The Pulse

Mayor Washington's consistent constituency

By NICK PANAGAKIS

In April, Chicago Mayor Harold Washington won reelection, a vote of confidence not awarded to an incumbent mayor since Richard J. Daley won in 1975.

In both 1987 elections Washington's winning margins were only 1 percentage point above his 1983 win. Against extremely different opponents he wound up with almost the same margin of the vote. He won these elections because a coalition of voters consistently provided him a small but comfortable majority.

Where did the Washington vote come from? The sizes of the components of this coalition can be determined from the election returns of the February primary. (Official April 7 general election results were unavailable for this column, but unofficial returns confirm conclusions about the constituencies).

To win these elections, Washington needed almost full support from blacks, who comprise 41 percent of Chicago voters. He needed Hispanic and white votes, too. In the February Democratic primary he received 53.44 percent of the vote or 587,594 votes. The crucial majority vote he had to get was 550,000.

Black support was nearly universal for Mayor Washington. In 10 all-black wards, February returns show that Washington got 98.9 percent against Jane Byrne: 243,160 v. 2,675. TV exit polls confirmed this percentage of blacks voting for Washington elsewhere in Chicago.

Adding nine wards, where blacks are the majority, to the 10 all-black wards, Washington got 412,174 votes and Byrne got 18,336 votes. The Byrne votes are mostly from nonblacks, but some nonblack votes went to Washington, too. In these 19 wards, we estimate Washington won 5,000 more nonblack votes than Byrne did. Subtracting this estimated vote from nonblacks, Washington's total black vote from these 19 wards in the primary is roughly 389,000. Adjusting this total to include black votes for Washington from the rest of the city, he winds up with a total 455,000 black votes in February.

Washington had 24,612, the majority of four predominantly Hispanic wards, in the February primary. These four wards are 69 percent Hispanic but contain only 39 percent of the city's Hispanic voters. A projected citywide Hispanic vote for Washington would be 42,000, which is in line with the Midwest Voter Registration Project's estimates from exit polls.

With 455,000 votes from blacks and 42,000 votes from Hispanics, Washington would have lost. The winning difference was 90,000 votes from nonblack and non-Hispanice voters.

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All this number-crunching indicates that in February Mayor Washington got 97 percent of the black vote, 55 percent of the Hispanic vote and 15 percent of the white vote, which is consistent with NBC's Election Day Voter Poll. Washington got 20 percent of the nonblack vote. In my February column I said he needed 21 percent of the nonblack vote to win, but contrary to expectations the black turnout of 74.1 percent slightly exceeded the citywide turnout for the first time.

... in February Mayor Washington got 97 percent
of the black vote, 55 percent of the Hispanic vote and 15
percent of the white vote . . .

Ward-by-ward analysis of election returns in February shows almost as many Washington votes coming from six lakefront wards as from all 17 northwest and south side white ethnic wards combined. Despite its unprecedented low turnout, the lakefront again contributed a significant vote for Washington; in fact, the lakefront wards showed the only noticeable percentage vote gains for Washington since 1983. This increase, together with lower turnout, could indicate that potential Byrne voters stayed home.

In the 1987 primary Washington made little headway over 1983 among white voters, but the narrow core of support that he retains is sufficient for him to win. In an attempt to define each candidate's coalition, the Chicago Tribune conducted a poll in March, interviewing 1.145 Chicago voters by phone. Since the votes from white Chicagoans were so crucial to a Washington victory in the general election, this summary gives more detailed breakdown of white voters who intended to vote in April. Undecided voters, mostly from the northwest and south sides, answered many of the questions the same way as those who said they would vote "against" Washington. (A note to poll users: After Washington was elected in April 1983, Chicago mayoral polls indicate the majority of "undecideds" are white and will ultimately vote for a white candidate.)

The Tribune Poll asked about problems in Chicago (see table 1). After years of Council Wars and months of bitter campaigning, the most significant problem that voters commonly perceived was political conflict in city government. The poll revealed that voters from every constituency valued candidate characteristics as leading to a possible solution of the problem. The three main ones on which they would base their choice were: effective leader (84 percent), settle the conflict (77 percent) and unite the city (76 percent).

The specifics of the conflict in city government went over the heads of many voters, based on voter opinions of the candidates. Most voters thought the campaigns were on the low road.

Another serious problem for most voters was corruption. With some pro-Washington aldermen under investigation during the campaign, even 46 percent of white Washington voters said this was a major problem, and 45 percent of black voters agreed. In a separate question asking which candidate "would reform city government," 71 percent of lake front white voters and 64 percent of Hispanics did not choose Mayor Washington as the reformer. Asked to identify which candidate "would not grant jobs and contracts in exchange for political favors," 85 percent of lake front white voters and 74 percent of Hispanics did not pick Washington. Yet the other candidates did not exploit this perception. Could it be that in the minds of many voters Washington's challengers were even less credible as problem-solvers?

