Judicial Rulings

Illinois Supreme Court

State must restore cuts in hospital Medicaid payments

A FEDERAL district judge in Chicago ordered the state to increase reimbursement to hospitals serving Medicaid patients by $60 million in fiscal 1984, ruling that the Illinois Department of Public Aid violated federal Medicaid law when it cut reimbursement after the Illinois General Assembly appropriated less than requested. The net effect of the December 5 court order will be an increase of $30 million in general funds spending in fiscal 1984, according to Robert L. Mandeville, director of the Bureau of the Budget. The federal government reimburses the state for 50 percent of what the state spends on all Medicaid programs. Technically, U.S. District Judge Milton I. Shadur granted the Illinois Hospital Association's request for a preliminary injunction barring the Department of Public Aid (DPA) from using "shortfall" rates to reimburse hospitals for inpatient Medicaid services, which are based on the legislature's appropriation. Shadur ordered DPA to use "final" rates, which are based on what DPA believes to be the hospitals' cost of delivering the services.

At this writing in early January, a trial was still pending in the case, Illinois Hospital Association v. Illinois Department of Public Aid. In the suit, filed September 28 at the end of the first quarter of fiscal year 1984, the Illinois Hospital Association (IHA) charged that the methods DPA used to compute its reimbursement rates for Medicaid services in fiscal 1984 violate the federal requirement that rates be based on "reasonable and adequate costs incurred by efficient and economically operated facilities." Prior to the passage of its appropriations bills, DPA had set the final rates; after the legislature appropriated about $150 million or 23.5 percent less than requested, the DPA set the shortfall rates.

In granting the injunction, Shadur said the hospitals had convinced him they will probably win their case, since, by DPA's own definition, shortfall rates are not based on "reasonable and adequate costs." Shadur said that federal Medicaid law clearly says reimbursement may not be tied to appropriations, and federal courts have consistently barred states from attempting to do so.

He also said the IHA had convinced him that loss of reimbursement due to the shortfall rates would force some of its 243 members to close, while many would cut back or cut out services to Medicaid patients. The harm done by the shortfall rates in fiscal 1984, Shadur said, far exceeds the inconvenience of "interim" rates used in fiscal 1983, when the state promised to make a reconciliation payment that represented the difference between interim and final rates. "Under DPA's revised methodology," he said, "there is no longer a reconciliation process that provides additional funds. This year's shortfall rates are the only assured appropriation, and no hospital can undertake a short-term borrowing against such a shortfall, in the same way that was possible for them during fiscal 1983, when they knew additional moneys would be paid within a fixed time frame." — Diane Ross

Broadcast ban lifted for higher courts but not for trial courts

ILLINOIS appellate and Supreme Court proceedings are now being broadcast by electronic media, but coverage of trial court proceedings is still prohibited.

On November 29 in a split decision (In Re Photographing, Broadcasting, and Televising Proceedings in the Courts of Illinois), the Illinois Supreme Court allowed the broadcasts on a one-year experimental basis starting January 11. But the court denied extended coverage of trial court proceedings, stating: "Trials are too sensitive and important to admit approval of factors that may expose them to prejudicial influences."

Justice Robert C. Underwood, concurring with the majority, said the difficulty with cameras in the courtroom today is not equipment problems which intrude upon the proceedings. "The problem which remains is the one I have always regarded as the more serious: the possibility, if not the probability, that miscarriages of justice will result from the subtle, insidious effect that televising trials will have upon the behavior of the participants in courtroom proceedings. The individual who is completely unaffected by the knowledge that he is appearing upon vast numbers of television screens in his community or, perhaps, throughout the nation is a rare creature; normally simply knowing that a certain event is being televised changes the demeanor, the attitude and often the tactics of the participants, be they witnesses, jurors, lawyers or judges."

Dissenting Justices Seymour Simon, William G. Clark and Thomas J. Moran argued the media should be allowed to broadcast the proceedings of trial courts as well as courts of review. They said that there was no compelling reason for a blanket prohibition of trial proceedings.

"While one pair of eyes or ears in a courtroom informs only one mind in a single moment, cameras or microphones in the courtroom can inform millions. The use of television cameras, as well as tape recordings, to inform concerned citizens about the judicial process is a useful development, and I believe that only for the most compelling reasons should we deny the public the educational advantages that this practice permits," Simon wrote.

But Justice Howard C. Ryan, agreeing with the majority, said he knew of at least four media violations of the previous rule banning cameras in any courtrooms. Ryan expressed concern that the media would violate rules in trial court proceedings. He also said that policing the media's conduct would divert the trial judge's attention away from the actual court proceedings. "I view this as too great a burden to place on the trial judge simply to permit the viewers of television to see some highly emotional scene extracted from a full day's trial and inserted in a 30-second spot on the 6 o'clock news." — Cynthia Peters

Excluding minorities from juries is unconstitutional only if it is systematic

PEREMPTORY challenges that result in the exclusion of minorities from jury duty do not violate equal protection unless it can be shown the exclusion is systematic. That was the Illinois Supreme Court's ruling in a split decision on December 1, when the majority held that the importance of selecting an impartial jury sometimes justifies excluding minority groups.

