Judicial Rulings

Illinois Supreme Court

Insanity is no defense in probation revocation

THE Illinois Supreme Court decided December 20 that insanity is not an acceptable defense in a probation revocation proceeding. This was the first time the Illinois high court faced such a question.

In People v. Anita Allegri (Docket No. 6100), the defendant, while on a 30-month probation for trying to take a two-year-old child from his father, unlawfully restrained a 13-year-old boy. Consequently, the state tried to revoke her probation. Her defense was that she was insane, unable to control herself and therefore unaccountable for her behavior.

The defendant argued that the criminal code is vague as to whether the insanity defense is acceptable in revocation proceedings, and that the legislature din't specifically exclude it; consequently the insanity defense should be applied.

Justice Seymour Simon, writing for the majority, said the statute at issue — section 6-2(a) of the Criminal Code of 1961 — doesn't address the employment of insanity as a defense in such cases.

The General Assembly's intent was that the insanity defense should apply only to cases in which guilt or innocence is being judged, said Simon. A probation-revocation hearing is not such a proceeding because it occurs after the defendant has been convicted and sentenced (Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 1973, 411 U.S. 778).

Furthermore, "The insanity defense had no bearing on the real issue," wrote Simon, "... which was whether the defendant's continued presence in society presents a danger. When the defendant unlawfully restrained a child, she demonstrated the threat which her continued freedom poses for society. That threat is no less real because [the] defendant's insanity would excuse her from criminal responsibility."

Constitutional questions were raised by the ruling's dissenters, Justice Joseph H. Goldenhersh and Justice Daniel P. Ward. The court's ruling ignored both the defendant's due process rights and constitutional protection against cruel and unusual punishment, Ward said. He added, the majority's decision is based on a "strange construction" of the state's criminal statute because it fails to extend the insanity defense to all types of cases. "It is inconceivable that the General Assembly intended that this fairness to handicapped persons would not be extended to all proceedings," Ward said.

Porter McNeil

No Illinois role in railroad employee claims

ILLINOIS courts have no original jurisdiction to hear employment-related disputes between parties covered by the federal Railway Labor Act (ALA), according to an Illinois Supreme Court decision handed down December 20.

Normally, the National Railroad Adjustment Board settles disputes between individuals covered by the ALA. In Fred A. Keller v. Illinois Central Gulf Railroad Co. (Docket No. 60233), the Illinois Supreme Court was asked to decide whether an action for retaliatory discharge brought by an employer covered by the ALA should first be heard by the board or by an Illinois court.

In a unanimous decision delivered by Justice Thomas J. Goran (with Justice Joseph H. Goldenhersh not taking part), the court said, "A thorough reading of the ALA makes clear Congress' intent that employment-based disputes between parties covered by the RLA are to be resolved exclusively pursuant to the act . . . state courts have no jurisdiction to hear and resolve such disputes."

Koehler contended that the preemption rule doesn't apply to cases in which the state may have a strong interest in regulating the conduct at issue. In this instance, the conduct in question was the alleged retaliatory discharge by Illinois Central Gulf Railroad Co. which may have been in violation of state law.

But the high court viewed the situation differently, leaning on what it called the "controlling" case (Andrews v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 406 U.S. 320) which said the board enjoys original jurisdiction to settle all claims arising under the Railway Labor Act.

Porter McNeil

Search of state trooper's raincoat pouch upheld

EMPLOYEES have no expectation of privacy of desks, lockers, etc. when searches relating to work are a normal and legal part of their employer's operations. The principle emerged from the Illinois Supreme Court's decision in People v. Neal (Docket No. 61365) handed down November 21. Justice Daniel P. Ward wrote the opinion.

Neal, a state trooper, issued traffic citations in a fictitious name when drivers posted cash bonds. A call from a driver concerned about irregularities triggered a search of Deal's patrol car and discovery of a number of such citations in a state-issue raincoat pouch. Deal argued that the car was assigned to him and that the raincoat was issued for his personal use. The state argued that routine examinations of patrol cars are made in the absence of troopers and that cars can be reassigned at any time. The raincoat might be searched, but normally in the trooper's presence as part of a uniform examination. The court found that the defendant had "no reasonable expectation of privacy" in the raincoat pouch.

F. Mark Filbert

Malpractice law in jeopardy

THE constitutionality of parts of the state's new medical malpractice law will be at issue before the Illinois Supreme Court later this month.

Key elements of the law were judged to be in violation of either the Illinois or U.S. constitutions December 19 by Cook County Circuit Judge Joseph M. Wosik. Wosik's decision was appealed directly to the state's high court by the attorney general's office.

The ruling struck down a provision of the law establishing a screening panel, saying it violates a constitutional ban against panels exercising judicial authority, according to Wosik. The screening panel provision, created to weed out unnecessary lawsuits before they go to trial, would require that people filing suit against the advice of the panel would be liable for all legal costs if they lost the case. Wosik said that would put the cost of a jury trial out of reach of the vast majority of Illinoisans.

Wosik also struck down a provision in the law allowing installment payments for large damage awards, as well as one that barred punitive damages against doctors. In addition, Wosik said the provision setting up a sliding scale contingency fee for plaintiff attorney fees violates the Illinois Constitution's separation of powers of government doctrine "because contingency fees are the subject of regulation by the judicial, not the legislative, branch of government."

The suit challenging the new law was filed last June — shortly after Gov. James R. Thompson signed the Medical Malpractice Act of 1985 (P.A. 84-7, H.B. 1604) on May 25 — on behalf of a woman whose child suffered brain damage as a result of alleged malpractice. 

Porter McNeil

85 on Illinois death row

DEATH penalties for two men convicted of murder were upheld by the Illinois Supreme Court December 20, pushing the number of Illinois inmates on death row to 85, according to officials of the Department of Corrections. In the two death sentences {State v. Johnny Neal Jr., Docket No. 57781, and State v. Charles Walker, Docket No. 59212), an execution date of March 26 was set for Johnny Neal Jr., and May 28 for Charles Walker. The next step is the federal appeals process. The last execution in Illinois occurred

August 24, 1962.

Porter McNeil

March 1986/Illinois Issues/33