Illinois' 1988 presidential primaries: voter turnout, margins, percentages

On the day following Super Tuesday's presidential primaries, a Chicago Sun-Times headline handicapped the remaining 1988 candidates for the March 15th Illinois primary — one week away. On the Republican side the newspaper labeled Vice President George Bush "the GOP's top bet," U.S. Sen. Robert Dole of Kansas as being "on the ropes," the Rev. Pat Robertson "a distant third in the race" and U.S. Rep. Jack Kemp of New York as "dead last." Seven days later Illinois Republican voters would confirm the newspaper's views by giving Bush an overwhelming primary victory, thereby assuring his nomination as the 1988 GOP presidential candidate.

As for the Democrats, the Sun-Times oddsmakers were not quite as accurate. They did correctly identify the three big Super Tuesday victors — Massachusetts Gov. Michael Dukakis, the Rev. Jesse Jackson of Illinois and U.S. Sen. Albert Gore of Tennessee. Dukakis was "the one to beat," Jackson had just enjoyed his "biggest day," and Gore had proved "he was alive in Dixie." They also properly dismissed the ebbing-to-nonexistent campaigns of U.S. Rep. Dick Gephardt of Missouri and Colorado's former U.S. Sen. Gary Hart. However, they and most of the other national media overlooked a fact that had been demonstrated over and over again in statewide party politics: Illinois Democrats love U.S. Sen. Paul Simon. Instead of being "left in the dust" following his "excused absence" from the Super Tuesday sweepstakes, Simon would rise up one more time in 1988 to win the overwhelming share of his state's national convention delegates. He won 89 of the delegates elected March 15, and Jackson won the other 24.

The week-long Illinois campaign in both parties could not be called a whirlwind. Some surprise endorsements by major Chicago newspapers did give Dole and Gore momentary lifts; Dukakis spent a good deal of TV advertising money trying to attract Simon votes without attacking Simon; and Jackson attempted to fire up the coalition that had supported the candidacy of the late Chicago Mayor Harold Washington.

In the end (see tables 1 and 2) Illinois Republicans saw their turnout increase by almost 200,000 voters over their lackluster 1984 presidential primary, while Democratic turnout dropped by almost the same number of voters when compared to their spirited, multi-office 1984 primary (that was when Illinois Democrats had a four-way U.S. senatorial primary, a publicized nomination battle for Cook County state's attorney, as well as a hotly contested presidential primary).

First to the Republicans and their primary. In 1980 George Bush's battered presidential campaign came to Illinois following a string of defeats in various southern states. Looking for a gimmick, Bush promised Illinois voters " a balanced budget plan 100 days after taking office." Few believed him. In 1988 a confident Bush rolled into Illinois basking in the limelight of his Super Tuesday sweep. Unlike 1980 Bush had the vote-producing muscle of potent Republican leaders behind him, and in his own words the three most important were his "James Gang": Gov. James R. Thompson, Secy, of State Jim Edgar and Cook County Sheriff Jim O'Grady. His campaign was better organized, better funded and unlike 1980 he did not have to mention his "Big Mo" (momentum). The major difference between 1980 and 1988 was that Bush's primary opponent was not Ronald Reagan.

Bush ran well throughout Illinois, but he was less popular downstate than in the metropolitan Chicago region. Of the 82 GOP delegates selected statewide Bush won 70. In the city, he won all but one: Former Gov. Richard Ogilvie won in the 9th Congressional District. Bush's delegate slates swept suburban Cook County and its collar counties, except for the 14th District victories of two Dole delegates, state Rep. James Kirkland and state Rep. Suzanne Deuchler. Dole won his other nine delegates in central and western Illinois.

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The Kansas senator had an opportunity to recapture some of his Iowa magic in Illinois. (If compromise is the mother's milk of politics then second guessing about political strategy is the "burp" — it occurs with only a little prodding.) Dole's potential appeal to downstate and rural Republicans was real. His political maturity since 1984 should have been apparent and appealing to suburban GOPs. His "unpreppy" demeanor had a solid chance of selling among the fledgling Republicans — blue-collar ethnic Chicagoans. Despite some first-rate help from Illinois House Minority Leader Lee A. Daniels, Dole was unable to compete. Why? Three quick reasons: Super Tuesday, an incumbent vice president and the president. If Dole had split Super Tuesday with Bush, he would have given the vice president a real horse race in Illinois. Second, although incumbent vice presidents have a hard time winning the presidency (Martin Van Buren in 1836 was the last one), few have been denied their party's nomination. Third, President Reagan's popularity remains high and rejecting Bush would have been a slap at the president.

