Judicial Rulings
Court splits on Rolando Cruz,
who will now get a third trial
During the complex unwinding of this case, Brian Dugan said that he alone had committed the crime. He had confessed to and been sentenced for five other sexual assaults with kidnapping, two of which had involved murder, with one of the murder victims being eight-year-old Melissa Ackerman. His admission of the Nicarico killing was couched in hypothetical terms, since he was trying to bargain for a promise of a life sentence rather than the death penalty. At the second Cruz trial the jury was informed of Dugan's Nicarico statements and the fact of his conviction for the other crimes. The defense attempted to introduce details about the other crimes in order to exculpate Cruz and discredit a prosecution theory that Cruz and Dugan committed the Nicarico murder together. The court forbade this evidence, and this has become the central issue. The court had rejected a similar appeal in December 1992 in a 4-3 decision, but just a few weeks later three justices retired from the court. Early in 1993 the new court granted a rehearing. The case attracted wide attention, with amicus briefs supporting Cruz filed by church leaders, law school deans and other legal bodies (see Illinois Issues, March 1993, pp. 6 and 28). An assistant attorney general resigned because she was so convinced of Cruz' innocence. Statements such as Dugan's must be admitted under an exception to hearsay rules. Heiple, author of the 1992 majority opinion, held that there was inadequate similarity of any of the five Dugan convictions to the Nicarico case to overcome the hearsay rule, and that Cruz had received a fair trial. He accused "the amicus crowd" of "a carefully orchestrated and well-executed extrajudicial campaign ... in defendant's behalf." McMorrow, another justice new to the case, carefully dissociated herself from Heiple's disssent and his criticism of the amicus filers in a temperate analysis that concluded that the second Cruz trial had been fair. The opinion, concurrence and dissents in People v Cruz (Docket No. 70407) came to 107 pages.
When discrimination is OK
In this case a woman bartender claimed that she was fired because of her gender and brought suit under Art. I, sec. 17 of the Illinois Constitution, which provides that the guarantees against discrimination for various reasons "are enforceable without action by the General Assembly ...."What it gives it immediately takes away, however, for the sentence continues, "But the general Assembly by law may establish reasonable exemptions relating to these rights..." In implementing the guarantees, the Illinois Human Rights Act protects "for all individuals within Illinois the freedom from discrimination because of... sex ..." (see Illinois Revised Statutes 1991, ch. 68, par 1- 102(A)) and makes it a violation "for any employer to ... discharge ... on the basis of unlawful discrimination" (par. 2-102(A)). The kicker is that par. 2-101(B)(l)(a) defines "employer" as "any person employing 15 or more employees..." The act provides that redress is to be sought solely through the Department of Human Rights. The plaintiff argued that the "under 15" provision shut off this path and that suit in circuit court was her only chance of redress. Lower courts reasoned that the act creates an exemption for employers of fewer than 15 and that it forecloses action in the courts. The high court agreed. It referred to debate in the Constitutional Convention that foresaw a possible need for exemptions for small businesses because of the intimate relation between employers and employees and saw this as a reasonable tradeoff for the potential injustice to employees in small businesses. It disagreed with another appellate decision that said, "Nothing in the Illinois Human Rights Act suggests that small employers should be left to discriminate as they wish" (Ritzheimer v Insurance Counselors Inc. 173 111. App. 3d 953 (1988)) and overruled it. Justice Charles E. Freeman wrote for the majority in Baker v Miller (Docket No. 75399). Justice Moses W. Harrison II filed a one-paragraph dissent affirming the reasoning in Ritzheimer.
Raiding the pension funds
Legislation of 1989 would have amortized the state's unfunded liability in the funds, estimated by some as high as $10 billion, over 40 years. When the General Assembly failed to appropriate payments to the funds required by law a group of judges instituted a class action. Legislation of 1991 transferred $21 million to the General Fund, and the plaintiffs sought the TRO against the immediate transfer. Subsequently the Supreme Court permitted the transfer, making the request for the TRO moot. Justice Mary Ann McMorrow wrote the majority opinion in People ex rel Sklodowski v State of Illinois (Docket Nos. 73485 and 74181 cons.). Justice Charles E. Freeman, joined by Justice Moses W. Harrison II, dissented in part. He said that the court could have acted under exceptions to the mootness doctrine: There is a substantial public interest, the situation may recur, and a decision could guide lower courts. F. Mark Siebert 34/August 1994/Illinois Issues
|
|||||||||||||||