By JOHN REHFUSS The local government scene
IF YOU want to understand Illinois collective bargaining practice, you only need to know two important facts. The first is that, unlike about 40 other states, Illinois has no statewide legislation on public collective bargaining. The second is that, as in any major industrialized state, there is a great deal of collective bargaining in Illinois, dating back some 40 years. Out of these two apparent contradictions emerges the basic factor undergirding labor-management relations in Illinois: there are no established rules to stabilize collective bargaining in the state. The reasons for the lack of a statewide law are generally known. During every legislative session laws are proposed, debated and inevitably defeated because ideological opposition to labor legislation is allied with the disinclination of Chicago and Cook County to forego their traditional informal dealings with their own unions in favor of supporting statewide legislation. Nonetheless, bargaining goes on at the state and local levels, and its frequency and intensity has been increasing for some time. There are some guidelines in the form of attorney general opinions, court cases, scattered bits of legislation and a governor's executive order. These piecemeal precedents do not add up to a comprehensive set of law and practice, however. What exists can be summarized quickly. By law, union dues can be withheld upon employee request, and firemen have the right to advisory arbitration in cases of wages, hours or conditions of employment. The attorney general has given some opinions, which have had some effect on practice at least in the jurisdiction requesting them (for example, regarding Vermilion County sheriffs deputies and the county board recognition of their union). The courts have indicated that an employee has the right to join a union, that local units may negotiate with the union, that certain types of employees (such as supervisors) can be prohibited from union representation and that grievance arbitration does not necessarily constitute an illegal delegation of power. The governor's executive order covers some 60,000 employees and will be discussed later. Beyond these sketchy rules, however, there is a no-man's-land without rules, prohibitions or even helpful hints.
Employee organization State government employees under the control of the governor are largely organized under the provisions of Gov. Dan Walker's Executive Order No. 6. Thirteen unions represent about 45,000 ofthe60,000 affected employees, excluding supervisors, managers and confidential employees. The 1973 executive order affects organizing activity, creation of bargaining units and supervision of elections, It provides that unions may directly negotiate with the state director of personnel, with the final settlement often dependent on legilative action. Of the 13 units, the three that represent clerical and paraprofessionals, client and patient direct care (mostly in mental health and children and family care) and professional human services (mostly public aid), each have over 11,000 members. At the local level, most members of employee organizations such as labor unions and nonunion employee professional organizations like the National Education Association (here after called EO's) are in school districts. Table I indicates that not only do school districts have the most emploees, but also that their employees are much more likely to belong to EO's. Nearly 60 per cent of school district employees are EO members, compared to less than 25 per cent in counties and just over 32 per cent in municipalities. Within the school districts, teachers are over 70 per cent organized, while other administrative or maintenance employees are under 30 per cent, averaging out to the above mentioned 60 per cent. There are too few township employees in EO's to warrant comment, but special districts, long overlooked, rank immediately behind school districts in the extent of organization. Most special district employees are in large hospital districts, the Chicago Park District and the Metropolitan Sanitary District, with the rest scattered throughout the state. It is not clear why membership is dropping so rapidly, although changes in one or two large units could affect the total. In summing up, it seems that the rates of increase are modest, at best, and do not indicate a rush to organize. Those already organized may be becoming
JOHN REHFUSS A professor of political science at Northern Illinois University, DeKalb, he is associated with the university's Center for Governmental Studies. 18/April 1978/ Illinois Issues more, militant, however, since work stoppage are increasing in number and (see table 4). Table 2 gives a bit more detail on the direction employee organization is taking. The rate of increase is sharply down for all functions except hospital employees, and the overall rate of increase is almost negligible compared to the 1972 to 1974 period. The modest 3 percent education increase was the only reason that membership grew at all. In many cases where there is no agency shop requiring employees to pay their "fair share" if they do not Join the union, relatively few employees join, even though the union represents a large group. However, it is clear that functions, such as highway and, to a lesser degree, hospitals have had actual decreases in membership, while membership in other areas such as police and fire has stabilized. A statewide law Anyone can make a fairly good argument for either supporting or opposing a statewide collective bargaining law. In one sense, the cons may out weight the pros, since the very absence of a law in Illinois may indicate that the advocates' case is not convincing. On the other hand, political realities