By DAVID H. EVERSON and JOAN A. PARKER

Legislative elections: reviving an old partnership

With the disappearance, due to the cutback amendment, of 59 House incumbents and of cumulative voting, the 1982 Illinois elections promised to be interesting. Post-election, the authors analyze the effects of the amendment in light of the claims of its proponents and opponents. In addition, the future policy consequences of the election are examined

BEFORE the fact, it seemed certain that the 1982 legislative elections in Illinois would be among the most unusual in the state's history; the "most unusual" is still the at-large House election of 1964. In 1982, reapportionment, that once every 10 years reshuffling of the legislative districts, alone would have accounted for an unusual election. But, added to that uncertainty, were the twin effects of the legislative cutback amendment: the reduction of the size of the House from 177 to 118 members (eliminating 59 incumbents at one whack); and the shifting from multi-member districts with cumulative voting to single-member districts and plurality voting.

The story of Illinois reapportionment in 1982 was one of politics and luck. (For an account, see Charles N. Wheeler, "Redistricting '81. A Democratic decade?" Illinois Issues, April 1982.) In the end, the Democrats, through a combination of luck and political savvy, had been dealt a potentially winning hand for the legislative election. Besides having drawn the new districts themselves, the Illinois Democrats also benefitted from a national Democratic trend in 1982 and skillful allocation of political resources in the legislative election campaigns.

These unique circumstances combined to produce a rousing Democratic victory in the legislative elections in Illinois in 1982. In addition, in the aftermath of this first election after the cutback amendment, predictions made by both its proponents and opponents weren't always right. But the larger consequences of the election are in the future: What will the Democratic legislative sweep mean for policymaking in Illinois? What shape will the dialogue take between the Republican governor and the Democratic legislature?

The elections

The story of this election starts with the 1982 legislative primaries. The new single-member House districts, crafted by the Democrats, were substantially altered from previous district boundaries, and most of the new districts paid little attention to existing political boundaries such as counties. For example, Wheeler points out that Republican stronghold DuPage County is "traversed by seven Senate and 11 House districts." The new and unfamiliar districts might be thought to have contributed to the extremely high percentage of "uncontested" primaries in the House in 1982.

No longer did cumulative voting offer challengers a chance in primaries to knock off incumbents because of the 'bullet,' the ability to cast three votes for a given candidate

But, regardless of these circumstances, Illinois legislative primaries characteristically have never attracted much competition (see table 1). In the 1982 Senate primaries, somewhat surprisingly, the percentage of uncontested races was below the mean of 74 percent for the previous five elections (which included 1972 — the last reapportionment election). In the House, however, the story is different. The percentage of uncontested primary elections went up significantly from an average of 62 percent (1972-80) to 74 percent in 1982. The cutback amendment may be singled out as a prime cause of the increase in uncontested House primaries. No longer did cumulative voting offer challengers a chance in primaries to knock off incumbents because of the "bullet," the ability to cast three votes for a given candidate; the cutback amendment had eliminated the system.

Another significant aspect of the 1982 primaries is the increase for both houses in the number of districts in which no one sought a party's nomination. In the Senate, it appeared that 39 percent of the nominated candidates would be automatically elected in the general election. That was a dramatic change, since elections from 1972 through 1980 had only 7 percent uncontested Senate races. In the House, the situation after the primary was even less competitive. It appeared that 45 percent of the districts would be uncontested in the general election, as opposed to an average of 4.4 percent for 1972-1980. (In these elections with three-member House districts, uncontested means having fewer than two candidates from one of the two parties for the three seats — a practice which had been reduced but not fully eliminated by the 1970 Constitution.) However, these extraordinarily high percentages did not hold through the 1982 general election.

As for the fate of incumbents in the 1982 primary, reapportionment forced some incumbents to run in new districts and others to run against another. But, overall, incumbent candidates in the House and Senate for 1982 were highly successful in their nomination contests (see table 2). The somewhat lower rate for the House is accounted for by six races in which one incumbent was paired against another in the primary. These were Democrats John F. Leon, Chicago, and Alfred G. Ronan,* Chicago, in the 12th District; Democrats Barbara Flynn Currie,* Chicago, and Raymond W. Ewell, Chicago, in the 26th; Republicans Patrick S.

*winner

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Grossi, Glenwood, and Robert J. Piel,* South Holland, in the 79th; Republicans John C. (Jay) Ackerman, Morton, and Judy Koehler,* Henry, in the 89th; Democrats Fred J. Schraeder, Peoria, and Donald L. Saltsman,* Peoria, in the 92nd; and Democrats Tim Donovan, Decatur, and JohnF. Dunn,* Decatur, in the 101st. As for the other House incumbents (running against nonincumbents or in uncontested races), the reelection rate was 93 percent (104 out of 112), nearly equal to that for the Senate. Obviously, neither reapportionment nor single-member districts hurt incumbents very much in the 1982 legislative primaries. (Of course, 59 incumbent seats were automatically eliminated by the cutback.)

