Attorney General Opinions

Arrests for nonjailable offenses

Arrests for nonjailable offenses are permitted. If there is reason to believe that an accused person charged with a nonjailable offense is likely not to appear in court, a cash bond can be required. If a defendant released on personal recognizance for a nonjailable offense fails to appear in court when ordered, a warrant may be issued for the person's arrest. If a defendant in a nonjailable offense is placed on supervision or probation and violates the conditions set, a warrant for the arrest of the offender may be issued as per sections 5-6-4 and5-6-4.1 of the Unified Code of Corrections (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, sees. 1005-64, 1005-6-4.1). And warrants for arrest can be used to enforce parking tickets and to initiate the prosecution of nonjailable municipal ordinances.

In addition, a judge who acts on the principles listed above and is sued by the defendant for deprivation of a civil or constitutional right is entitled to the protection afforded by the state's Idemnification Act. A recent amendment to the act (P.A. 84-387, effective September 16, 1985) specifies that a judge is an employee of the state for the purposes of the act and thus qualifies for legal representation and indemnification (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1984 Supp., ch. 127, sec. 1302). In this opinion, Atty. Gen. Neil F. Hartigan was asked to interpret U.S. Supreme Court case Pulliam v. Allen (1984), in which two Virginia men arrested for using abusive language (maximum fine: $500) and public drunkenness (maximum fine: $100) were jailed after they could not post bail. The de-fendants claimed that incarceration after being unable to post bail for nonjailable offenses is unconstitutional. "It appears that the trial court in Pulliam v. Allen did not categorically enjoin the incarceration of persons charged with non-jailable offenses," Hartigan wrote. "Rather, the trial court enjoined the incarceration of such persons solely because they were financially unable to make bail." (File 85-18)

Intergovernmental 'agreements'

Joliet Junior College cannot make an "intergovernmental agreement" with the Will County Metropolitan Exposition and Auditorium Authority that essentially involves leasing property for a period exceeding 20 years. To do so would violate section 3-38 of the Public Community College Act, which specifically prohibits such leases (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 122, sec. 103-38). Although Article VII, section 10 of the Constitution enables units of local governments to cooperate with each other without obtaining statutory authority for each venture, it does not give them the authority to contravene a law. (File 85-10)