Judicial Rulings By SHELLEY DAVIS

Illinois Supreme Court

The public interest and the employers' right to fire
FIRING an employee because he helped police investigate a fellow worker suspected of breaking the law constitutes a retaliatory discharge, the Illinois Supreme Court ruled 4-3 on April 17.

Stating that public policy favors "citizen crime-fighters," the court said, "The foundation of the tort of retaliatory discharge lies in the protection of public policy ..." The case, Ray Palmateer v. International Harvester, involved a manager who alleged he was fired because he agreed to assist in the investigation and trial of an employee suspected of violating the Criminal Code of 1961 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, sec. 1 — 1 et seq.)

It is a general rule that "at-will" employment can be terminated at any time for any or no cause. The tort of retaliatory discharge, recognized in Illinois since 1978, is an exception to that rule. It holds that when the discharge of an employee contravenes public policy in any way, the employer has committed a legal wrong. However, the employer retains the right to fire workers at will in cases where no clear mandate to public policy is involved. The problem, of course, is in the definition of the term "public policy."

International Harvester said Palmateer "recklessly and precipitously" resorted to the criminal justice system, upsetting the work atmosphere. Justice Seymour Simon, however, in speaking for the majority, defended Palmateer's actions: "The cause of action [for retaliatory discharge] is allowed where the public policy is clear, but is denied where it is equally clear that only private interests are at stake. . . . There is no public policy more basic, nothing more implicit in the concept of ordered liberty than the enforcement of a State's criminal code."

Dissenting were Justices Robert C. Underwood, Thomas J. Moran and Howard C. Ryan, who said that public policy supporting "citizen crime-fighters" is not found in any statute. According to Ryan, who spoke for the minority, most jurisdictions "have required that public policy against such discharge be clear and well-defined, that the mandate of public policy be clear and compelling, and that there be strong public policy against such discharge."

In this case, Ryan said, Palmateer "had taken it upon himself to become involved in crime fighting when it was neither required by law, nor by his employment, and obviously was against the wishes of his employer."

Comparative negligence and contributory negligence
THE STANDARD of comparative negligence in common law cases was adopted over contributory negligence by the Illinois Supreme Court in a 5-2 decision April 17.

Under the "pure" comparative negligence system adopted by the court, persons involved in a negligence lawsuit are liable for damages in proportion to the percentage at which they were at fault in the accident. Under the contributory negligence system, which Illinois has used for nearly 100 years, the person bringing the suit is unable to collect any damages for his injuries if he contributed to the accident in any degree.

In the consolidated cases, James Alvis v. James Ribar et al. and Karin Krohn v. Abbott Laboratories, Inc., both involving automobile accidents, the court noted that the "contributory negligence defense has been subject to attack because of its failure to apportion damages according to the fault of the parties." The court added that there is "a compelling public demand to abolish the old rule."

"Under a comparative negligence standard, the parties are allowed to recover the proportion of damages not attributable to their own fault," Justice Thomas J. Moran said, in speaking for the majority. He said, "The basic logic and fairness of such apportionment is difficult to dispute."

Pointing out that 36 states have adopted some form of the comparative negligence system, Moran rejected the claims of the Ribar and Abbott Laboratories that adoption of the system would lead to difficulty in apportioning relative fault, overcrowded dockets and escalating insurance costs.

In the dissenting opinion, Justices Robert C. Underwood and Howard C. Ryan said the decision to adopt comparative negligence "is best left to the General Assembly."

"One of the major problems with a judicially decreed change of this magnitude is its effect upon a great many other, related areas of law," Underwood said. "Unless the legislature acts, it will in all probability be years before these questions can be judicially answered."

Underwood also disagreed with the majority view that the legislature is waiting for the court to act, citing the consideration and rejection of six bills in less than five years as evidence that the General Assembly is not ready to adopt the comparative negligence system.

Home rule and landlord-tenant rights
As a home rule body, the city of Evanston can enact its own landlord-tenant ordinance even if it is stricter than state laws, the Illinois Supreme Court ruled in an April 17 decision.

In the case, The City of Evanston v. Create, Inc., the high court disagreed with Create's contention that landlord-tenant rights are an area of "far-reaching statewide interest" that can only be legislated by the General Assembly. "... we find no evidence of a statewide interest so compelling as to preclude home rule power," said Justice Thomas J. Moran, speaking for the court.

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"Evanston may act under its constitutionally granted police powers to pass reasonable regulations concerning the activities of landlords and tenants in order to protect the public health, safety, morals, and welfare," Moran said.

Moran also pointed out in upholding the rulings of the Cook County and 1st District Appellate courts, that the main body of the Evanston ordinance was enacted in 1873, and the court has "consistently found that an ordinance enacted by a home rule unit pursuant to the [1970 Constitution] supercedes a conflicting statute enacted prior to the effective date of the constitution."

Construction company found negligent under Road Injuries Construction Act
IN RULING for the first time on the Road Construction Injuries Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 121. sec. 314.1 etseq.), the Illinois Supreme Court said that the common law defense of contributory negligence is not permissible under the act.

The cases, Joseph Vegich v. McDougal Hartmann Company et al. and Sharon R. Kawolsky v. McDougal Hartmann Company, involved an accident that occurred on a section of Route 24 in Peoria County that was closed for repairs, but was not adequately barricaded or marked. Kawolsky, the driver of the vehicle, was killed, and Vegich, a passenger was seriously injured. McDougal Hartmann, the company in charge of the repairs, contended that since both had been drinking before the accident occurred, they were contributorially negligent.

However, Justice Seymour Simon, in speaking for the high court, said the responsibility for posting adequate warning signs rests with the construction company. Therefore, they are liable if an accident occurs where signs are not posted. "When the statutory purpose of prevention is frustrated by a wilful violation and an accident follows," Simon pointed out, "the full burden of the loss must be laid on the wrongdoer, even if the victim was himself negligent.

"By using the term 'wilful' in the Road Construction Injuries Act, the legislature meant to create a strict liability action for which contributory negligence would be no defense," Simon concluded in affirming the decision of the 3rd District Appellate Court. □

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