After the primaries, it appeared 53 representatives and 23 senators had no competition in the general election. The situation changed during the summer when local party committees moved to fill vacant spots in several districts. The parties added candidates in 23 House races, bringing the percent of uncontested races down from 45 to 25 percent, and candidates in 11 Senate races, reducing the uncontested seats from 39 to 20 percent. (The Senate figure is still higher than for the previous five elections, but an argument can be made that it follows a trend which started in 1974.)

The cutback arguments

The fact that one House race out of four was uncontested in the general election is significant because cutback amendment proponents argued that single-member districts would increase competitiveness. But that theory would only be true where the second party is viable; in Chicago, the Republican party is not viable. The lack of effective competition in single-member Senate districts in Chicago had demonstrated this point prior to the cutback, and it proved true in 1982: 11 of the 12 uncontested candidates for the Senate were Chicago Democrats. In the House races, the story is similar: 19 of the 30 uncontested races involved Chicago Democrats. The cutback alone could not produce competitiveness where there is no functioning second party. And no longer can cumulative voting allow for the representation of minority party members in the absence of a viable local party structure.

Proponents of the cutback also argued that cumulative voting was an incumbent's protection device; Patrick Quinn, founder of the Coalition for Political Honesty, once asserted that "the complicated and collusive system is consciously designed to protect incumbents and limit political competition."

The success of incumbents in the general election was complicated by reapportionment, as well as by the cutback amendment. But in the end, the number of incumbents winning was about as high as it usually is (see table 2).

Only four Senate incumbents were defeated: The Republicans lost Richard A. Walsh (River Forest, 26th), W. Timothy Simms (Rockford, 34th) and Randy Thomas (East Moline, 36th). The lone Democrat incumbent to lose was James Gitz (Freeport, 35th). In addition, Republican John J. Nimrod of Glenview, who had been defeated in the 28th District Republican primary by Rep. Bob Kustra of Glenview, ran as a third party candidate and was defeated.

In the House the incumbent reelection rate of 80 percent is deceptively low, compared to the Senate's 91 percent (see table 3). Of the 22 losses suffered by incumbent House members in 1982, 15 came in races where one incumbent was paired against another. (A special situation occurred in the 17th and 36th districts where two Chicago incumbents previously elected as Democrats, Arthur Turner and Monica Faith Stewart, were defeated running as third party candidates. They are not considered incumbents in these analyses.)

If the incumbent-against-incumbent races are excluded, 91 percent (75 out of 82) of the remaining House incumbents were reelected. The seven incumbents defeated by nonincumbents were Republicans Harry J. Smith (River Grove, 52nd), Ray LaHood (Moline, 72nd), Edward McBroom (Kankakee, 86th), Irv Smith (Springfield, 99th) and Clyde W. Robbins (Fairfield, 108th); and Democrats J. Glenn Schneider (Naperville, 41st) and Samuel M. McGrew (Galesburg, 94th).

The 91 percent figure is close to the average reelection rate of 95 percent under cumulative voting from 1972 to 1980. If we exclude quasi-incumbents LaHood and Harry Smith (both of whom were appointed to the legislature

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after the primary and before the general election), then the reelection rate for incumbents is 94 percent. The conclusion must be reached that the abolition of cumulative voting had a marginal effect on the fate of incumbents in 1982.

In an earlier article for Illinois Issues, we argued that one should not "expect the 118 single-member districts . . .to produce more competitive elections than the old system" ("The bullet bites the dust," March 1981, p. 14). Using the standard that only races in which the winner receives less than 55 percent of the two party vote are actually very competitive, few legislative races were competitive in 1982 (see table 3). More House contests were competitive (in the 54-46 percent range) than was true for the Senate in 1982. However, the most striking aspect of the results is that more than 85 percent of races for both houses were not very close.

Proponents of the cutback had argued that single-member districts with plurality voting would reduce the automatic safety of incumbents, increase competitiveness and upgrade the accountability of legislators to the electorate. The first election after the cutback does not bear out this argument. Theoretically, single-member districts should increase competiveness; however the change to single-member districts cannot create competitiveness where the lack of diversity in a district and the absence of a viable second party organization preclude effective challenges. The cutback was oversold on this point.