do not always reflect the most sensible course for labor relations. An examination of both sides of the issue, against the background of relevant data and history, does however, tend to make passage of a law seem the most desirable Most arguments against a statewide law, first of all, are arguments against organizing public employees at all. Some purists might be in favor of collective bargaining but favor a decentralized approach allowing each unit to develop its own standards and procedures. They would argue that labor relations is a home rule matter appropriately left to each unit. This view is not widely held, for most see the practical problems inherent in the present local option plan. Therefore, most of the prevailing arguments against a statewide law are really arguments against collective bargaining. To a large degree, in other words, many of these "anti" arguments are basically ideological. Some simply oppose labor unions, or oppose any attempt by employees to unite or seek a formal bargaining relationship with the governing body. Government sovereignty is at stake. There is a more moderate position which holds that unions are appropriate for the private, but not the public sector because public needs are different, because the private "model" will not work in cases such as the protective services, or because civil service and merit systems provide adequate protection for employees. There is a good deal to be said for this point of view, but it is getting harder and harder to maintain it when one considers the extent to which collective bargaining is accepted in other states, and even in Illinois.
Most politicians and citizens are pragmatic, however, and basic ideological positions are not widely enough held to prevent statewide collective bargaining. It is probable, too, that ideological rhetoric is often merely a mask for practical objections. The real reasons for resistance to statewide laws are a host of practical concerns that public managers have, regardless of their labor support in election campaigns.
Many managers, for example, believe that statewide laws might well tilt the balance toward labor unions and set off a massive organization campaign that would jeopardize labor peace or at least weaken the position of public officials. Many legislative bodies, it is argued, simply cannot resist employee demands when those making the demands are voters as well. Many governmental units do not have the management capability to negotiate effectively, and there is concern that any agreements would favor employees. These "weak management" arguments arise at least partially from the strained financial position of most governments. Present practice calls for retrenchment without reducing services too much. Any larger piece of the local, state or education pie goes to employees at the expense of reduced services or tax increases. Therefore, it is argued, this is not the time to tie the hands of management or reduce flexibility of local legislative bodies, a theme few would quibble over. There are rebuttals to these arguments, of course, most of which involve rejecting the idea that public employees should stand hat in hand or that public managers will not be able to negotiate effectively if citizens are supportive of retrenchment. However, the weight of the above objections is considerable and a significant factor in the minds of many citizens and legislators alike. An argument can also be made that local units have responsibility for managing their own affairs, and that labor-management relations is a basic part of this responsibility. If the federal April 1978 Illinois Issues /19 government won't pass a national collective bargaining bill and hasn't the power to adopt a fair labor standards act, then neither do states have the responsibility to legislate on matters which should be settled locally. There is no legal or constitutional ground for this argument, but it has practical weight with many advocates of absolute home rule for localities. A final argument against a statewide law is that dealing with labor unions or employee organizations is a time-consuming, laborious task that poses an additional and sometimes intolerable burden on managerial and political officials. Marathon bargaining sessions in many localities, conducted over and over again with each EO, lend credence to this argument. There is simply no question that enormous amounts of time must be committed when initiating collective bargaining. The difficulty is complicated by the large number of bargaining units in many places. In 1975, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, Springfield had 10 formally recorded contracts in public works; eight were in the Water, Light and Power Department. Union membership ranged from 150 in the largest unit to five or less in three unions. The carpenters and painters each had a two-member union. Two other unions, the machinists and the operating engineers, each had two separate unions in the department.' One should not assume that all organized units are this fragmented, but it does make a good horror story for managers and public officials who are genuinely concerned about the time commitments demanded by collective bargaining. Under a merit or civil service system, it is argued, such an investment of time would have some payoff to employees which would be impossible under collective bargaining. Results and purpose In fact, shorter and more routine negotiating sessions and a smaller number of bargaining units would probably be a result of a statewide system of collective bargaining. Indeed, this is the purpose of such a law. However, there is no doubt that many local units would spend more time in negotiations and contract administration than they now commit to employee relations.
