 |
Home | Search | Browse | About IPO | Staff | Links |
|
Judicial Rulings
By a strict interpretation of language in statutes and in a lease the Illinois Supreme Court determined that housing assistance payments under the U.S. Housing Act (see 42 U.S.C. Sec. 8 (1991)) do not constitute rent. The decision was filed January 20. The defendant in this case was able to pay only $6 per month of his rent; the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) paid the balance under terms of sec. 8, defined in sec. 1437(a) as "aiding low-income families in obtaining a decent place to live and ... promoting economically mixed housing." The landlord billed him for repairs allegedly brought about by his negligence and moved, under terms of the lease, to evict him when he failed to pay. Although the landlord returned his rent check, the landlord continued to accept the HUD payments for several months. The defendant argued that these were the equivalent of rent. Under the terms of the lease acceptance of additional rent constituted a waiver of eviction rights. The court held that rent arises from an agreement between renter and landlord, arising out of control of the property. HUD was seen as having no part in this agreement; it had a separate contract with the landlord. The lease said, "The amount ... that HUD makes available monthly ... is called the tenant assistance payment." The statute allows HUD payments for two months after a tenant is evicted (sec. 1437f(4)). Finally, the court said, "To characterize the assistance as [rent] would effectively defeat HUD's interest in the development and availability of economically mixed housing for low-income families." Justice Charles E. Freeman wrote for the majority in Midland Management Co. v Helgason (Docket No. 75195). Justice James D. Heiple, joined by Justice Moses W. Harrison II, dissented, saying that according to the majority "the rule [of law] does not apply to the case in hand." He said that calling HUD's payments "tenant assistance payments" was an attempt to avoid confusion in the lease. In other places the lease refers to "the tenant's share of the rent." Ambiguity is to be construed against the author, in this case the landlord. Since HUD is mentioned in 25 subpara-graphs of the lease, Heiple found that it is indeed a party to the agreement. He also cited general and legal dictionaries that define rent simply in terms of payment for use of property without identifying the payer.
A statute making transmission of the HIV virus by a known carrier through intimate contact with another, a felony (see Illinois Consolidated Statutes 5/12-16.2(a)(l)) has been ruled constitutional by the Illinois Supreme Court. The opinion was filed January 20. The defendants claimed that the statute is impermissably vague and also violative of constitutional guarantees of free speech and association. The opinion dismissed all claims without detailed consideration, saying: "Neither the statute nor the cases before us have even the slightest connection with free speech"; "The defendant's cases do not infringe on any supposed right of association as claimed. In fact, we know of no such right" and "We ... read the statute as being sufficiently clear and explicit so that a person of ordinary intelligence need not have to guess at its meaning or application." According to news stories, plaintiffs had argued that the prohibition would hamper association with others and thus also imply free speech rights. Further, they claimed vagueness in the statute's definition of intimate contact as "the exposure of the body of one person to a bodily fluid of another person that could result in the transmission of HIV" and raised a number of situations in which prosecutors could move in the future, such as sneezing in a crowded elevator. The court said, "We take judicial notice of the fact that intimate sexual conduct whereby blood or semen of an infected person is transferred to an uninfected person is a primary method of spreading the infection." It termed possible future cases "pure speculation and conjecture" and said, "We are here concerned only with the specific conduct of these defendants and the application of the statute to them." Justice James D. Heiple's opinion only occupied two and one-half pages. The consolidated cases were People v Russell (Docket no. 73721) and People v Lunsford (Docket No.74443).
When a new section is added to a law care must be taken to get it in the right place. A slight misplacement led the Illinois Supreme Court to declare a statutory provision unconstitutional on January 20. In 1989 the General Assembly added a section to the theft statutes allowing undercover sting operations in which police would offer allegedly stolen goods to fences. The definition of theft was amended to include obtaining "control over property in the custody of any law enforcement agency which is explicitly represented ... by any law enforcement officer ... as being stolen" (see Illinois Revised Statutes 1989, ch. 38, par. 16-l(a)(5)). The defendant pointed out that this could apply to an evidence technician "who took from a police officer for safekeeping the proceeds of 26/March 1994/Illinois Issues a theft which the police officer had recovered and gave ... with the representation that the goods were stolen." Section 16-l(a)(5) appears after other definitions of theft that include three cases of criminal intent. The court ruled that the section and these definitions cannot be reconciled. It urged the legislature "to cure the constitutional defect of the statute as it is written at the earliest possible time." Chief Justice Michael A. Bilandic wrote for the majority in People v Zaremba (Docket No. 74221). Justice Benjamin K. Miller's dissent cited as precedent later cases that would allow the mental state for theft to include knowledge. Here the defendant bought for $20 property worth $300 that he was told was stolen; this, according to Miller, would constitute adequate knowledge, and thus criminal intent, for his interpretation.
The point at which a client loses confidence in an attorney's advice was central to a case decided January 20 by the Illinois Supreme Court. In 1973 a firm of patent attorneys had advised a client that its new machine did not infringe any existing patents. Unfortunately, the advice overlooked the product of one rival firm. Two years later the owner of this patent brought action against a third firm and secured a favorable court decision in 1980. During that period the plaintiff firm in this case learned of the suit and in 1980 asked its attorneys about it. The attorneys assured the company that it had no problem and suggested possible defenses if suit were brought against it. Sure enough, in 1982 the battle was joined with the attorneys still saying that there was no problem. In 1986 the courts finally ruled that there was patent infringement. In 1987 the company sued the law firm for malpractice. The law firm argued that the five-year statute of limitations had expired since the company should have been aware of possible problems as early as 1973 and certainly by 1982. The court said, "The law firm ... was hired for its advice. The advice was given and the client relied on it, allegedly to its ultimate detriment. Throughout the proceedings, however, the client was reassured as to the soundness of its legal position."
Justice James D. Heiple wrote the majority opinion (Chief Justice Michael A. Bilandic not participating) in Jackson Jordan Inc. v Leydig, Voit & Mayer (Docket No. 70410). Justice Benjamin K. Miller's dissent thought the company should have been less trusting: "By 1980, and certainly by 1982, no reasonable person could have failed to realize the error in Leydig's assurance that Jackson would face no patent infringement problems."
F. Mark Siebert March 1994/Illinois Issues/27
|