Two major stories are in the Chicago vote. Of all the regions in Illinois, Chicago was the strongest Bush country. He carried 45 of 50 wards. (The only one he lost with substantial general election Republican vote strength was the 43rd Ward on the lakefront, where the Republican committeeman was a Dole delegate candidate.)

The second story is Edward Vrdolyak. The former Democratic-party-chairman-turned-Republican proved his love and devotion to his new party by pumping out the vote from his southeast side bailiwick. Vrdolyak's 10th Ward had by far the largest GOP turnout of any city ward (it beat the city's perennial GOP ward turnout champ, the northwest side 41st Ward by over 50 percent). In a city wide ward by ward comparison, the 10th had 43 percent of its voters ask for a Republican ballot; the next best GOP ward, the 41st, had 24 percent. Since the city Republican vote more than doubled 1984 totals, the 10th Ward's production of over 10 percent of Chicago's total Republican vote is impressive. From the 10th Ward, Bush received his highest vote percentage (80 percent) and his largest margin of victory (6,336 votes, triple the margin in his next highest ward). Most spectacular of all, Bush received almost 25 percent of his total city wide margin of victory from the 10th. Although there are doubts that Vrdolyak can win a major countywide elective office as a Republican, there is no doubt that he can turn out his former Democratic ward supporters in a Republican primary.

In suburban Cook County, Bush swept all 30 townships. In no township was his vote under 50 percent. For reasons that are not quite clear, his best vote came from the more ethnic-oriented townships in the western and southern parts of the county. Cicero gave him his highest vote percentage (71 percent) and his largest vote margin (3,991), while others like Lemont, Leyden, Bloom, Worth and Thornton provided him with huge victories.

As for Dole his "best" areas were in the north and northwestern part of the county. His strongest showing was in Evanston with 44 percent of the vote. Though clobbered generally in the Cook County suburbs, some Dole delegate candidates were barely defeated: for example, former U.S. Atty. Dan Webb in the 3rd Congressional District and Congressman John Porter (R-10) in his home district.

Turnout-wise Republicans made up only 40 percent of the suburban Cook County vote. A majority of voters asked for a Republican ballot in only eight townships (Cicero and seven north suburban townships), and GOP turnout went over 10,000 votes only in Wheeling Township. In both the November general

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election and the spring 1989 township elections, suburban Republicans may have their hands full holding on to their traditional political predominance in the old "country towns" of Cook.

Collar county Republicans gave Bush a solid and broad victory, and he trounced Dole in each. The combined GOP turnout in these five counties (DuPage, Kane, Lake, McHenry and Will) nearly matched the Republican turnout in Cook County. In 1984 the collars had outvoted Cook, but in 1988 the GOP resurgence in Chicago made a difference. While Dole won only a couple of delegates (in the 14th District) in this vote-rich region that has become the most important Republican area in the state, he did better downstate. He captured delegates in four districts (including a clean sweep of the 15th), while barely losing several other extremely close delegate contests. Key to Dole's downstate delegate competitiveness were the slates put together for him by Daniels. The Dole delegate ranks were filled with state legislators who, unlike their counterparts in the Chicago metropolitan area, possess a great deal of name recognition with their party's faithful. Dole only

While Dole won only a couple of delegates (in the 14th District) in this vote-rich region that has become the most important Republican area in the state, he did better downstate

won 10 of the 96 downstate counties in the beauty contest vote; in only three counties (Henderson, Stark and Calhoun) was Dole's winning percentage above 50 percent. Obviously many GOP downstaters voted for Bush in the beauty contest but then voted for one or more Dole delegate candidates.

Downstate Bush did extremely well percentage-wise in the southern counties where turnout was low, while he received his best margin wins in the downstate's most populous counties, such as Winnebago and Sangamon. In the latter two, Bush had the strong support of GOP heavy hitters: U.S. Rep. Lynn Martin in Winnebago and Gov. Thompson and Secy. of State Edgar in Sangamon.

In sum it was a Bush bandwagon victory in the Illinois primary, and Dole never had a chance after he was annihilated on Super Tuesday. As for the others, Kemp dropped out before Illinois, and Robertson went nowhere. A note on Robertson: His evangelical movement produced a high of 20 percent of the vote in only three Illinois counties — all in the south.

