Illinois Supreme

Court Murder conviction, by itself, is test of parent's fitness

ON DECEMBER 1, 1980, the Illinois Supreme Court ruled that the state had not proved to its satisfaction that a man who had previously been convicted of murdering his wife was an unfit parent (see Illinois Issues, March 1981, p. 36). In the case, In re Hannibal Abdullah, a Minor (People v. Lonnie Abdullah, a/k/a Yumba Lasumba), the high court said that the mere fact of conviction did not prove Abdullah unfit by reason of depravity and therefore the state must have his consent to place his child for adoption. The court remanded the case to the circuit court for a new trial.

After Abdullah's murder conviction was upheld by the 4th District Appellate Court and his request to appeal denied, the Supreme Court granted the state's petition to rehear the case for Abdullah's unfitness as a parent, and on June 26 the court reversed its previous ruling, saying that the state had indeed proved its case for Abdullah's depravity and no new trial was necessary.

In delivering the court's opinion, Justice Seymour Simon said, "Three separate factors in the evidence showed defendant's depravity. First, he was convicted of murder, the most serious criminal offense there is. . . . Second, the murder victim was the mother of the child. . . . Finally, the extended term of imprisonment imposed (60 years) indicates that the murder was accompanied by exceptionally brutal. . . behavior demonstrating wanton cruelty. Taken together, these three factors. . . . show depravity." The child can now be placed for adoption by the Department of Children and Family Services without Abdullah's consent.

Affirmative action ruling against Kodak upheld

EASTMAN Kodak Company was denied the opportunity to submit bids to the State of Illinois by the Fair Employment Practices Commission (FEPC). The commission claimed Kodak had failed to rectify an "underutilization" of minority employees in its Oak Brook plant. The Supreme Court upheld the FEPC ruling in a decision June 26. In the case, Eastman Kodak Company v. The Fair Employment Practices Commission, the FEPC ruling had been overturned by the circuit court and upheld by the appellate court.

When the FEPC charged Kodak with underutilization of minorities, Kodak responded with an affirmative action plan which the FEPC rejected because the plan did not include Chicago in its minority recruitment area. In a public hearing, Kodak stated that efforts to recruit minorities in Chicago had been unsuccessful.

The company also argued that the FEPC has the power under Section 4 of the Fair Employment Practices Act to take "affirmative action" in cases involving individuals but not to require a company to submit a program affecting minorities as a class. In the court's opinion, Justice Daniel P. Ward stated, "Kodak cites no authority for what would be an absurdly narrow construction of affirmative action."

To Kodak's contention that the FEPC ruling would force Kodak to engage in preferential hiring, the court replied that the FEPC did not require the company to adopt Chicago as a recruitment area or to hire minorities; it simply denied Kodak state bidding rights. The court acknowledged Kodak's argument about the disadvantages of traveling long distances and its effect on tardiness and absenteeism, but noted that almost half of Kodak's current employees live outside of the proposed recruitment area, with 19 percent living in Chicago. Justice Ward stated, ". . . we hold that the Commission's decision ... is not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence."

Union members not involved in strike eligible for UI benefits

UNION members who pay dues but are not directly involved in a strike may receive unemployment benefits for work stoppages caused by the strike, the Illinois Supreme Court ruled June 26. In the case, General Motors v. William M. Bowling, Director of Labor et al. (UAW Local 694 et al., Appellants), the court reversed an appellate court decision and affirmed earlier rulings by the director of the Illinois Department of Labor and the Cook County Circuit Court.

UAW shop clerks employed at two General Motors plants claimed they were eligible for unemployment benefits because they had crossed picket lines and continued to work during a 1970 strike by UAW production workers. The court ruled in favor of the clerks, citing a proviso from Section 604 of the Unemployment Compensation Act which states that an individual who is unemployed because of a labor dispute at the place he works is eligible for unemployment benefits if he is "not participating in or financing or directly interested in the labor dispute which caused the stoppage of work" and if he does not belong to a class of workers "any of whom are participating in or financing" the dispute (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 48, sec. 434).

General Motors argued that, because the clerks paid union dues, they were, in effect, financing the strike. But the court disagreed, stating, "The claimants paid no money directly to the striking local; they paid their dues to the international. . . . There is no way to say exactly what money, or how much money, passed from the claimants ... to the striking workers. . . . the amount in question is clearly insignificant." Regardless of whether their unemployment was due to the labor dispute, "the claimants are eligible for unemployment benefits," the court stated.

Alcoholism factor in disbarment case

ALCOHOLISM can be seen as a mitigating factor in attorney disbarment proceedings, the Illinois Supreme Court ruled June 26. In the case, In re James Francis Driscoll, Attorney, it was shown that in late 1977 Driscoll had converted to his own use money that, by court order, was to go to his clients.

Driscoll admitted the charges, but said he was a severe alcoholic and not in control of his actions. He was "detoxified" in 1978, and has since quit drinking, committing no misdeeds either before or after his alcoholism. The Hearing Board recommended that Driscoll be disbarred; the Review Board recommended he be suspended for 30 months and thereafter until further notice. Driscoll appealed, asking for a probationary arrangement and arguing that no suspension should be necessary.

The Supreme Court suspended Driscoll for six months, stating, "We would like to see respondent restored to an active practice [of law). . . . We must also protect the integrity and reputation of that profession, and protect the public."

November 1981 | Illinois Issues | 33