The City of Edmonds in Washington State has a law on its books which defines "family" as follows:

"An individual or two or more persons related by genetics, adoption, or marriage, or a group of five or fewer persons who are not related by genetics, adoption or marriage".

The Oxford House sought to establish a group home to house 10 to 12 unrelated persons in a single-family zoning district. Edmonds sought to apply its law to limit the occupancy of the single-family home. At the District Court, the City of Edmonds argued that its law was a "maximum occupancy restriction" which was exempt under §3607(b)(l) of the federal Fair Housing Act (FHA). That section exempts from the Act "any reasonable local, State, or Federal restrictions regarding the maximum number of occupants permitted to occupy a dwelling." The District Court agreed with the City.

The Ninth Circuit Court, however, disagreed, finding that Edmonds' law was not a maximum occupancy restriction within the meaning of the Fair Housing Act and, the absolute exemption did not apply. The case was returned to the District Court for further proceedings on the issue of whether the City failed to grant a "reasonable accommodation." In contrast, the Eleventh Circuit, in the case of Elliott v. City of Athens, Georgia, held that an ordinance similar to the ordinance in the Edmonds case was exempt under the Act.

The Supreme Court took the case to straighten out the dispute in the circuit courts. In a 6-3 vote, it upheld the Ninth Circuit ruling. The Supreme Court found Edmonds' law to describe "family living, not living space per occupant." It found Edmonds' law to define family primarily by background and legal relationships and that the law also accommodated other group associations: "Five or fewer unrelated people are allowed to live together as though they were a family." The Supreme Court framed the issue as "whether the law was a 'maximum occupancy restriction' or a'family composition rule'." The Court found that Edmonds' law was not a maximum occupancy restriction and therefore the absolute exemption did not apply.

Left intact by the decision to be resolved by some later case is the question as to whether "family composition rules" violate the Fair Housing Act, and if so, under what circumstances. The Court was careful to note that it was not deciding this issue. In footnote 4, it stated, "We do not decide whether Edmonds' Zoning Code provisions defining 'family' as the City would apply it against Oxford House, violates the FHA's prohibitions against discrimination set out in 42 U.S. Code, §3604 et seq." Further the Court stated, "The sole question before the Court is whether Edmonds' family composition rule qualifies as a 'restriction regarding the maximum number of occupants permitted to occupy a dwelling' within the meaning of the FHA's absolute exemption."

In fact, the Court rebuked Edmonds' claims that subjecting single-family zoning to the FHA's scrutiny would "overturn Euclidean zoning." In its rebuke, the Court pointed out that in making this argument, Edmonds was ignoring the limited scope of the issue before the Court and exaggerating the force of the FHA's anti-discrimination provisions. The majority pointed out that the FHA anti-discrimination provisions, when applicable, require only 'reasonable accommodations' to afford persons with disabilities equal opportunities to use and enjoy housing.

In fact, the Court expressly recognized that family composition rules are an essential component of single-family residential use. The Court limited its opinion to a determination that Edmonds' family composition rules do not fall within the "absolute exemption" provisions of the Fair Housing Act. Thus, the decision in no way implicates or addresses the question of whether, and under what circumstances, family composition rules violate the Fair Housing Act.

In the dissent written by Justice Thomas, the three-member minority took issue with the majority's assumption that such exceptions to the Fair Housing Act must be read narrowly. Justice Thomas did not find the language to be as limiting as the majority did. According to the dissent, the very establishment under

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Edmonds' Code of a specific limit of the number of unrelated persons who may occupy a dwelling in single-family neighborhoods qualified as a maximum occupancy restriction and therefore fell within the absolute exemption from the Fair Housing Act.

The decision is disappointing in that limitations on unrelated persons under the "family" definition found in most municipal ordinances will not be entitled to an absolute exemption from the Act and litigation regarding these provisions and claims of violation of the Act will continue. On the other hand. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, and Moore v. City of East Cleveland, continue to be recognized as the leading authority on the subject of family composition rules. Euclidean zoning remains active and valid. It is clear from the opinion that the Court has steadfastly refused to enter into the arena of determining when and under what circumstances restrictions on the number of unrelated persons found in a zoning ordinance violate the Fair Housing Act. The Court determined that those family composition rules or what it referred to as "family value preservers" must be viewed in light of the "reasonable accommodation" provisions in the Fair Housing Act. With respect to those restrictions the Court noted that no one should "exaggerate the force" of those antidiscrimination provisions. •

Page 22 / Illinois Municipal Review / June 1995