The major argument for a statewide law is simply that it will stabilize and regularize labor relations in the state, preventing the current kaleidoscopic practices that characterize Illinois. Some units bargain in good faith while others refuse to bargain. Some bargain in bad faith, which is worse than not bargaining at all. Many units, particularly in the Chicago suburban area, pay a premium salary to keep out unions. Chicago itself provides union wages and benefits but refuses to bargain formally. Among units that choose to bargain, practices vary enormously. In places such as Madison County or Decatur and in most school districts, negotiations have become highly stabilized. In others, such as Will County or the East Aurora School District, negotiations are chaotic and often ineffective. Often there is absolutely no consistency between governmental levels or even at the same level. Many small units do not understand (if they have heard of) mediation or factfinding. Grievance arbitration is not always used, and even when it is used, it varies enormously in scope and application. Sometimes supervisors are in the union, sometimes in a separate union, and sometimes not in any union. Some police departments, for example, exclude all supervisory employees from the rank of sergeant up, while others include all policemen except the chief. This lack of uniformity works in erratic ways, sometimes against labor, sometimes against management, and sometimes against both. Unfair labor practices by a management, such as bullying employees or reneging on agreements to accept the findings of arbitrators, while not quite common, still occur. These practices would be rare if a statewide policy and review board existed. On the other hand, some employers are simply afraid of unions and give away not only their management rights but also the agency exchequer. They might not do so if there were broadly known practices and policies. Finally, both parties may be frustrated by lengthy and fruitless bargaining sessions, loss of respect for each other, and dissatisfaction on both sides over the actual contract. With no statewide practice to guide the parties, unrealistic expectations are fairly common. This makes for bad feelings and labor unrest. An associated matter is the question of equity. With no state law, varied practice leads to inequitable situations At Northern Illinois University, for example, the clerical union, in an election called by the Board of Regents, was decertified even though the vote favoring the union was 235 to 120. The regents ruled that without a state law, a vote of a majority of all employees (240 of 479 in this case) in the bargaining unit was needed for verification, and that the endorsement had therefore been five votes short. This absolute majority is perfectly legal, but well at odds with prevailing private practice — with voter referendums generally, and with what other state agencies are doing. Without a state law, it is impossible to assure that likes are treated in like fashion. For example, a labor relations policy for, say, settling police grievances, depends purely on where one works or what the government is willing to do, even when the policy may have substantial statewide impact. Labor-management activities An example of the range of Illinois labor management activities is shown in table 3. It involves a randomly selected group of 25 municipalities (16 in the Chicago area, 9 downstate) over 10,000 in Illinois which were surveyed in fall 1976. Eight, about a third, had no 1Bureau of Labor Statistics, BLS File of State, County and Municipal Collective Bargaining Agreements, Fall, 1975 (Washington, D.C., Report No. 454), p. 21. 20/ April 1978/ Illinois Issues reported union membership. Four others had employee members in unions which were not recognized by the municipality. Thirteen, or about half, recognized one or more union. In this latter group, five were largely or completely organized. Assuming this is true of all larger municipalities, about a third will have no reported union activity, about a fifth will be largely or wholly unionized, and about half will fall somewhere between. Of those units with unions, nine agreed to have the employer check off and remit dues to the union or employee organization. Seven of the municipalities had a formal grievance procedure, and only four had formal mediation or arbitration (impasse) provisions. These three provisions are crucial to an effective labor-management relations program, and their absence suggests the unevenness of labor relations practice. Finally, five of the cities (three with recognized unions, two without) have and strikes or job actions such as police 'blue flu." This total is higher than the average for Illinois (see table 4) and suggests that formal statistics about work stoppages understate the amount of job actions that actually take place. Another advantage of a statewide law would be the probable elimination of some outdated management personnel practices which are both inefficient and unfair. Patronage, for example, despite perennial predictions of its demise, is still a hardy institution in Illinois, at least in most units. Most unions detest patronage even more than they favor seniority. Paternalism ("I take care of 'my' employees") is another problem. Another is some civil service or merit principles, such as elaborate written rests for promotion and hiring. Unions prefer seniority, and they have a good case since most examination or promotion procedures have little relationship to merit and, in any case, have never been validated. Labor peace argument
Some argue that statewide laws would promote labor peace by providing a means of mediating disputes, by requiring a central agency to establish bargaining units, conduct elections, rule on unfair labor practices, and settle disputes. This would be similar to the Office of Collective Bargaining which administers the governor's executive order. The increase in strikes in the past year, as shown in table 4, is used as evidence that work stoppages will continue to increase unless there is central authority to regulate collective bargaining. The number of Illinois strikes jumped some 50 per cent in one year, and the increase was entirely in local government, led by education. The number of employees involved increased about ninefold. A central labor relations agency could certainly provide mediation for disputes which now often result in strikes, and any statewide law would certainly provide for some final resolution of irreconcilable differences short of strikes. However, before embracing the labor peace argument, one should understand that no set of laws or rules guarantee freedom from strikes. The best that can be said is that statewide laws might reduce their frequency and severity.
