Letters                                                                                

Message to lawmakers:
Relabel tax caps as 'voter thresholds'

Editor: Illinois has become befuddled on the issue of property tax caps (caps), so let's get real for a moment. Caps are not really tax caps. Caps seem to imply a point of no return. Maybe caps should be called "voter thresholds," a point to begin our voting process.

Some lawmakers are against caps because they do not want to place mandates on local governments. Can one rightfully argue that a point at which you have a right to vote is a mandate? Other lawmakers are against caps because they say they benefit the wealthy instead of those on fixed income. Are we not all equal in the voting booth? Others are against caps, crying, "It won't solve our problems." Is voting a problem? How about this one: "Illinois voters do not really know what's best for them."

Each lawmaker should be required to take Logic 101 and History 909! Some lawmakers may better understand the serious nature of this issue if we dare the Illinois legislature to vote against any downstater's right to vote. We must vote for the right to vote. Support downstate property tax caps for all Illinois voters.

Cruz case:
Burris' view as appellate prosecutor

Editor: In your March 1993 issue, the "Politics" column by Charles N. Wheeler III voiced the writer's dissatisfaction with the Illinois Supreme Court's recent 4 to 3 decision, affirming the conviction and death sentence in People of the State of Illinois v. Rolando Cruz. As stated by Mr. Wheeler, Cruz has filed a petition for rehearing in this case and, as of the date of this letter (March 9), that petition has not yet been ruled on by the Supreme Court. I will not attempt to litigate this pending matter outside the courtroom, but I am compelled by Mr. Wheeler's mischaracterizations to clarify the course of these proceedings and my own role as the appellate prosecutor in this case.

Of particular interest to Mr. Wheeler were the claim of another convicted killer, Brian Dugan, that he alone was responsible for the crimes of which Cruz has been convicted and the fact that some evidence of Dugan's claim was not allowed to come before the jury. I would remind you and your readers that the exclusion of particular documents or testimony from a trial is by no means an extraordinary ruling. Mr. Wheeler's status as a "layman" may excuse his casual disregard of the longstanding rules against the use of hearsay evidence in criminal trials. However, the rules of evidence serve an important role in our judicial system, by evaluating the reliability of out-of-court statements before they can be placed before a jury that will neither see the witness nor hear any cross-examination of him under oath. In this case, the Supreme Court found that there was nothing to indicate that Dugan's so-called "confession" was trustworthy. Mr. Wheeler's apparent belief to the contrary, bolstered by selective references to Dugan's statements and omitting discussion of the errors in those statements, is not a sufficient basis for his implicit suggestion that criminal cases should be decided by popular opinion, rather than by time-tested rules of law.

Mr. Wheeler went on to discuss the opinion of unspecified "legal ethics experts" as to my duties as the attorney general of this state and raised the issue of the resignation of a young atttorney on my staff who had been assigned to work on the Cruz appeal. Unfortunately, Mr. Wheeler has offered an incomplete and seriously misleading version of my role and my responsibilities in this case.

Although Mr. Wheeler did not discuss the history of this case, it must be understood that the pending appeal is from Cruz's second trial, which culminated in his second conviction and death sentence. On review of Cruz's first review of conviction, the Supreme Court ruled that Cruz and his co-defendant, Alejandro Hernandez, should have had separate trials. However, the court also rejected the argument that the evidence against Cruz was insufficient to support a jury's verdict. Given that conclusion by the Supreme Court, it must be acknowledged that the decision to prosecute was well within the ethical boundaries of prosecutorial discretion, as regulated by the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct.

As the result of Cruz's second conviction and death sentence, he again received, under state law, a mandatory review of his case by the state Supreme Court. State law assigned the duty of defending the jury's verdict to me, as the attorney general. That duty does not include the right or the obligation for me to substitute either personal or popular opinion for that trial judge, the jury or the members of the Illinois Supreme Court. To the contrary, I must and did act as an advocate for the People, in whose name a defendant had been duly convicted of murder. I must discharge this duty to defend a jury's verdict unless I find that there exists no reasonable and ethical argument to advance in support of the conviction. I have not made such a finding in this case.