In the case, People v. Stanley Payne, Payne was found guilty in Cook County Circuit Court of aggravated battery and armed violence, but the Third District Appellate Court reversed the verdict, saying the prosecutor used peremptory challenges to exclude black jurors.

At issue were interpretations of two U.S. Supreme Court decisions. In the 1965 Swain v. Alabama decision, the court ruled that peremptory challenges excluding minorities did not violate equal protection,

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but warned against systematic exclusion. In 1967 the court handed down the Taylor v. Louisiana decision establishing the Sixth Amendment right to have a fair cross section of the community represented on lists from which jurors are drawn.

The Illinois court said the Taylor ruling did not change the Swain precedent and only requires the lists from which prospective jurors are drawn to represent a cross section of the community. If the list represents such a cross section, then minorities may be excluded from duty in specific cases.

Dissenting Justice Seymour Simon said the large number of cases in Illinois raising this issue indicates prosecutors are systematically using peremptory challenge to exclude blacks from juries. "The prosecution may use peremptory challenges for any legitimate reason under our Constitution but purposeful discrimination against, or exclusion of, black persons cannot be a legitimate purpose," Simon argued.

In a separate concurring opinion, Justice William G. Clark agreed with the majority but called on the legislature to limit the use of peremptory challenges. Clark suggested the General Assembly consider limiting the number of challenges which can be used.

— Cynthia Peters

Prisoners can be sent out-of-state to ease overcrowding

OUT-OF-STATE transportation of prisoners is not necessarily cruel and unusual punishment, the Illinois Supreme Court ruled, upholding the constitutionality of the Thompson administration's transfer of 20 inmates to Nevada in August 1983 to ease overcrowding. The split decision in Sayles v. Thompson was issued December 1 after the state directly appealed a circuit court's ruling that the transfers were unconstitutional.

The justices primarily disagreed about the clarity of language in the 1970 Illinois Constitution's transportation clause, which reads: "No person shall be transported out of the State for an offense committed within the State" (Article I, section 11).

The high court ruled that the drafters of the Constitution intended to prohibit the transfer of prisoners as punishment for a crime, but did not absolutely ban out-of-state transportation. Writing for the majority, Justice Robert C. Underwood said: "The language of the clause is not unqualified, for it prohibits prisoner transportation only when such transportation is for the commission of an offense," or if it "constitutes cruel and unusual punishment." In regard to transporting inmates to ease overcrowding, Underwood said: ". . . we cannot regard such transfers as cruel and unusual when the clear objective and consequence is to significantly improve their basic living conditions. Accordingly, we hold that such transfers do not violate the transportation clause."

Dissenting Justices William G. Clark and Seymour Simon argued that the clause absolutely forbids such transfers. "The Illinois Constitution does not forbid the movement of prisoners outside of the State unless it is reasonable, or cruel and unusual or anything else. It simply forbids it," Clark wrote. In his dissent Clark argued that even if the transfers were made to ease overcrowding, they were still cruel punishments because they separated prisoners from their families and attorneys. Clark said he could also foresee abuses in making such transfers discretionary; prisoner administrators could effectively punish prisoners in this way without judicial supervision. — Cynthia Peters

Court upholds penalties for marijuana possession

PENALTIES for the possession of marijuana can be stiffer than those for other drugs, the Illinois Supreme Court ruled December 16, when it upheld the constitutionality of the state's cannabis law.

Under state law, someone convicted of possessing up to 200 grams of drugs like amphetamines or barbiturates qualifies for first-offender probation, after which the offense is stricken from his or her record. But anyone possessing upwards of 30 grams of cannabis is not eligible for this type of probation. A Cook County circuit court said the cannabis law violated the equal protection rights of Matt Mathey and Linda Feigenheimer, both convicted of possessing over 30 grams of marijuana. The judge gave them first-offender probation.

But the Supreme Court said that while marijuana may be closer in character to barbiturates and amphetamines than to drugs like heroin and cocaine, this does not mean they are so similar in nature as to require identical criminal penalties. "By placing marijuana offenses in a separate statute, the legislature has identified marijuana as constituting a particular social concern," said Justice Daniel P. Ward, speaking for court.

Quoting from the 1980 case of People v. Bradley, Ward said the equal protection clause "requires equality between groups of persons 'similarly situated'; it does not require equality or proportionality of penalties for dissimilar conduct." Marijuana and drugs like barbiturates and amphetamines are not similarly situated, Ward said.

The court also found the law's penalties based on amount to be reasonably related to the legislature's intent to control marijuana use and direct the greatest efforts toward large-scale possessors.

— Cynthia Peters

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