The issue of property tax increases played well in the white ethnic areas but was not an issue for most Washington voters. A majority (55 percent) of both white and black Washington voters rent, while 64 percent of whites against Washington owned their homes.

Crime, an issue raised by Edward Vrdolyak, who was running as the Solidarity Party candidate, was a problem to many voters, but to more Hispanics (48 percent) than blacks (34 percent), and more important to both these groups than to whites (27 percent).

Washington's white voters were more concerned about discrimination against blacks in employment and housing than they were with the issues of crime and property taxes. In other words, they closely fit the description of "progressive whites." Fear of a takeover of power and influence by blacks was cited by 27 percent of white voters "against" Washington; the same fear was expressed by 26 percent of all Hispanic voters.

Who won the war of words? No one. All candidates failed to win a majority or even a plurality of favorable opinion from each of the three voting groups (whites, blacks and Hispanics). (See table 2.)

Washington's white voters were more
concerned about discrimination against blacks in employment
and housing than they were with the issues of crime and property taxes

HI-der. That's how Republican candidate Donald Haider's name appeared on questionnaires during the Tribune Poll in case staffers had not learned the name. But voters had learned the name, although few had opinions of the candidate. Haider was pleased that he received 76 percent name recognition in the poll, achieved without significant campaign expenditure. His major media effort was a red windbreaker emblazoned with his name for the benefit of TV audiences watching campaign coverage.

Vrdolyak's "high negatives" in many polls were the topic of much media coverage, but, based on earlier poll results, opinion of Vrdolyak was on an upswing (table 2). Vrdolyak credits the change to his paid media campaign, undertaken to offset what he considered unfavorable treatment by the media.

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When the Tribune Poll asked those surveyed how they would vote on April 7, Washington won with 52 percent of the vote, 34 percent would vote for others, and there were 14 percent undecided. The ultimate disposition of the undecideds was predictable from demographics and their answers on issue questions. Washington's 52 percent is the same he received in polls just preceding the Democratic primary against Byrne and meant that the extended field of challengers to Washington would attract no more votes than Byrne. It showed that Washington still had a core of opposition.

One attempt to measure the strength of support among the various constituencies was the response to the question: Suppose you had 10 votes to spread among the four candidates? Over half, or 56 percent of white voters gave none of their votes to Washington, while 71 percent of black voters gave all their votes to Washington (see table 3). The mayor has become a hero to black voters; his opponents run against black pride.

Electoral support for an incumbent is frequently measured by the number of voters who approve of the job he is doing. Based on norms for prior mayors, satisfaction with the job being done by Mayor Washington was quite high: 67 percent gave approval, which included 45 percent of whites. Job approval, however, does not necessarily translate into votes: The poll showed only 20 percent of whites would vote for Washington. Such a gap suggests that other factors influence voting choices (see table 4).

Table 4. Important attributes, percentage selecting Washington over others

Only 21 percent of all voters, far less than those who said they would vote for Washington, selected him over other candidates as the one who would avoid property taxes. These taxes, however, were not an issue to many of his voters. Sixty percent, more than would vote for Washington, selected him as the candidate who best represented their views on hiring blacks and minorities. This, according to other polls, has not been an issue for most white voters.

The percentage who selected Washington for leadership and fairness matched his general support.

Other areas where he scored lower than his vote strength included: personal conduct and ethics; avoiding unnecessary conflicts; and not likely to grant jobs and contracts in exchange for political favors.

A cornerstone of the Washington administration has been reform. Most voters (85 percent) believed Chicago was ready for reform, and a majority (60 percent) also said that Washington had made progress.

Reform in Chicago relates to politics as well as government. There was division as to whether Washington was sincere about reform or whether he was reforming a political machine to his liking (see table 5). Even a majority of lakefront whites thought he was forming his own machine and only 29 percent of them picked Washington as the candidate "who would reform city government."

Much has been written about race as an issue. Vrdolyak is reported to have first interjected race into Chicago's mayoral elections by calling the 1983 election a "racial thing." Some Chicagoans in 1983 were disturbed when Jesse Jackson told them the night of Washington's primary victory: "It's our turn." In this Tribune Poll, however, a majority of blacks disagreed that the election "boils down to the fact that a black should have a turn to run the city." The Washington campaign trades heavily on the spirit of the civil rights movement, with mixed results. In response to a direct question in the Tribune Poll, many voters — white, black and Hispanic — thought both Vrdolyak and Washington "used the race issue just to get more votes." (See table 6.) These questions of race and genuine reform seem to form a barrier against greater Washington support.

38/May 1987/Illinois Issues