Letters
Collective bargaining
We are at a loss as to why the author omits
the most recent and definitive Illinois
Supreme Court decision dealing with the
subject of public employee strikes, even
though the decision is more than one year
old. On May 20, 1974, the Illinois Supreme
Court unanimously ruled that public employees do not have the right to strike and
that court injunctions are obtainable by
public employers to stop such illegal strikes.
The High Court states that "strikes of public
employees are very apt to create immediate
emergencies bearing sharply upon the
health, safety, and welfare of the public."
The decision involved striking police and
sanitation workers in the City of Pana,
Illinois (City of Pana v. Crowe, No. 26208).
The Court indicated that neither the
Benedict case nor the Peters case (cited by
Bianco in his article) required the Court to
depart" . . . from the long standing rule that
public employees have no right to strike and
that a strike by them is unlawful and
therefore not within the scope of the anti-injunction act." In view of this decision, the argument by
Mr. Bianco, that "Illinois courts may not
issue injunctions against strikes except when
those stikes are by public school employees"
is false and misleading. His argument that
there are no state laws on the subject is also
inaccurate (see P.A. 78-5, dealing with the
Regional Transit Authority, for example). Another important omission in Mr.
Bianco's article is lack of any discussion of
the devastating economic consequences
which invariably flow from collective
bargaining legislation for public employees.
In every state which has such a law on the
books, strikes by public employees — even
where the state law prohibits such strikes —
have been longer, more numerous and more
costly to the public than in states like Illinois
without such legislation. Dear Editor: Quite frankly, I am totally
confused by Mr. Bianco's understanding
and conclusion of the law regarding strikes
by public employees. In City of Pana v.
Crowe, 57 Ill. 2d 547,316 N.E. 2d 513 (1974),
the Illinois Supreme Court held: "In our
opinion neither the Peters case nor the
Benedict case requires that we depart in this
case from the long standing rule that public
employees have no right to strike and that a
strike by them is unlawful and therefore not
within the scope of the anti-injunction act." 316 N.E. 2d at 515. On what rational basis Mr. Bianco draws
his conclusion that "the Illinois courts may
not issue injunctions against strikes except
when those strikes are by public school
employees" is totally beyond my comprehension.
Dear Editor: The recent article [November
1975] by Vito C. Bianco entitled "Public
Sector Collective Bargaining in Illinois: What's Happening" is slanted in its advocacy of collective bargaining for public employees, as is indicated by your editorial
comment preceding the article. However,
given this bias, it is unfortunate that the
author presents an inaccurate picture of the
legal standing of public employee strikes in
Illinois and omits any discussion of the
devastating consequences of public employee collective bargaining laws in other states.
Orville V. Bergren,
President, Illinois Manufacturers' Association
Dennis Dohm,
Attorney, Oak Lawn
Corporation income tax rate
I think the constitutional provision is
quite clear in limiting the degree to which
corporations may be discriminated against
without requiring that they be taxed more
heavily than individuals. I think this
provision, and its interpretation, may be
important as the General Assembly seriously
considers modifying it this year. 22 / March 1976 / Illinois Issues
Dear Editor: I was particularly interested in
the staff report in the December 1975 issue
on the new Constitution after five years. I
expect several people have called to your
attention an error with regard to the revenue
article. It says several places in the staff
report that corporate and individual income
taxes are required to be at a ratio of 8 to 5,
After going on to explain that the corporate
rate can't be increased without increasing the
individual rate, the article then says, "...
nor for that matter, can either rate be
lowered without lowering the other tax."
While Article IX, Section 3 says, in part,
"... in any such tax imposed upon corporations the rate shall not exceed the rate
imposed on individuals by more than a ratio
of 8 to 5."
Norman J. Beatty,
Executive Vice President,
The Civic Federation, Chicago