But cutback opponents also made errors in projecting its impact. They argued that the numbers of women and minorities would be drastically reduced. This argument was based on the assumption that without cumulative voting allowing minority groups to "bullet" their candidates into office, these candidates couldn't win; but two important points were ignored. First, there is a nationwide trend toward electing women in greater percentages to state legislatures. In 1980, about 10 percent of the membership of state legislatures nationwide was female; in 1982, that percentage increased to about 11 percent. Second, most blacks are elected from constituencies which are heavily black. Therefore, the smaller and more racially homogeneous single-member districts would, in all likelihood,

Table 3 Party competition in Illinois legislative races, 1982
	Senate	House
Strong 2-party competition1	5 (8%)	15 (13%)
Weak 2-party competition2	38 (64%)	62 (53%)
1-party dominance3	16 (28%)	41 (34%)
1 The winner received between 50.1 and 54% of the 2-party vote. 2 The winner received between 55 and 74% of the 2-party vote. 3 The winner received 75% or more of the 2-party vote.

elect black representatives. Although the cutback would decrease the percentages of those groups, and blacks by definition, single-member districts would not necessarily decrease the percentages of those groups. In fact, despite the cutback, the percentage of women and blacks in the House increased, albeit slightly (see table 4). Thus, this consequence of the "cutback" was not anticipated correctly. At the same time, the percentage of women in the Senate has nearly doubled.

One of the clear effects of cumulative voting was to cushion the House membership against electoral landslides. In many instances, single-member districts work to exaggerate the percentage of seats won by the majority party. When the majority claims a clear majority of the vote, it often gains an overwhelming percentage of the seats. Such conditions prevailed in the House elections in 1982. In the previous session, the Republicans held a 91-86 member edge (51 percent of the vote had earned them 51 percent of the seats). After the 1982 elections, the Democrats held an overwhelming 70-48 member edge (59-41 percent). Statewide in 1982, the Democrats received 56 percent of the vote which

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would translate into 66 seats; therefore, they received a four-seat bonus thanks to the change to single-member districts. They have the extra majority to override amendatory vetoes and line item vetoes, and are within striking distance of the 60 percent majority needed to override an outright veto of an entire bill by the governor.

A final unanticipated consequence of the cutback was to strengthen the influence of Chicago in the Democratic House delegation in Springfield. Of course, reapportionment played a role as well. Chicago and Cook County legislators now control 38 percent of the total membership in the new House (previously it was 34 percent). The cutback contributed to this result because Chicago Republicans were virtually eliminated from the House. Moreover, it appears that regular (or organization Democrats) hold a plurality of the votes in the Democratic caucus.

In addition to sheer numbers, Chicago Democrats have additional advantages in the new General Assembly. House Speaker Michael Madigan (Chicago, 30th) was responsible for the map which set the stage for the Democratic rout in the House. He also funneled party funds to downstate Democratic candidates thereby establishing a set of political IOUs. The Democrats also gained a 33-26 member edge in the Senate (56 percent) and the Senate president will continue to be Philip J. Rock (Oak Park, 8th), who is also state Democratic chairman. For the first time in many years, organization Democrats control the top leadership positions in both houses of the Illinois General Assembly.

Finally, it should be noted that the Democratic sweep in the General Assembly races reflected national election trends. In the 1982 elections, Democrats won control of both houses of state legislatures in 34 states.

Policy consequences

The outcome of the 1982 Illinois legislative elections, influenced as they were by reapportionment, the cutback and national political trends, will influence policy choices in the next two years and perhaps for the following decade.

The fact that the Democrats control both houses of the legislature and the Republicans control the governorship is important, but not as significant as some underlying conditions. These are: Gov. James R. Thompson's reelection by the narrowest of margins, Thompson's pragmatism and the strong influence of Chicago in the Democratic legislative delegation.

First, Republican Thompson's ability to influence the legislature is reduced. But Thompson is a realist. There are pressing issues such as tax reform, transportation and education funding, which the state must address. No solutions can move through the General Assembly without 60 votes in the House, 30 in the Senate and the governor's concurrence. Policymaking will, therefore, be a result of a tripartite relationship; two of the partners must be the governor and the Chicago Democrats. The shotgun marriage between Thompson and the Chicago Democrats will restore a time-honored tradition in Illinois politics — Republican governors and the leader of the Chicago Democratic organization have often teamed up to make decisive policy choices in Illinois.

But the big question is: Where will the rest of the votes come from? Either the downstate Democrats or the suburban Republicans must join the coalition to make policy. At this point, the better bet would seem to be on the downstate Democrats because of the organization IOUs from this most unusual election.□

David H. Everson is director of the Illinois Legislative Studies Center at Sangamon State University, and Joan A. Parker is a research associate in the center. Research assistance for this article was provided by Elizabeth Phillips, graduate assistant in the center. Everson and Parker have co-authored other articles on election topics, including "Congressional elections: the advantage of incumbency" in Illinois Elections (second edition), 1982.

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