HIGHWAY ANNEXATIONS: A NEW MUNICIPAL PROBLEM
By LOUIS ANCEL and JACK M. SIEGEL of the Chicago Bar

During the past year and a half several municipalities throughout the State have attempted to expand their territory by "annexing" highways which touched the city or village only by the width of the road itself and then extended outward for distances of several miles from the municipality proper. Frequently these "strip" annexations were used to link up subdivisions or other desirable tracts of land which would not otherwise be "contiguous" to the annexing municipality. In other cases, highways alone were annexed to gain control of traffic, make possible future annexation of adjacent properties, or block annexations to other municipalities. The practice has been most wide-spread in Cook County where the Villages of Streamwood, Hickory Hills, Bridgeview and Worth, among others, have engaged in wholesale strip annexations (Streamwood has reportedly annexed approximately 75 miles of road), but similar attempts, have taken place in several other counties as well.

Unquestionably the origin of recent strip annexations can be traced to the City of Chicago's annexation of O'Hare Airfield on March 28, 1956. The municipally owned airport lies approximately three miles northwest of the city proper. In order to render its territory contiguous to the City, portions of Higgins Road and East River Road were annexed under the same ordinance. The link between the City and the airport is as narrow as thirty-three feet at several points. The motivation behind the annexation remains obscure particularly in the light of the broad powers given to municipalities over municipally owned territory beyond the corporate limits.¹ Nevertheless despite the objections of neighboring municipalities at the time, the annexation went unchallenged and apparently emboldened other municipalities to try the same technique.

The practical results of the strip annexations which have taken place are worth consideration. In counties such as Cook and Lake, where county zoning and building code standards are high, property owners have been able to use highway annexations to link up to municipalities with lower code standards and thus avoid county restrictions. One striking example of this technique was the annexation to the Village of Hickory Hills in Cook County of a 40 acre subdivision connected to the Village, almost a mile away, by a two lane highway. Under Village regulations, the subdivider was able to build homes and install septic tanks on lots which were half the minimum size required by the County ordinance. The neighboring property owners in an unincorporated area, alarmed at the possible health hazards involved, asked Cook County State's Attorney Benjamin Adamowski to file a quo warranto proceeding, and the annexation was recently invalidated in the Circuit Court of Cook County by Judge Harry M. Fisher. This case is apparently the only court decision which has yet come out of the flurry of road annexations.²

Besides enabling favored property owners to escape County building and zoning restrictions (a privilege which may be short lived in view of additional powers to establish minimum standards even in incorporated areas given to counties in northeastern Illinois, by the last General Assembly), highway annexations also have allowed the annexing municipalities to extend their traffic and police control well beyond the boundaries of the municipality proper. In addition, such annexations have cut off unincorporated areas from future annexation to municipalities of their own choice or possible municipal incorporation, by running fingers of purportedly "annexed" territory through the area. The possibility always exists, of course, of involuntary annexation of territory less than 60 acres in size if surrounded by roads belonging to one or more municipalities.

Many of the villages which have engaged in the practice have justified it on grounds of self-defense. They have insisted that such moves were necessary to protect their own fringe areas from encroachment by their neighbors and to insure themselves sufficient area for natural expansion. Whatever the reasons advanced, the use of highway annexations have played havoc with the official maps of the counties involved and have threatened the planned and orderly development of the affected municipalities and their neighbors.

The statutory framework for annexations to Illinois cities and villages is found in Article Seven of the Cities and Villages Act. a While there are several alternative methods for annexation provided, the basic requirement for each method is that the territory involved must be "contiguous" to the annexing municipality. The Courts of this State have on several occasions construed the meaning of "contiguous" as used in the incorporation, annexation and disconnection statutes, and an examination of these decisions would seem to indicate that when the highway annexations reach the Supreme Court, they will probably be invalidated.

