Judicial Rulings

U.S. Supreme Court

State reps have no immunity under feds

STATE LAWMAKERS are not immune from federal prosecution for their legislative acts, according to a ruling by the US, Supreme Court March 19.

The case, U.S. v. Gillock, stemmed from federal prosecution of Edgar H. Gillock, a former Tennessee state senator, on charges he accepted a bribe to block an extradition and introduced legislation to enable four persons to receive master electrician licenses.

Gillock argued that a Tennessee state legislator is privileged under the Speech or Debate Clause of both the U.S. and Tennessee constitutions to prevent introduction of evidence concerning his legislative actions in a federal criminal prosecution. He was successful in suppressing the evidence before his trial in federal district court, and a federal appeals court upheld the decision. The Supreme Court, however, disagreed 7-2.

Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Warren Burger said the U.S. Constitution's Speech or Debate Clause applies only to members of Congress, and the Tennessee clause merely limits the prosecutorial power of the state. Burger said, "Here we believe that recognition of an evidentiary privilege for state legislators for their legislative acts would impair the legitimate interest of the federal government in enforcing its criminal statutes with only speculative benefit to the state legislative process."

The issue of immunity for state legislators appeared in the 1977 cement bribery convictions of four Illinois lawmakers (North v. U.S., Walker v. U.S., Craig v. U.S. and Market v. U.S.). In that case, the Supreme Court did not comment on the defendants' immunity claims, but it did uphold their federal convictions, prison sentences and fines (see Illinois Issues, Dec. 1978).

28/June 1980/Illinois Issues

The right of employee to sue city

In an April 16 ruling, the U.S. Supreme Court broadened the rights of city workers to sue their employers.

The case, Owen v. City of Independence, Mo., involved the dismissal of George D. Owen as city police chief. Owen claimed the city fired him without specifying grounds for his dismissal or allowing him an opportunity to refute the city's complaints at a public hearing. Thus, said Owen, the city had violated [he Civil Rights Act. The city, however, claimed it had qualified immunity from liability because it had dismissed Owen in good faith and without malice.

Both the federal district and appellate courts found the city had violated Owen's right to due process under the 14th Amendment but ruled the city was entitled to qualified immunity since it had acted in good faith.

The Supreme Court reversed the decisions of the lower courts. In a 6-3 decision written by Justice William J. Brennan, the court said the goal of the Civil Rights Act is to provide protection to persons wronged by the misuse of power. Citing Monroe v. Pape, Brennan said, "By creating an express federal remedy, Congress sought to enforce provisions of the 14th Amendment against those who carry a badge of authority of a State and represent it in some capacity, whether they act in accordance with their authority or misuse it." Brennan added, "The knowledge that a municipality will be liable for all of its injurious conduct, whether committed in good faith or not, should create an incentive for officials who may harbor doubts about the lawfulness of their intended actions to err on the side of protecting citizens' constitutional rights."

Dissenting were Justices Lewis F. Powell, Potter Stewart and William H. Rehnquist. Powell noted the court had moved from absolute immunity of municipalities to strict liability "in two short years." He said the decision is in conflict with the law in 44 states and the District of Columbia. "I believe that strict municipal liability unreasonably subjects local governments to damages judgments for actions that were reasonable when performed. It converts municipal governance into a hazardous slalom through constitutional obstacles that are often unknown and unknowable," Powell said.

Freedom of information

The U.S. Supreme Court ruled unanimously March 19 that a government agency may not release material under the Freedom of Information Act if the agency holding the information has been enjoined from doing so by a federal tourt. The case was GTE Sylvania Inc. el at v. Consumers Union of the United States, et al.

Death penalty overturned

IN A 4-3 DECISION April 18, the Illinois Supreme Court overturned the death sentence given a lake County man for murdering a Waukegan police officer because he is not "a man with a malignant heart who must be permanently eliminated from society."

In the case, Illinois v. Robert K. Carlson Sr., Carlson was convicted of killing his ex-wife, setting fire to her home and fatally wounding a police officer. The court upheld Carlson's prison sentence of up to 100 years for murdering his former wife Rosemary and up to 20 years for arson, but the court ordered a new sentencing hearing for the murder of the police officer.

Testimony showed Carlson purchased a gun and ammunition from a coworker on November 11, 1977 after Rosemary told him their planned reconciliation was off and that she had a boyfriend. The following day he bought two gasoline cans and filled them with gasoline. Then, on November 13, he shot Rosemary 10 times in her home and tried to burn down the house. After leaving the house, Carlson met a friend at a tavern to whom he gave $3,200 to be used for the education of Carlson's son. Before he had left the tavern, Carlson had shot Sgt. Harry White, a police officer.

Testimony by Carlson's physician at the sentencing hearing indicated the defendant had undergone a process of "physical and emotional deterioration" during a year or two prior to November 1977. A psychiatrist testified Carlson was "extremely distraught" at the time he shot White, and Carlson testified he did not intend to kill the officer, but himself.

The Supreme Court said the trial court erred by not giving enough consideration to mitigating factors as Carlson's poor physical and emotional health and his lack of any previous criminal record. The circuit court found that the factor of no previous criminal activity was meaningless in light of Carlson's convictions for murder and arson. The Supreme Court, however, said the convictions should have been considered "all a part of one unfortunate and tragic event precipitated by the events leading up to the killing of Rosemary." The high court also said Carlson's concern for his son should have been considered as a mitigating factor. Writing for the majority, Justice Howard C. Ryan said, "Focusing on the individual offender and the circumstances of the particular offense (and not the fact that it was a peace officer who was killed), we see an individual with no past criminal record who would in all probability be leading a life acceptable to our society had not his unfortunate marital affair triggered this tragic sequence of events."

Dissenting, Justice Robert C. Underwood said the trial court did consider the defendants' lack of a criminal record, but the brutality of the murders outweighed it. He also found little parental concern "manifested by a father who has just murdered his son's mother and intends to flee to California." Underwood continued, "Any suggestion that defendant was attempting suicide when he killed Sergeant White is, in my judgment, little short of ridiculous."

Also dissenting were Justices William G. Clark and Thomas J. Moran. They found that a number of errors were committed during the course of the trial, but they disagreed with the decision of the majority to overturn the death sentence.

Discrimination for pregnancy

The State Supreme Court ruled 5-2 April 18 that Illinois Bell Telephone Co. was correct in refusing to pay disability benefits to four pregnant women in 1972 and 1973. The justices said Illinois Bell acted in accordance with the law in effect at the time and had not treated the women unfairly. They did not address the question of whether the disability plan violates the recently amended Federal Equal Employment Opportunities Act which prohibits cenain employment related classifications based on pregnancy.

The Illinois Fair Practices Commission (FEPC) had ruled that the women were victims of sex discrimination because Illinois Bell had refused them disability benefits. The high court said, however, under Bell's disability plan "normal pregnancy" could not be considered a disability.

The Supreme Court's ruling in the case, Illinois Bell Telephone Company v. The Fair Employment Practices Commission, vacated the order of the FEPC and reversed the judgment of the appellate court. The ruling of the circuit court was affirmed.

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