaigns has increased as well. Unanswered is whether PAC money has increased to a greater extent. The supposition is, however, that it has.

Second, PAC money in this study has been shifting gradually from Republicans to Democrats. This correlates with other studies that show a trend away from Republicans and to Democrats, whose party has controlled the General Assembly during the past 10 years or so. Major PACs are becoming more sophisticated in choosing recipients. No longer are the ideological biases of a PAC the sole determinant in dispensing campaign dollars. PACs such as the ISMS and the RPAC, whose backgrounds would naturally make them comfortable with more conservative Republican candidates, are considering other factors, such as incumbency and perhaps anticipated party strength in the legislature, when making their contribution decisions. There is a greater tendency today for major Illinois PACs to play both sides of the aisle. Everyone wants to be with a winner, and PACs seem more willing than ever before to ignore party labels and ideological preferences in order to maximize their influence with those who are elected.

Third, it obviously follows that PACs are making better use of their money. "Lost money" continues to decrease as PACs increasingly aid candidates who subsequently win.

More study is needed to determine whether PAC money makes the difference in the outcome of any legislative race. No doubt there are cases where it does. More study is also needed to determine whether PACs, with their tendency to contribute to "winners," are increasing their access to those winning legislators. It would appear that PAC contributions to incumbents facing little or no opposition do buy access, but there is another intriguing phenomenon in these situations that needs study. There are some races where well-entrenched incumbents, regardless of party affiliation, receive sizable PAC contributions when they face no serious opposition. These contributions obviously have little to do with the results of the election but do accomplish other purposes. For example, not only do these dollars buy access and ultimately help in influencing legislative activity, but safe incumbents, not needing a large treasury for their own campaign, can use some of these dollars to help fellow candidates. That brings up the question of collecting the legislative arena for past favors rendered. The Illinois Campaign Finance Act does require the reporting of all such expenditures between candidates.

Table 6. Contributions to incumbent legislators ($ in thousands)

Table 7. Contributions to challengers ($ in thousands)

In sum, "loyalty" is the concept that apparently drives Illinois PAC contributions. More and more PACs seem to use their bankrolls to reward their proven friends (incumbents), whether they be Republicans or Democrats. PACs are becoming increasingly pragmatic in handling their growing treasuries. The issue of campaign finance in Illinois has not been a hot legislative item. The continuing escalation in the cost of campaigning in the state will probably force the issue forward as it has in Congress. For example, records on file with the state Board of Elections indicate that the cost of legislative campaigns jumped dramatically just from 1984 to 1986. Expenditures for House elections by candidates from both parties rose about 22 percent, while Senate campaigns registered an amazing 135 percent increase. With party control of the Senate much more uncertain than in the House, obviously Senate candidates of both parties spent record levels in an effort to gain or retain the balance of power.

Escalation of campaign costs and of PAC contributions in congressional campaigns and Illinois legislative campaigns may be the reasons to consider change, but there is no consensus for a remedy — in Congress or in Illinois.

Some contend that special interest money should be capped. Others argue for spending limits, although the U.S. Supreme Court has held that limits are constitutional only when public funds (taxpayer dollars) are used to pay for such campaigns. There are others who want limits on individual contributions so that the wealthy cannot "buy" an office. Finally there are those who maintain that our present system, which basically allows for an unchecked flow of dollars in and out of campaign treasuries, is the essence of our free democratic system.

It is the conclusion of this writer that this endless chase for dollars has to stop, regardless of the means chosen to achieve this end. One final warning: Before anyone starts an anti-PAC war dance or embraces some other reform program, it would be wise to remember the following: Campaign finance reform at the federal level in past years has already demonstrated that change has had more unforeseen bad consequences than the good consequences that were intended. The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 and its subsequent amendments were not intended to weaken seriously the role of parties in federal elections, but they did. The act was not meant to open the door to unchecked independent expenditures, but it did. And the act was not intended to snuff out traditional grass-roots activity in presidential elections, but it almost has.

In Illinois, the present system should be examined closely to find its faults and limitations, and a strategy should be carefully plotted for change. If we don't, we'll wind up like Charlie Brown trying to kick the football one more time and getting the policy equivalent of Lucy's evil grin.

Ronald D. Michaelson is executive director of the Illinois State Board of Elections, the agency responsible for administration of the Illinois Campaign Finance Act. He also serves as a lecturer in public affairs at Sangamon State University.

12/May 1987/Illinois Issues