The reform efforts in Illinois, as in other states, have roughly followed the blueprint laid down by the prestigious federal advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations in its 1963 report, "The Role of the States in Strengthening the Property Tax." Four reform areas were outlined: (1) professionalizing the assessment process; (2) making it easier for the taxpayer to understand the system; (3) setting a realistic statewide assessment standard, and (4) establishing a strong state agency to enforce and implement the reforms. The state of Illinois has attempted to make reforms in each of the four areas.

Professionalization
The establishment of the office of the county supervisor of assessments was an attempt to professionalize the assessment process. Until 1970, counties could choose to have a supervisor of assessments or could allow the county treasurer to assume assessment duties on top of his other tasks. After 1970, however, each county was required to have a separate county assessor or supervisor of assessments (except St. Clair County which has an elected board of assessors).

Supervisors of assessments, one-half of whose salary is paid by the state, must pass a state-administered examination to be appointed. They have the job of supervising, coordinating and supplementing the work of the elected township assessors. Their powers have gradually been increased by allowing the county to levy separate funds (without referendum) for the support of this office and for the provision of assessment tools such as tax maps and property record cards which individual townships frequently cannot afford. Also, in 1977, the General Assembly in P.A. 80-602 transferred authority to set up property index numbering systems from the county treasurer to the county supervisor of assessments.

The second way in which Illinois has promoted professionalization is by providing incentives for local assessing officials to seek professional training. Under an earlier program, any assessing official could receive $300 a year from the state by earning the designation of "Certified Illinois Assessing Officer" (CIAO). This required attending a three-day basic course and a three-to-five-day advanced course and passing an examination.

Legislation passed by the General Assembly in 1977 (P.A. 80-589) increased the requirements for receiving the stipend. In addition to the CIAO designation, the law requires 60 hours of course work before a stipend will be granted. And, in order to continue receiving the stipend, the assessing official must take 120 more hours of course work within four years.

Informing the public
Public understanding of the property tax system has always been poor. Many taxpayers become concerned about the equity of their assessment only after they have received their tax bill. When they go down to the county courthouse or to their township assessor to complain, they find out that the opportunity to appeal has already passed. Appeals must be made before tax bills are mailed.

In 1977, the General Assembly acted to make the taxpayer's job easier. H.B. 2198 (P.A. 80-421) opened to the public the annual meeting between the supervisor of assessments and the township assessors at which assessment policy is set. A second piece of legislation, H.B. 2199 (P.A. 80-614), increased the amount of information a taxpayer receives on his assessment notice. The taxpayer is now informed about the assessor's judgment as to the market value of his property as well as the assessed value, the relationship between the assessed value and the tax bill, and the procedures and time limits for appealing assessments.

Statewide assessment standard
The Illinois Constitution requires that all property be assessed uniformly. The legislature, however, may choose the percentage of market value which will be the statewide standard. Enforcement of the statutory standard has been difficult.

Until 1975 when the Illinois Supreme

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Court ordered the state to enforce the statewide assessment level by issuing realistic multipliers, actual assessment levels had always lagged behind the statutory requirement. In the 1960's the statewide standard was 100 per cent of market value. By 1971 the discrepancy between actual levels and the statutory requirement was so glaring that the legislature was forced to lower the standard to 50 per cent of market value, thus legitimizing the assessors' failure to follow the old law. When the Supreme Court acted in 1975 in the case of Homer v. Lehnhausen, actual assessment levels had further eroded and the legislature again lowered the requirement to 33 1/3 per cent of market value to forestall massive assessment increases in most of the state.

By 1976 there was talk of lowering the statutory level to 25 per cent of market value. This was not done. In 1977, however, farm property was, in effect, exempted from the 33 1/3 per cent requirement by P.A. 80-247 which allows farmland to be assessed on the basis of the value of crops produced instead of market value.

State supervision
Gradually, the state has increased its supervisory authority over property tax administration. The state has the power, when it cares to exercise it, to raise or lower assessments by the use of county multipliers. It can also order reassessments. The state administers qualifying examinations for supervisors of assessments and for board of review members in counties over 100,000 in population. The courses which will qualify a local assessing official to receive a state stipend must be approved by the state. In addition, the state has assumed a more active role in assessment administration by conducting its own training programs and by providing direct technical assistance to local officials.

Illinois has used various agencies to supervise property tax administration. From 1943 until 1969 supervision was performed by the Property Tax Division of the Department of Revenue. In 1969, the property tax function was moved to the newly created Department of Local Government Affairs (DLGA). Dissatisfied with the DLGA's performance, a legislative subcommittee recommended in 1975 the establishment of an independent tax commission. The recommendation, which was not accepted, would have brought Illinois back to the sort of commission the state used from 1919 until 1943.

Misdirected reform
Although the legislative changes seem to indicate that Illinois has made significant progress toward property tax reform, the effect on actual assessment practices has been slight. In a few areas of the state good quality assessment is being performed, but in most counties inequities continue. Some local assessing officials refuse to voluntarily comply with the statutory 33 1/3 per cent assessment level. In 1975 one county had an average assessment level (before application of the state multiplier) as low as 3 1/3 per cent of market value. Five counties had assessment levels before the state multiplier of less than 10 per cent of market value.

Opening up the property tax system is a favored strategy of reformers who assume that an informed public will be able to demand changes

Not only is voluntary compliance with the statutory assessment level poor, but assessments are also very uneven within counties and townships. The coefficient of dispersion is the statistic used to measure the variation of individual assessments around the average assessment level. In 1975, 28 counties had coefficients of dispersion for urban assessments higher than 50 per cent.