This is not a case in which the prosecutor concealed the existence of potentially exculpatory evidence from defense counsel, as would be a violation of ethical standards. Here, both sides were aware of Dugan's statements and argued their admissibility before the trial judge. Although some individuals who do not share my legal and ethical duties as an advocate for the People urged me to "confess error" in this case, on the basis of Dugan's claims and their exclusion by the trial judge, the brief that I filed in the Supreme Court demonstrated that legitimate arguments could be, and were, advanced to support the trial court's rulings and the jury's verdict. All of the alleged errors identified by defense attorneys were addressed, and they were the subject of a reviewing court to examine, and the majority of the court determined that there was no error or abuse of judicial discretion that required a reversal of this second conviction.

In fact, the court would have made these determinations, even if I had chosen not to fulfill my responsibilities as an advocate, because a "confession of error" is not binding upon a court under the law of this state. (See People v. Martin, 67 Ill. 2d 462, 367 N.E.2d 1329 (1977).)

With regard to Mary Brigid Kenney, the

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young lawyer who resigned from my staff last year, it is very clear that she did so on the basis of her personal rejection of the conviction of Rolando Cruz. As I have explained, however, an individual's personal conclusions cannot drive the administration of our criminal justice system. That is not to say that Ms. Kenney's concerns were not taken seriously or that her personal conclusions were not thoroughly considered and evaluated by the senior staff of my office. Our review led to the determination, however, that the jury's verdict could and, therefore, had to be defended in the Illinois Supreme Court.

Info and workshops on
variable rates for garbage

Editor: In the December 1992 issue of Illinois Issues, a minor error was contained in the article, "Where will all the garbage go? Progress on County Solid Waste Programs." In the sidebar titled "Nuts 'n' bolts of waste management plans," it stated, "The Illinois Environmental Protection Agency (IEPA) is starting a program next year to encourage larger communities to study the feasibility of variable rate (garbage fee) structures." The reference to the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency should have been the Department of Energy and Natural Resources (ENR). A report as well as workshops will be developed to help all communities study variable rates, not just larger ones. Anyone interested in this program can contact the ENR for further information at (217) 524-5454.

Fluoridation policy revisited

Editor: The angry and insulting letter from Dr. Bruce Douglas (February 1993) reflects the extreme frustration felt by those who have spent their entire careers promoting fluoridation in the face of sustained and widespread opposition from scientists and laypeople here and abroad. In trying to bring about universal fluoridation, its leading proponents have made a tremendous investment in time, prestige, publicity and public money, and therefore seem unable to objectively evaluate the growing body of evidence against its safety and effectiveness.

Compelling evidence has been accumulating for many years. No one can dispute the alarming increase in dental fluorosis (mottling). This condition indicates that a toxic amount of flouride was ingested while the tooth cells were forming. Flouride is a cumulative, enzyme poison and its effect is not limited to the teeth. For example, flouride is associated with an increase in hip fractures in the elderly (Journal of the American Medical Association, July 25, 1990; August 12, 1992). Osteosarcoma (bone cancer) in young males has increased in recent years, but the Public Health Service has declared this unrelated to flouridation even though this rare cancer showed up in government-sponsored rodent tests for flouride effects. Other tumors and diseases were also found in the rodents.

Can it be that Dr. Douglas is unaware of the volume of evidence against flouridation or does he summarily dismiss as "kooks" any and all dissenting scientists? Either way, the public interest is not being served.

Editor: "Who is Mrytle Sapora" asks Bruce L, Dounglas, D.D.S., M.P.H., professor of public health, University of Illinois, in the February 1993 issue, in answer to her letter (August-September 1992 issue) condemning the practice of mandatory flouridation. Myrtle Sapora is a member of the International Network of Pure Water organizations, as am I and thousands of others. Our members are among the most prestigious MD's, D.D.S.'s and scientists in the world, including members of our own U.S. Environmental Protection Agency.

