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Judicial Rulings




When a bill becomes law after an amendatory veto

Although the effective dates of laws are covered by both the Illinois Constitution and Illinois statutes, one situation has been in limbo: bills amendatorily vetoed by the governor which are subsequently accepted by the legislature. The Illinois Supreme Court cleared up the anomaly in a decision August 22 by refining the definition of "passed." When a bill is "passed" by the General Assembly prior to June 30 with no effective date specified, the law provides for a uniform effective date of the following January 1. The Constitution requires such a law. The Constitution also says that bills "passed after June 30 shall not become effective prior to July 1 of the next calendar year" unless passed by a three-fifths majority of both houses.

Whenever the governor amendatorily vetoes a bill (usually in the summer) he is changing the language of the bill, subject to approval by the legislature (usually in the fall). The court said, "To hold that a bill has 'passed' at a time when its final content is not yet established would constitute an aberration in the legislative process." The court ruled that "a bill that is the subject of an amendatory veto. . . is not 'passed' for purposes of determining its effective date until the final vote approving the Governor's recommended changes is taken in the General Assembly."

The matter arose in relation to Mulligan v. Joliet Regional Port District (Docket No. 65317). Justice William G. Clark wrote the opinion; Justice John J. Stamos did not participate.


Another hole in the exclusionary rule

Exceptions to the exclusionary rule were expanded by a 4-3 decision handed down by the Illinois Supreme Court on July 20. The rule generally prohibits use of evidence gathered in violation of guarantees contained in the fourth amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court have made exceptions. This Illinois decision could end up in the U.S. Supreme Court.

The disputed detail in the case was the hair color of the defendant, who was charged with murder. Immediately after the crime witnesses did not mention this, but in later identification they made a point of the red color. A defense witness testified that the defendant's hair was black on the day of the crime. The defendant did not take the stand at the trial, but the trial court allowed the prosecution to introduce a statement by the defendant, illegally obtained by the police and previously suppressed, that his hair was red on the day in question. The Supreme Court sustained this ruling.

The exclusionary rule bars evidence obtained illegally, but the high court pointed out that "over the years a number of narrow exceptions have evolved" in decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court. The purpose of these exceptions has been to prevent a defendant from shielding his own perjurious statements — made during direct testimony or cross-examination — from impeachment by illegally obtained evidence.

The Illinois Supreme Court rejected the principle that the defendant's own testimony in these cases constituted a waiver of the exclusionary rule, which would limit the principle to evidence given by the defendant. It said, "[T]he animating principle behind all these cases was a balancing between the goals of the exclusionary rule and the importance of arriving at the truth in criminal trials." The court justified its extension to testimony given by witnesses other than the defendant: "In our view, if a defendant is prohibited from using perjury by way of a defense, it matters not from whose lips that perjury comes." It said that its position was narrow since it would be limited to defense evidence, other than the defendant's, given on direct examination. It felt that this would sufficiently deter police officers from obtaining illegal evidence with impunity.

Justice Howard C. Ryan wrote the majority opinion in People v. James (Docket No. 65049). Justices Daniel C. Ward and William G. Clark filed dissenting opinions; Justice John J. Stamos joined both. Clark termed the decision a "judicial repeal of the fourth amendment." He felt that application of the majority decision would go beyond impeaching potentially perjurious testimony to rebutting it, which would be a clear violation of the fourth amendment. He also felt that safeguards against police exploitation of the principle in order to gather illegal evidence were far from adequate.


DUI suspension

Summary suspension of a driver's license is possible even though there may be no underlying criminal charge. The Illinois Supreme Court sustained an appellate court decision on May 26.

In this case the breathalyzer test showed a blood alcohol content above the acceptable level. When the criminal charges finally came to trial, the state did not prosecute because the police officer witness was not present. The defendant moved to rescind the summary suspension because there was then no underlying criminal charge.

The Supreme Court reiterated earlier positions that the summary suspension hearing is clearly a civil proceeding independent of the criminal proceeding. It said that "the statutory summary suspension is designed to protect the persons who travel the highways. It is not a punishment imposed by the court." Justice William G. Clark wrote the opinion in People v. Gerke (123 111. 2d, 85).□       F. Mark Siebert


October 1988 | Illinois Issues | 25



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