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Judicial Rulings                    

Loss of consortium
via scaffold act for
injured worker's spouse

The Illinois Supreme Court extended the possibility of suing for loss of consortium to spouses of injured construction workers. Its January 23 decision liberally interpreted provisions of the Structural Work Act, often called the Scaffold Act (see Illinois Revised Statutes 1987, ch. 48, sec. 60 et seq.).

The decision hinged on interpretation of language in section 9: "A right of action shall accrue to the party injured, for any direct damages sustained ...." The court found the phrase "'party injured' ... broad enough to include an injured worker's spouse who suffers a loss of consortium as a result of a defendant's willful violation of the Act."

The statute permits actions for damages by survivors of deceased workers, and earlier court decisions have permitted spouses to claim for loss of consortium when a worker is killed. The statute has no specific language allowing for loss of consortium for the spouse of an injured worker, but the court tracked present language through an earlier Structrural Work Act and back to the Mines and Miners Act of 1899. It cited a pair of cases under that statute and said that the legislature must have known of them when it passed the first Structural Work Act in 1907, using language from the mines act.

The court said, "Given the fact that recovery for loss of consortium is permitted when a worker is killed ..., logic and fairness dictate that recovery also be allowed when a worker suffers nonfatal injuries...."

Justice Michael A. Bilandic wrote the opinion in Harvel v City of Johnston City (Docket No. 71290). Chief Justice Benjamin K. Miller and Justice James D. Heiple both dissented. Both called for plain interpretation of the language of the act, limiting claims to the "injured party." Miller said that "the majority rewrites the language of the statute and legislates what it perceives to be the preferable result," while Heiple said the majority "takes a legislative pronouncement which is clear-cut, declares it to be ambiguous and then offers a judicial interpretation that is preferred by the court." In his quest for interpretation of what he takes for clear language, Heiple went so far as to deny a cause of action for loss of consortium by the spouse of a deceased worker.

Comic
Cartoon from new textbook
Governing Illinois:
Of the People,
by the People,
and for the People

Truckers and DUI

Drivers of semi-tractor-trailers face stiffer penalties for driving under the influence of alcohol than do other drivers. The Illinois Supreme Court ruled the penalties constitutional in a decision filed January 23.

In this case the defendant had a blood alcohol level of 0.299 percent, and beer cans were discovered at the accident scene. Illinois' Motor Carrier Safety Regulations include portions of Title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations (see Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 95 1/2, sec. 18b-105). They forbid truck drivers to consume alcohol for four hours before going on duty, to drive while under the influence or to have any alcoholic beverage in their possession. At the time of this accident section 18b-108 of the code made violation of any rule a Class 3 felony, subject to fine of $25,000.

The trial court agreed with the defendant that constitutional guarantees of equal protection were breached by the statute since the state could charge some drivers under the influence with a petty offense. Much was made at trial of the fact that the Class 3 penalties could apply to a truck driver who failed to carry a spare hearing aid battery, a penalty termed disproportionate to the offense.

The Supreme Court ruled that singling out truck drivers is not an unconstitutional classification because of the danger involved in operating a big rig and the state's interest in protecting its citizens. It said, "It is not unreasonable that the punishment... for a professional driver who operates a semi-tractor-trailer ... while intoxicated, and in possession of alcohol, is a Class 3 felony." It pointed out that the statute speaks of willful breach of the rules and observed, "It is a giant leap from the conduct of the defendant to that of the phantom defendant who fails to carry a spare hearing aid battery...."

There were no dissents. Justice Joseph H. Cunningham wrote the opinion in People v Blackorby (Docket No. 71522).

Enforcing child support

A statute intended to enforce child support payments by parents living in another state also applies intrastate when parents live in different counties. The Illinois Supreme Court made this interpretation of the Revised Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (RURESA, see Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 40, sees. 1201-1242) on January 30. Almost all 50 states have adopted RURESA to facilitate enforcement of support payments on a parent living in another jurisdiction.

The act says, "This Act applies if both the obligee and the obligor are in this State but in different counties." Lower courts had held that it applies to out-of-state orders for parties who subsequently move to Illinois. The high court said, "By its plain terms, the language of section 33 illustrates that the legislature contemplated intrastate as well as interstate application of RURESA. Section 33 places no exceptions, limitations or conditions upon intrastate enforcement of support orders."

Justice Michael A. Bilandic wrote the opinion in People ex rel. LeGout v Decker (Docket No.71657).

Rights of illegitimate children

An out-of-court settlement of a paternity suit does not necessarily limit rights to parental support of the child in question, according to the Illinois Supreme Court. It filed its decision January 30.

In this case the putative father had made a lump sum payment with "the understanding that the Defendant does not admit paternity but is buying his peace from the suit." Subsequently the Department of Public Aid sued on behalf of the child to determine paternity, to reimburse support already made by the department and to provide future support.

The Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act permits modification of support agreements for legitimate children (see Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 40, sees 502 (a), (f)), but several decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court have held that state law discriminating against nonmarital children violates equal protection guarantees.

The Illinois Parentage Act of 1984 (see Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 40, sec. 2512.1) says that "neither the entry of a settlement order, nor the terms of a settlement order shall bar an action brought under this Act by a child to ascertain paternity." The Illinois Supreme Court held that, taken with U.S. Supreme Court decisions, "equal protection of the law would be violated if the right to seek support from their parents during the whole of their minority were granted to marital children but denied to non-marital children." It did not find Illinois law unconstitutional since section 1.1 of the Parentage Act of 1984 says, "Illinois recognizes the right of every child to the physical, mental, emotional and monetary support of his or her parents under this Act."

Justice Joseph H. Cunningham wrote the opinion in Department of Public Aid ex rel Cox v Miller (Docket No. 71687).

F. Mark Siebert

26/March 1992/Illinois Issues


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