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creased hip fractures (Jacobsen et al. 1990, Cooper et al. 1991, Danielson et al, 1992). The National Toxicology Program report 1989-90 found fluoride causes cancer in animals; the National Cancer Institute HHS report (February 991) found fluoride induced cancer in humans and the New Jersey Department of Health report (November 8, 1992) found bone cancer rate is 6.9 times higher among 10-19-year-old males in fluoridated municipalities of New Jersey.

Editor: As for "more epidemiological" research on fluoridation than any other public health measure, fluoridation proponents cannot document one medical-clinical study, done by medical doctors, peer-reviewed by medical doctors knowledgeable on fluoride and published in a reputable medical journal that proves safety of fluoridation for all.

Editor: Along with pasteurization, water purification and immunization, fluoridation is considered one of the four most important public health measures of our time.

More than 37 percent of children who grew up with fluoridated water will not have cavities as teens, and as adults they will have 40 to 50 percent fewer decayed, missing and filled teeth. Currently, approximately 50 percent of children from ages 5 to 17 who were raised with fluoridated water have no decay.

The effectiveness of water fluoridation has been documented in approximately 140 studies from 20 different countries over a period of several decades. In addition, over 80 national and international organizations endorse water fluoridation, including the World Health Organization, the American Dental Association, the American Medical Association, the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and the National Cancer Institute.

In February of 1991, the Public Health Service released the results of a nine-month study regarding the safety of water fluoridation. A committee of scientific experts was convened to review extensive research and epidemiologic data. The committee concluded that fluoridation presents no cancer risk and is safe and effective in preventing dental decay.

The cost of administering community water fluoridation averages only 35 to 40 cents per person annually, making fluoride an extremely cost-effective health booster. It is estimated that every dollar invested in fluoridation saves about $50 in dental expenditures, resulting in savings of billions of dollars for the American public each year.

Fluoride is not a foreign chemical in water, as some might suggest. All water contains some fluoride naturally. Water fluoridation is simply the process of adjusting the natural level of fluoride to the concentration necessary for protection against tooth decay. In a nutshell, Mother Nature herself knows that fluoride is good for one's teeth!

Readers: Your comments on articles and columns are welcome. Please keep letters brief (250 words); we reserve the right to excerpt them so that as many as space allows can be published. Send your letters to:

Clarification: In February's Illinois Issues, Comptroller Dawn Clark Netsch was inaccurately referred to as the state's first female elected to constitutional office. That historical footnote belongs to Fae I. Searcy (Mrs. Earle B.), who was appointed clerk of the Illinois Supreme Court to fill the remaining portion of her husband's term upon his death in 1955. She went on to run successfully for the position, which was a six-year office at the time, in 1956 and 1962. Under the Constitution of 1848 and legislation enacted in 1897, this position was a constitutional office. The office became appointive under the 1970 Constitution.

Corrections: In "New members of Illinois House" (February 1993, pages 17-23), the political parties for Rep. I. Ronald Lawfer (R-74, Freeport) and Rep. Barbara A. Giolitto (D-68, Rockford) were incorrectly identified in the body of the article. Party identification was correctly printed in the summary listing for all members of the House at the end of the article (page 23).

In "Welfare and medical assistance" (March 1993), arithmetical error needs correction in programs at the Department of Public Aid. Spending for income assistance is now down to $ 1,041 billion, a decline of 9 percent over the decade, not 6 percent as reported (page 32, column 2 in paragraph 4). Medical assistance rose 180.7 percent in 10 years, not 64 percent as reported (page 32, column 2, paragraph 5). Medical assistance tripled over the decade, from $1,566.3 billion in fiscal 1984 to $4,398 billion in fiscal 1993.

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