The leading case is Wild v. The People, 227 Ill. 556. That case was a quo warranto proceeding testing the organization of the Village of Weston. The statute provided that a village could be organized in an "area of contiguous territory, not exceeding two square miles." In considering the plat of the territory at page 559, the Court determined that the territory was not "contiguous" within the meaning of the statute. After concluding that a certain portion of the territory was not contiguous when the only connection between two tracts was by the tact that they cornered with each other, the Court went on to consider the question of contiguity when two portions of the Village were attached only by a half mile strip which was fifty feet wide. The court at 560 said:

"It is also to be observed that from the main body of the territory a strip 570 feet in width east and west extends south from a point near the north-west corner of section 10 almost one mile to the south line of that section, and from the south fifty feet of that strip another strip fifty feet in width from north to south extends west a half mile, where it intersects the east line of a body of land 1,000 feet in length from north to south and 550 feet in width from east to west, all included within the village. It is apparent that the 50-foot strip is merely included for the purpose of connecting the piece of ground at the west end thereof with other territory in the Village. It is also apparent that the piece of ground at the west end of the strip is not, in fact, contiguous to grounds in the village other than that strip. The use of that strip to connect the tract at its western extremity with other territory in the village is a mere subterfuge and not a compliance with the law. It is useless to discuss the plea further. (Emphasis added.)

In Morgan Park v. City of Chicago, the City of Chicago attempted to annex the Village of Morgan Park. The City and Village shared a common

2. People ex rel. Adamowslri. v. Village of Hickory Hills, 58 C. 944. Adamowski has also filed suit against the Village of Streamwood asking for a judgment of ouster over the roads purportedly annexed and demanding damages in the sum of $5,000.00.

3. Ill. Bev. Stats., 1957. Ch. 24 § 7-1 et seq.

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boundary line at the north and south portions of the Village. However, at the center the two municipalities did not adjoin one another for a distance of one, and three-quarters miles. Lying between the two was an unincorporated area of two hundred acres. If the Village had been annexed there would have been an unincorporated area of two hundred acres completely surrounded by the City. In holding the annexation invalid, the court discussed the same questions raised by the present "annexations." Beginning at 192 the Court said:

"The statutory authority to annex territory to a city, town or village is limited to such territory as is contiguous to the city, town or village, and no incorporated city, town or village can be annexed to another unless they adjoin each other. The words employed in the statute which specify the location of two incorporations in relation to each other have no arbitrary meaning or definition, and their meaning must be determined by the object sought to be accomplished by the statute. Where the word 'adjacent' was used in the statute with respect to school districts, it was held in People v. Keechler, 194 Ill. 235, to mean districts so united or joined together was to form a compact district or territory; and in Wild v. People, 227 Ill. 556, in construing a statute providing for the incorporation, as a village, of contiguous territory, it was held that territory was not contiguous where the only connection was at the corners of tracts, and that the use of a strip of land to connect tracts was a mere subterfuge, and not a compliance with the requirement of the law that the territory should be contiguous. That was a proceeding in quo warranto to teat the validity of the incorporation of the Village of Weston, and the conclusion was that the Village could not be organized out of tracts of land connected only by narrow strips, although there was actual contact between different tracts by that method. In City of Galesburg v. Hawkinson, 75 Ill. 152, it was held that any change in the boundaries of a city must necessarily contract or enlarge the sphere of its municipal jurisdiction and therefore constitute so far an amendment of its charter, and this doctrine was adhered to in People v. Ellis, 253 Ill. 369. A city could not be organized as the City of Chicago would be, with the Village of Morgan Park annexed to it, having unorganized or unincorporated territory within its boundaries and entirely surrounded by it. As a city could not be organized in that way, it was not intended by the General Assembly that the same result should be accomplished by a change of the boundaries, constituting to that extent an amendment of its charter. If that could be done by annexation, a city might become a mere ring, hoop or belt around a large unincorporated area, which, of course, was never in contemplation when the statute was enacted. It is therefore clear that a village situated like Morgan Park cannot be annexed to the City of Chicago with unorganized and unincorporated territory of the town of Calumet within the boundaries of the city entirely surrounded by it." (Emphasis added.)

Many of the recent highway annexations, of course, produce the results condemned in the Morgan Park case, that is, rings and belts are being drawn around large segments of unincorporated territory.

