Greylord fallout hits Lane

On February 22 the Illinois Supreme Court suspended attorney Fred Lane, president of the Illinois State Bar Association in 1985-86, for one year. The court found that Lane made an improper loan to former Cook County Circuit Court Judge Reginald Holzer, convicted on federal charges resulting from Operation Greylord.

In 1977 Holzer asked Lane for a $2,500 loan to help pay off debts left from his unsuccessful campaign for Illinois Supreme Court judge. Lane signed a blank check on his law firm's account, and his secretary used it to purchase the cashier's check requested by Holzer, which Holzer deposited in his personal account. No notes were signed nor interest discussed.

Later Lane appeared personally in a case before Holzer, who stated to the opposing attorney that Lane had been helpful to him over the years. After Holzer decided in favor of Lane's client, he crossed Lane's name off his list of creditors, although he asserts that he still considered the loan to be in force.

The high court stated that its rules in force in 1977 permitted attorneys to contribute to judicial campaign funds but prohibited gifts or loans directly to judges. In that period Lane drew 73 checks to campaign funds, including three to Holzer's campaign. Lane claimed that he had considered this to be a loan to a campaign fund but had used the unusual mechanism simply because he hadn't known what title or form the fund would be taking. The court found his testimony before the grand jury in Holzer's trial inconsistent with this claim. It cited testimony by Lane and Holzer that both considered Holzer personally liable for the loan. The court concluded "that respondent made the loan to Holzer, albeit to relieve debts incurred in his campaign, and that the loan was not made to an existing campaign fund or to a separate fund in formation."

The court found no improper motive on Lane's part, saying: "Rather, we believe the respondent's violation of the Code resulted from carelessness in complying with the requirements of the rules."

The court's opinion in In re Fred Lane (127 Ill. 2d 90) was unsigned. Justice John J. Stamos did not participate, and Chief Justice Thomas J. Moran dissented, calling the evidence against Lane wholly circumstantial and, therefore, unconvincing.

Voluntary dismissal rule changed

In a decision of February 22 the Illinois Supreme Court made a change, effective prospectively that day, in the rule governing voluntary dismissals. It did so "to curb the current abuses of the voluntary dismissal statute" (see Illinois Revised Statutes 1985, ch. 110, sec. 2-1009).

The statute permits plaintiffs to file for voluntary dismissal and to refile within a year. This allows a plaintiff to correct procedural or technical defects, but the court noted increasing use of the statute to avoid a potential decision on the "merits" or to avoid an adverse ruling. Delays and crowding of dockets have resulted. Under the new rule "the trial court may hear and decide a motion which has been filed prior to a section 2-1009 motion when that motion, if favorably ruled on by the court, could result in a final disposition of the case."

The court consolidated three cases. In all three, trial judges had granted defense motions for summary judgment and denied the motions for voluntary dismissal. Appellate courts reversed. The high court agreed with them, seeing the statute as granting plaintiffs an absolute right to dismiss voluntarily. It chided the legislature for failing to change the statute five years ago when the court called attention to abuses in its application. The court made the present rule change in assertion of "our authority to manage the courts."

Justice William G. Clark wrote the opinion for the unanimous decision (Justice Horace L Calvo not participating) in Gibellina v. Hartley, Schmitt v. Motorola and Ware v. Central DuPage Hospital (127 Ill. 2d 122).

More on DUI . . .

Plea bargaining a drunk driving charge to reckless driving can have consequences later. In a February 22 decision the Illinois Supreme Court let stand a provision that if there is an earlier bargained guilty plea to reckless driving, supervision is an impermissible part of sentencing under subsequent DUI charges (see Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, sec. 1005-6-l(d)).

The court ruled that state and federal guarantees of equal protection are not breached by differing treatment for a defendant pleading guilty to a reckless driving charge and one charged with DUI who bargains to plead guilty to reckless driving. The latter "is offered some consideration in exchange for his agreement to enter a plea of guilty, which one who enters a blind plea is not." The court said, "The

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thrust of this statute is to prevent repeat drunken driving offenders from driving and endangering the lives of motorists on Illinois highways. This is a legitimate goal that is well within the State's police powers."

Justice Horace J. Calvo took no part in the unanimous decision in People v. Eckhardt (127 Ill. 2d 146); Justice Howard C. Ryan wrote the opinion.

. . . and on mandatory suspension

On February 22 the Illinois Supreme Court upheld a finding by the circuit court of Will County that a portion of the Illinois Vehicle Code is unconstitutional. It provided that persons convicted of certain sex- and drug-related offenses should suffer mandatory revocation of their driver's licenses (see Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 95, sees. 6-204(a)(l) and 6-205(b)(2)). As a result the Secretary of State's Office rescinded 1,200 suspended licenses.

The court found that suspension bears no rational relation to the alleged felonies, either as deterrent or punishment, unless vehicles are used to commit them. The court said that its decision is unaffected by recent legislation (sec. 6-206(a)(29), effective January 1, 1989) that gives the secretary of state discretion to revoke licenses when there are convictions of the listed felonies.

Justice Ben Miller dissented, citing the likelihood that loss of mobility would cut down on commission of such felonies. Justice John J. Stamos wrote the opinion in People v. Lindner (127 Ill. 2d 174).

Stop and frisk limitations

Police officers who stop persons suspected of criminal activity may not automatically frisk them, according to a ruling filed February 22 by the Illinois Supreme Court. "Each case must stand or fall on its own set of concrete facts," said the court.

The applicable portion of the Code of Criminal Procedure says that when a peace officer "reasonably suspects that he or another is in danger of attack, he may search the person for weapons" (see Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, sec. 108-1.01). In the present case officers had followed suspects for over an hour. Finally five of them stopped the suspects' vehicle and five of them approached it, three with guns drawn. It was agreed that the suspects offered no resistance to the stop and other commands by the officers. The court felt that no reasonable person could feel threatened under these circumstances.

Justice Joseph F. Cunningham, who has since left the court, wrote the opinion in People v. Galvin (127 Ill. 2d 153). Justice John J. Stamos and Horace C. Calvo did not participate.

F. Mark Siebert

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