Chicago mayoral election this year; regular election again in 1991: signatures on nominating petitions

Chicagoans will vote this year to fill the un-expired term of the late Mayor Harold Washington. The Illinois Supreme Court settled the issue in a decision filed November 21. The primary election is Tuesday, February 28; the general election is Tuesday, April 4. Those are the dates for other regularly scheduled general municipal elections.

The Coalition to Let the People Decide in 1989 (Coalition) had brought action in circuit court to require the Chicago Board of Election Commissioners to hold the mayoral elections in 1989 under the consolidated schedule of elections established in the Election Code (see Illinois Revised Statutes 1985, ch. 46, sees. 2A-l(a), (b)). The United Citizens of Chicago and Illinois (United Citizens) had sought to block such elections in a separate action. The circuit court accepted the position of the Coalition and United Citizens appealed.

Under sec. 2A-25 of the Election Code the next regular election for mayor of Chicago is set for 1991, meaning that the interim mayor, not elected by the people, would have served the remaining unexpired 40 months of Mayor Washington's term. The Illinois Municipal Code provides, however, that when "there remains an unexpired portion of the term of at least 28 months, and the vacancy occurs at least 130 days before the general municipal election next scheduled under the general election law. . . the vacancy shall be filed at that election" (see Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 24, sec. 3-4-6). The court harmonized the two statutes as indicating that the next general municipal election, the 1989 dates, should be used as an interim election for the post of mayor of Chicago. The court said, "While the Election Code provides for uniformity and stability in the elected offices, the Illinois Municipal Code responds to specific and extraordinary circumstances not covered in the general scheme of elections created by the Election Code."

The decision was unanimous, with the opinion in United Citizens of Chicago and Illinois et al. v. Coalition to Let the People Decide in 1989 (Docket No. 67302) written by Justice Joseph H. Cunningham.

OK for party committees to fill legislative vacancies

On November 21 the Illinois Supreme Court found constitutional the statute under which party officers fill vacancies in the state legislature. When Rep. Alan J. Greiman (D-1, Skokie) resigned his seat in 1987 to become a judge, two citizens of Cook County brought suit seeking to bar the Democratic party's district representative committee from appointing a successor.

The plaintiffs claimed that the law establishing this method of filling a legislative vacancy unconstitutionally delegates legislative power to private individuals. The Illinois Constitution says: "Within thirty days after a [legislative] vacancy occurs, it shall be filled by appointment as provided by law. . . . An appointee to fill a vacancy shall be a member of the same political party as the person he succeeds" (see art. IV, sec. 2(d)). The Illinois Election Code provides that such a vacancy shall be filled "by appointment of the legislative or representative committee of that legislative or representative district of the political party of which the incumbent was a candidate at the time of his election" (see Ill. Rev. Stat. 1986 Supp., ch. 46, sec. 25-6).

The court found the statute constitutional because it confers "indicia of public agency" on party committees, because members of such committees must be residents of a ward or township within the district and because they were elected at a party primary.

Justice John J. Stamos wrote the opinion in Kluk v. Lang and Isaac v. Lang (Docket Nos. 66321, 66322 and 66323 cons.). The decision was unanimous and came after Louis I. Lang, the appointed representative, won election to a new term from the district.

Court ducks election issue: signatures on nominating petitions

In a November 29 decision the Illinois Supreme Court failed to address an apparent anomaly in the statutes governing signatures on nominating petitions.

In December 1987 Raymond B. Olivero filed nominating petitions for the office of resident circuit judge of La Salle County. Kenneth A. Kozel challenged 400 of Olivero's signatures coming from residents of Bureau and Grundy counties. La Salle, Bureau and Grundy counties comprise the 13th Judicial Circuit.

An election for resident circuit judge is limited to residents of the county (in this case, La Salle) in which the judge sits (see Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 37, sec. 72.42-1). Kozel argued that only residents eligible to vote for an office may sign nominating petitions for that office and that the signatures from Grundy and Bureau were invalid.

In this case the State Board of Elections acted as an electoral board to hear the objection because the circuit involved is situated in more than one county. On January 15, 1988, it issued a written statement denying Kozel's petition but, strangely, stating that Olivero would not be certified for the primary ballot. On January 19 it issued an amended statement certifying Olivero. On January 28 Kozel filed a petition for judicial review.

Both the circuit and appellate decissions supported Olivero. Like the electoral board they relied on section 7-10(h) of the Election Code, which makes no distinction between candidates for resident positions and candidates for at-large positions who must run throughout their circuit.

Petition for judicial review of an electoral board's decision must be filed within 10 days of the decision under sec. 10-8 of the Election Code. The high court held that the board's January 15 ruling was effective. It ruled that Kozel's petition for review filed January 28 was untimely, which precluded further consideration of the issues it raised.

Justice Howard C. Ryan did not participate in the otherwise unanimous decision in Kozel v. State Board of Elections (Docket No. 67299). Justice Ben Miller wrote the opinion.

Fetus cannot sue mother

"The way to effectuate the birth of healthy babies is not. . . through after-the-fact civil liability in tort for individual mothers, but rather through before-the-fact education of all women and families about prenatal development." Thus the Illinois Supreme Court struck down the right of a child to sue its mother for injuries suffered because of her negligence during pregnancy; the court was supporting "the public policy favoring healthy newborns." This may be the first time that any state supreme court has considered the matter. The decision was filed November 21.

A father brought suit on behalf of his infant daughter because she exhibited at birth injuries attributable to her mother's automobile accident during the fifth month of pregnancy. It was claimed that the mother's negligence contributed to the accident.

Since 1946 most courts have allowed action against a third party for injuries to a fetus subsequently born alive. The court observed that if this principle were extended to allow action against the mother, "Mother and child would be legal adversaries from the moment of conception until birth." If a mother were thus made "the guarantor of the mind and body of her child at birth," there would be no legal standards by which her conduct during pregnancy could be judged. The opinion summarized: "This court holds that if a legally cognizable duty on the part of pregnant women to their developing fetuses is to be recognized, the decision must come from the legislature only after thorough investigation, study and debate.

Justice Joseph F. Cunningham wrote the opinion in Stallman v. Youngquist (Docket No. 64957); Justice John J. Stamos did not participate.                    F. Mark Siebert

January 1989 | Illinois Issues | 30