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U.S. V. PALATINE:
GROUP HOMES ARE NOT ABOVE THE LAW

By BETH ANNE JANICKI
Chief Legal Counsel, Illinois Municipal League

On October 11, 1994, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit handed down its decision in U.S. v. Village of Palatine, No. 93-4008. The Seventh Circuit's decision, authored by Justice Cummings, represents a significant victory for municipalities in their attempt to control the placement of group homes within their boundaries. The Illinois Municipal League, upon the direction of its Board of Directors, filed a brief amicus curiae on behalf of the Village of Palatine in this matter.

I. FACTS

This case involved a dispute between the Village and Oxford House, Inc. Oxford House, Inc. is a nonprofit corporation which was established to assist in the housing of recovering alcohol and substance abusers. The State of Illinois, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 300x-25, was required to set-up a revolving loan fund for group homes for recovering substance abusers in order to receive certain federal block grant funds. Illinois contracted with Oxford House, Inc. to administer the Illinois revolving loan fund. In September of 1992, representatives of Oxford House, Inc. rented a single family home located within the corporate limits of the Village of Palatine in an area zoned R-1B Single Family. At the time, Palatine's zoning ordinance permitted living arrangements of three unrelated individuals and group homes for up to eight unrelated persons if the home had a State license and was supervised. Oxford House was neither licensed nor supervised and with eleven-unrelated individuals it did not meet Palatine's definition of "group home" or "family". The Village subsequently amended its zoning ordinance to allow as a special use a group home which was not professionally staffed. At no time did Oxford House seek to obtain a special use permit from the Village, even though Oxford House was aware that this procedure involved only a simple application and one public hearing. Oxford House had stated as its policy that "Oxford House, Inc. does not seek prior approval of zoning regulations before moving into a residential neighborhood. It considers itself no different from a biological family and its members just move into any suitable house." (Slip op. at 3).

The Village filed an action in circuit court to request that Oxford House be required to apply for a special use permit and to comply with the Village's Life Safety Code. Oxford House then filed a complaint with the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development who investigated the complaint and requested that the Department of Justice file a Complaint for Prompt Judicial Relief under the Fair Housing Act to enjoin the Village from pursuing its State court action. In April of 1993, the United States commenced action against the Village. The district court entered a temporary restraining order enjoining the defendants from evicting the residents of Oxford House. The matter was then referred to U.S. Magistrate Judge Joan B. Gottschall who, after three days of hearings, issued a Report and Recommendation concluding that a preliminary injunction should issue. In December of 1993, Judge Aspen issued a preliminary injunction against the Village. The Village appealed to the Seventh Circuit.

II. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT'S OPINION

"Discrimination" is defined in part by the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3) as:

"(B) a refusal to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services, where such accommodations may be necessary to afford such person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling . . ."

On appeal, the Seventh Circuit addressed Oxford House's contention that the Village discriminated against the residents of Oxford House by failing to make a reasonable accommodation in the application of its zoning laws. The Seventh Circuit held that to the extent that Oxford House argued that the Village failed to make a reasonable accommodation in applying its zoning laws, this issue was not ripe. (Slip op. at 6).

Oxford House, however, had also argued that re-

November 1994 / Illinois Municipal Review / Page 19


quiring compliance with the notice and hearing requirements for obtaining a special use permit was itself a failure to make a reasonable accommodation under the Fair Housing Act. The Court found that this issue was ripe for review. Palatine is required both under Illinois law and the constitutional principle of procedural due process to hold a hearing on a proposed special use and to provide prior notice of that hearing (65 ILCS 5/11-13-1.1). Oxford House, however, believed that a "reasonable accommodation" under the Fair Housing Act would require the waiver of the constitutional and statutory requirements of notice and a hearing on a proposed special use. This Court found that determining what constitutes a "reasonable accommodation" requires a balancing of the needs of the parties involved and". . . the burden on the inhabitants of Oxford House-Mallard imposed by the public hearing — which they need not attend — does not outweigh the Village's interest in applying its facially neutral law to all applicants for a special use approval (citation omitted). Public input is an important aspect of municipal decision making; we cannot impose a blanket requirement that cities waive their public notice and hearing requirements in all cases involving the handicapped." (Slip op. at 7).

Justice Manion, in his concurrence, stated:

"The Oxford House is an organization with a lofty and impressive goal; it seeks to assist recovering alcoholics and drug abusers. That honorable goal, however, does not put Oxford House above the law. Yet, the Oxford House has adopted a rather high-handed policy: 'As a matter of practice, Oxford House, Inc. does not seek prior approval of zoning regulations before moving into a residential neighborhood.' ... As a rationale for bypassing

Page 20 / Illinois Municipal Review / November 1994


Palatine's procedures for obtaining a special use permit, the Oxford House asserts that its residents (now that they are in place) would be stigmatized by the required hearing. Of course, had Oxford House not disregarded the law in the first place, there would be no residents illegally living in the House who could be stigmatized." (Slip op. at 9).

Justice Manion also stated that a denial of the special use permit by the Village would not automatically constitute a violation of the Fair Housing Act since the accommodations sought by Oxford House might not be reasonable in light of concerns regarding safety of the residents of Oxford House, concerns for property rights of others, or concerns for residents of other group homes. (Slip op. at 10). This language is significant because, most likely, Oxford House will now comply with the Village's special use procedure and, if the Village denies the special use permit, the "reasonable accommodation" language of the Fair Housing Act will again be at issue.

The Court vacated the preliminary injunction entered by the District Court with instructions to dismiss the case without prejudice.

III. CONCLUSION

This is a case which could have had a severe impact upon Illinois municipalities. The growing complexity of civilization makes zoning an indispensable function of municipal government. Local governments are in the best position to control and direct the use and development of property within their jurisdiction. To construe the Fair Housing Act requirement of a "reasonable accommodation" as mandating the waiver of procedural due process and zoning laws would have pushed the "reasonable accommodation" provision of the Fair Housing Act far beyond its intended effect.

November 1994 / Illinois Municipal Review / Page 21


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