If the county's average assessment level was 33 1/3 per cent of market value, a coefficient of dispersion as high as 50 per cent means that properties with a market value of $50,000 are as likely to be assessed at $25,000 or at $8,000 as at the correct assessment of $16,700. In other words, a property chosen at random is likely to be assessed 50 per cent above or below what it should be. Although the average taxpayer does not realize the seriousness of the situation, inequities of this magnitude are not uncommon.

Part of the problem, of course has been the rapid inflation of real estate values. But the primary reason that reform efforts have failed is the basic incompatibility of the perspectives and goals of the reformers and those of the central actors in the property tax process.

In the area of professionalization, for example, the reformers assume that assessing officials want to conduct the frequent reassessments so vital to an equitable system. The reformers believe that only ignorance and lack of the proper tools stand in their way. In actuality, assessing officials are not eager to conduct more frequent valuations and so remove inequities. Doing this would mean raising the taxes of citizens who have been underassessed the past. These citizens can be quite vocal in their disapproval while those who benefit from such reevaluation will rarely rise to support the assessor. Since township assessors are elected, they tend to be quite responsive to public disapproval. Supervisors of assessments are equally sensitive, since the county board members who hire and fire the supervisor must also face the wrath of angry taxpayers. The long and short of the problem is that teaching assessors how to do a good job of valuation is not enough. Whether the system can be changed to provide rewards and incentives for doing a good job is another question.

Opening up the property tax system is a favored strategy of reformers who assume that an informed public will be able to demand and enforce changes in the system. Unfortunately, the average taxpayer's attention span is limited. When increases in tax bills are particularly dramatic or when gross inequities are unearthed by the media, there is a brief flurry of protest which rather quickly subsides.

Taxpayer's action
The taxpayer's action, or lack of it, is understandable. In the first place, the property tax system is horribly complex (see Illinois Issues, October 1977). The two-year period from assessment to collection and the division of responsibility among township assessors, various county officials, the state and a large number of local taxing districts leaves many taxpayers understandably bewildered. In the second place, average

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single-family homeowners have too little at stake to sustain an active interest in reform. The prospect of saving $50 or $100 in taxes is not enough to make most of them take on the lobbying effort which genuine reform demands. Taxpayers whose stake in the tax system is larger � farmers and businessmen � are much better organized and have more influence in property tax administration than the average residential property owner who has no permanent interest group to speak solely for him. This imbalance of interest group pressure favors inequity rather than reform.

The conflict over a statewide assessment level is another area where the goals of reformers and practicing assessing officials collide. Reformers point out that state aid programs such as school aid, which include assessed valuations as part of a distribution formula, require a uniform assessment level to operate fairly. If uniformity is not enforced, districts which systematically underassess property would look artificially "poor" and would receive extra state aid while districts which keep assessments up-to-date would appear wealthier and would be penalized by receiving less state aid.

Reformers also note that uniformity is necessary because taxing districts frequently include more than one assessment district. In such cases a lack of uniformity in assessment levels means that residents in the more lowly assessed area would pay relatively less for the taxing district's services than residents of the more highly assessed area.

Although the assessor might recognize the theoretical desirability of uniformity, he has little incentive to raise assessments in his own jurisdiction. To do so would upset taxpayers, lose state aid for local school districts and require residents of overlapping districts to pay a larger share of the taxes supporting that district. On the other hand, if the assessor can get away with assessing below the statewide standard, tie benefits local taxpayers and school districts.

Local assessors are also aware that the easiest way to stay in office is to keep assessments as stable as possible. Frequent reassessments are not only a lot of work, they can also lead to a short term in office.

Another more subtle reason local assessors resist adhering to a rigid statewide standard is distrust of the assessment-to-sales-price ratio studies which are used to measure compliance with the statutory 33 1/3 per cent assessment level. They feel that their own judgment as to the value of property is more accurate than the whims of the buyers and sellers who make up the real estate market in any given year.

The trend toward strengthening the state's power to supervise property tax administration is based on the assumption that the state will be insulated against the pressures that bear on local assessing officials. Illinois' experience does not support this assumption. State officials are as sensitive to irate taxpayers as are local officials. The state's most effective tools have not been used for fear of arousing the anger of taxpayers or of local governmental officials who resent intrusions into their territory. Despite horrendous assessment inequities in some counties, the power to order a reassessment has not been used in recent times. Finally, the state's power to equalize assessment levels across counties is not used until a crisis or judicial intervention forces action. As responsibility over property tax administration has been transferred to the state, the political pressures causing inequities have followed.

Any hope for the future?
The standard solutions to the problems of the property tax � professionalization of assessors, opening up the system, a rigid statewide assessment level and more state control � are not likely to work. They have not been successful in the past in improving the overall quality of assessments and they have not worked in other states.

Is there any alternative to the familiar pattern of isolated islands of reform surrounded by a swamp of inequity? Based on experiences in other states, there are several paths Illinois could follow. The judiciary could clean up the system by enforcing the constitutional requirement of uniformity. Alternatively, the legislature might decide that realism is the best policy and take unenforceable statutes off the books, giving local assessors more autonomy. A third choice might be a shift from the property tax to other means of funding local governmental activities. The response to the current crisis may indicate which path Illinois will follow. 

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