A final advantage of a statewide law is that management's job would be easier in many cases. Personnel issues would be raised at specific contract times, nagging grievances would have a formal process for airing, and management would deal with one person representing all employees in that bargaining unit. This is a private enterprise model, and it works well there. It is a bit more impersonal and even more brutal than traditional public practices, for it assumes that employees get what their union is strong enough to bargain for. This thought horrifies many public sector officials, but they will simply have to face up to the inevitable result of an adversary relationship. While management may no longer be as paternalistic as in the past, it may not need to be as solicitous as before, either. If employees are to bargain collectively and thus equalize power with management, they may have to suffer on those occasions when the bargain struck is not as favorable as before. Compromise bill Statewide collective bargaining laws have failed in the past, and they will likely fail again before one passes, if, in fact, one ever does. Passage is dependent largely upon an agreement by both parties, labor and management, that they stand to gain more by working out a compromise bill acceptable to both sides than they will lose by the present hit and miss system which has developed in Illinois. In so doing, they will have to convince legislators and a diverse set of interests that the time for a comprehensive statewide act is here. This may not be the time. However, a look at the present situation suggests that both parties are paying a high price for lack of a statewide act and, in fact, that those presumably benefitting may not always be realizing the fullest benefits. Organized labor is losing opportunities for membership gains, and may actually be losing ground. In addition, it is becoming clearer that management in many cases is fully capable of driving a hard bargain and there may not be economic advantages to unionization. In at least one case (DeKalb County Nursing Home), decertification resulted in employees receiving a pay boost as April 1978/Illinois Issues/21 they moved up to the overall county scale. Labor may have to reconsider its opposition to any bill which is not pro-labor.
Management may have to look at the price in terms of labor strife and the uncertainty that inconsistent provisions and unsophisticated techniques have caused. The famous Skokie police firing of several years ago resulted in a court decision which reinstated patrolmen, but at a cost the patrolmen generally were unwilling to pay (court costs, etc.). Many units can avoid unions if they have the will and sometimes the money to buy off employees, but there will be many cases where this will not work. Where it will not work, there will be job actions, or at least substantial unrest. This will be extremely costly in terms of public support, long-term employee relations and possibly financial stability. Local government management organizations, (such as the Illinois Municipal League, Urban Counties Council, Illinois Association of School Boards, etc.) may have to vigorously support a moderate bill. A statewide collective bargaining bill is needed to stabilize bargaining practices. Management would probably benefit from such a bill because it would know at last what to expect and — with stable, statewide bargaining conditions — would be able to negotiate with flexibility. Contrary to cries of alarm and indignation, an equitable bill will not force public employers into fiscal insolvency. Unions still have to bargain for what they get, and so far neither the state under Executive Order No. 6 nor any local unit has been bargained into bankruptcy. Where unions have exacted excessive awards, a statewide bill would hardly make the case worse. Collective bargaining won't go away. If legislators don't pass a bill in this session, the same old debate will continue — and the same problems will remain. 22/ April 1978/ Illinois Issues
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