Under the disconnection statute, territory on the border of a city or village may be disconnected if it "is not contiguous in whole or in part to any other municipality," and it disconnected, "will not result in the isolation of any part of the municipality from the remainder of the municipality." Two decisions of Appellate Courts construing these provisions are worthy of note in considering the validity of highway annexations. In Wolbach v. Village of Flossmoor, 329 Ill. App. 528, the Court relied on the Wild case in permitting a parcel of land to be disconnected from the Village of Floss-moor even though the parcel touched the corner of the Village of Olympia Fields. The mere fact the parcel touched the Village did not render it "contiguous" in the Court's view.

In the case of in re Disconnection of Territory of Mt. Prospect, 341 Ill. App. 272, the court held that a proposed disconnection would isolate a portion of the Village even though a highway would remain between the two portions after the disconnection. The Court said at page 276:

"Petitioner says that nothing short of an isolation which makes an island of the isolated section is within the meaning of the Act. It argues that the Northwest Highway, remaining after disconnection, is sufficient connection between the eastern and western portions of the village, because the village can lay its utilities "in the grassy gutter or ditch" of the highway. Other things than pipes and wires go to make up a village. To use petitioner's own designation, we think that the westerly tract would be considered an island, even though it may be connected by the highway with the other part of the village. Throughout the country many tracts of land are called 'islands' although they may be connected with the mainland by thoroughfares, causeways and viaducts."

It would thus appear that a highway connection is insufficient to produce the contiguity required of land in a municipality, and an annexation based on the contiguity provided by a highway would be Invalid.

The interpretation of the Illinois Supreme Court in the Wild case has also been followed by the Courts of other States in striking down strip annexations.⁵

The highway annexations described here are apparently based on Section 7-8 of the Cities and Villages Act, which gives authority to annex by ordinance, contiguous territory which is used for highway purposes. It provides :

"Any municipality by ordinance may annex any territory contiguous to it even though the annexed territory is dedicated or used for street or highway purposes if no part of the annexed territory is within any other municipality. After the passage of the ordinance of annexation a copy of the ordinance, with an accurate map of the territory annexed, certified as correct by the clerk of the municipality, shall be filed with the recorder of deeds ot the county in which the annexed territory is situated. As amended 1955, July 11, Laws 1955, p. 1378, § I."

It would appear, however, that this statutory provision is not authority for the type of annexations considered. Under the statute the territory must of course be "contiguous" and the decisions cited indicate that strip annexations are not "contiguous" as interpreted by our Supreme Court. Rather the purpose of the statute would appear to be to permit the annexation of territory used for highway purposes which runs parallel to and has a common line with the municipality, without the consent of the owner of the fee or the public agency involved. Also it would appear to permit annexation by ordinance of territory separated from the municipality only by a highway, by annexing the highway along with the territory, provided of course that the whole tract met the test of contiguity and the other requirements of law.

Based on the foregoing, it must be concluded that the so-called highway or strip annexations are invalid as a matter of law, and would tall it properly attacked by quo warranto proceedings. The decision of Judge Fisher in the Hickory Hills case mentioned above seems completely sound and should be vindicated it the question reaches the Supreme Court.

It is not enough, however, to dismiss the flurry of road annexations

(Continued on page 134)

5. See for example Clark v. Holt, 237 S.W. 2d. 483 (Arkansas), Pot-Tin v. Village of Chulibuck, 2S4 P 2d 414 (Idaho); State v. Village of Mound, 48 N.W. 2d 855 (Minnesota).

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HIGHWAY ANNEXATIONS: A NEW MUNICIPAL PROBLEM

(Continued from page 132)

as mere land grabs and ill-considered attempts to follow Chicago's example with O'Hare Field. The road annexations should be recognized as efforts, no matter how badly conceived to deal with the problems arising out of the unprecedented growth of urban communities in this State. Our whole system of statutes dealing with incorporation, annexation and disconnection need a thorough re-evaluation and analysis in order to bring them up to date and bring them in harmony with the needs of our cities and villages. Such a study and a legislative program derived from it should be high on the agenda of the Municipal Problems Commission and all others interested in sound Municipal development in this State.⁶

Page 134 / Illinois Municipal Review / June 1958