For the Democrats Simon's win in the 1988 Illinois presidential primary was almost reminiscent of Mayor Daley's era. Party leaders rallied behind an Illinois favorite son to show their support for one of their party loyalists and to keep outsiders off the Illinois delegation at the national convention. The winning favorite son was Paul Simon, who has earned the affection of Illinois Democrats after over a quarter century of party and governmental service. That loyalty to Simon and a "regular" Democrat delegation was simply too much for either Jackson or Dukakis to overcome.

Jackson's campaign made any true repeat of a Daley era Democratic presidential primary impossible. Chicago's black Democratic leaders and voters revolted against statewide leadership to support their own favorite son, Jesse Jackson. Jackson's candidacy is an example of the dilemma facing national, state and local Democrats: party loyalty v. race loyalty. Unless Democrats are able to resolve this sensitive and potentially disruptive problem, they and their candidates will continue their racial feuding over primary politics, while the Republicans concentrate on the general election.

As for Dukakis, he tried to make the best of a bad bargain, and he almost succeeded. He thought that his Super Tuesday victories would mean something in Illinois. For some, they did; for most others, they did not. Simon stalwarts, anti-Jackson Democrats and party regulars were convinced that the Illinois senator was their best chance for controlling their delegation in Atlanta — and for stopping Jackson. For many Illinois Democrats, and some non-Democrats, stopping Jackson was a top

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priority, and Dukakis was not the man to do it. The Massachusetts governor wisely played out his Illinois primary cards, hoping a Simon collapse would propel him to the top. Once that seemed impossible, Dukakis resigned himself to a third-place finish, realizing that most Simon delegates will be his in Atlanta. As for Sen. Gore of Tennessee, his Illinois campaign started slowly and soon dropped into irrelevancy.

Chicago's Democratic primary results would have shocked Mayor Daley. Chicago cast less than 50 percent of the Democratic statewide vote. Democratic primary day in Chicago was incredibly quiet. The only excitement occurred in several black ward committeeman races where some Mayor Sawyer supporters were upset by newcomers backed by Aid. Tim Evans. The middle-class black, southside wards are now kings of Democratic turnout in Chicago. Sawyer's 6th Ward led with 25,867 votes, and of the top 10 Democratic turnout wards, less than half were white.

What gives Chicago black Democrats even more clout is the almost total absence of a Republican party presence in their community. Twelve black wards had 99 percent of their voters ask for a Democratic ballot, and the other black wards had over 90 percent. In the white ethnic areas only three wards recorded 90 percent Democratic ballots: State's Atty. Richard M. Daley's 11th Ward, U.S. Rep. Dan Rostenkowski's 32nd Ward and Ald. Ed Burke's 14th Ward.

Jackson ran wild in Chicago's black community. His spectacular victory (see table 4) was based on winning over 90 percent of the vote in 14 predominantly black wards, over 80 percent in five racially mixed but heavily black wards, and running strong in six other wards undergoing some degree of racial change.

Margin-wise Mayor Sawyer's 6th Ward gave Jackson his biggest ward victory. The other middle-class black wards (8th, 9th, 17th, 21st, 34th) made up five of Jackson's six next best margin wards. The only exception to the south side's pro-Jackson dominance was the 24th Ward on the west side, the scene of a hotly contested ward committeeman's race.

Simon and Jackson split the 50 Chicago wards, but Simon's top percentage ward (70 percent in House Speaker Michael J. Madigan's 13th Ward) would have ranked 20th best on Jackson's list. In only three other wards (23rd, 39th, 50th) did Simon's winning percentage reach 60 percent. Only Madigan's 13th Ward gave Simon a winning margin of over 10,000 votes, a margin that Jackson exeeded in 17 wards. Simon had to split his vote with Dukakis and, to a lesser degree, Gore; thus Simon's 28 percent citywide vote was a considerable accomplishment. Given the nearly unanimous black support for Jackson, Simon was fortunate to lose in the city by only 165,000 votes. While Dukakis won no wards, his strongest showing was on the northwest side. The 40th, the home of a recognizable Greek community, was where he did the best; he won over one-third of its vote.

Did Jackson do better than he did in 1984? The answer was a loud yes in Chicago. Jackson upped his citywide totals by over 88,000 votes and increased his citywide vote percentage by 17 points (from 35 percent to 52 percent). In 1984 he lost Chicago to Walter Mondale by 37,653 votes; in 1988 he carried the city by 163,766 votes (a margin turnaround of 201,419). In 1988 he ran better in every city ward compared to 1984.

In suburban Cook County Simon whipped Jackson badly, winning 26 of the 30 townships. Jackson's triumphs came mainly in south suburban townships containing a substantial number of black residents (Bloom, Calumet, Proviso and Thornton). Simon's best areas were a rare coalition of liberal north suburban townships, led by the heavily Jewish Niles and New Trier,

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and the conservative west suburban, ethnic townships of Berwyn and River Forest. The uniting link in this coalition was a dislike of the Jackson candidacy and a long history of supporting Paul Simon for public office.

Jackson's performance in suburban Cook improved in every township except one — New Trier. (Of all the voting areas analyzed — Chicago's 50 wards, suburban Cook's 30 townships, the five collar counties and the other 96 downstate counties — New Trier Township is the only place where Jackson's vote percentage dropped compared to 1984.) Jackson's total suburban vote went up by over 13,000 votes compared to 1984, but he trimmed his vote loss to the winner by only 5,000 votes. In 1988 Simon received over 8,400 more suburban votes than Mondale did in 1984.

The vote in the five collar counties paralleled the suburban Cook vote. By almost the same percentages, Simon won a majority of the collar county Democratic vote as he swept the region. Only in Will County with its substantial black population in the Joliet area did Jackson crack the 20 percent vote barrier. Though beaten in the collars, Jackson did improve his 1984 record: He increased his vote percentage, ranging from 4 percent to 6 percent. Most, but not all, of the improvements can be traced to demographics; more blacks have moved into this fastest growing area of the state.

If the election had ended with Cook and the collar counties, Jackson would have won: He had almost a 40,000-vote lead over Simon with over 70 percent of the Democratic vote counted. Downstate Illinois, however, has always been Simon country and in 1988 he won all 96 counties, receiving a higher vote percentage (59 percent) and a larger vote margin (189,961) than Jackson won in Chicago. In short, downstate Democrats gave Simon his statewide victory margin.

Eleven counties in far southern Illinois — his political base - gave Simon over 80 percent of their vote. In 80 of 96 counties Simon received over 50 percent of the vote. Only in north and northwestern Illinois, specifically in Winnebago and Boone counties, was Simon tested by Dukakis.

Margin-wise Simon did best in the south. Madison County provided its favorite son with close to a 20,000-vote margin. Almost as impressive was his 7,713-vote margin from rural Franklin County. Two other rural and fiercely loyal southern counties, Saline and Williamson, were in Simon's top 10 counties by vote margins.

As for Jackson, he won over 30 percent of the vote in four downstate counties (Alexander, Kankakee, Pulaski and St. Clair). Only in St. Clair, where the predominantly black city of East St. Louis is located, did Jackson seriously challenge Simon; Jackson lost by 4 percent. As in other parts of Illinois Jackson's vote downstate improved compared to 1984. Undoubtedly the overwhelming portion of his vote was racially based, but Jackson nearly doubled his vote percentage downstate, attracting over 26,000 more voters. Unfortunately for Jackson, his main 1988 opponent was Simon, who garnered 26,000 more votes downstate than did the 1984 downstate winner, Gary Hart. Despite Jackson's better showing in 1988, he did not narrow his vote loss downstate.

What does it all mean? At the Republican convention in New Orleans, the Illinois delegation will once again be led by Gov. James R. Thompson who should play a major role in the proceedings. Unlike 1980, when he endorsed John Connally for president, Thompson backed the right horse in 1988, gave Bush his all-out support and earned a right for vice presidential consideration. Thompson and the other two GOP "Jims" — Edgar and O'Grady — demonstrated in 1988 that endorsements by major Republican officeholders (those with patronage) do make a difference.

At the Democratic convention in Atlanta, the Illinois delegation will be center stage. If Dukakis sews up the nomination with the California primary on June 7, the big issues in Atlanta will be the vice presidential selection and the platform. Most of the Illinois delegates will be philosophical free agents: Some will be personally loyal to Simon or Jackson; others may be loyal to some other prominent Illinois Democratic leader; while others will be loyal only to the party itself. Whatever the outcome of the convention, Illinois will be the only state with two highly visible favorite sons.□

Paul M. Green is director of the Institute for Public Policy and Administration, Governors State University. The author would like to acknowledge the assistance of Mary Jane Fields and Merle Janowitz of the Illinois State Board of Elections and Connie Kaplan of the Chicago Board of Elections.

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