BY CONRAD P. RUTKOWSKI: Associate professor of political science, Sangamon State University, he earned his Ph.D. at Fordham University. Rutkowski is currently a contributing editor to Illinois Issues.

SECOND ARTICLE IN A THREE-PART SERIES By CONRAD P. RUTKOWSKI

Fogel's 'Justice Model': Stop trying to reform. Punish, but treat all alike


EDITORS' NOTE: This is the second article in a three-part series dealing with the Illinois "Justice Model" which is a package of related proposals aimed at reforming this state's criminal justice system. In this article the author attempts to detail the various components of the plan with particular emphasis on its most significant parts. The Justice Model is now available in published form under the title "... We Are the Living Proof . . ." from the W. H. Anderson Publishing Co. of Cincinnati, Ohio.

THE "Justice Model" of Dr. David Fogel is an attempt to bring about a greater degree of compatibility among the various elements which make up the entire criminal justice process, particularly as it exists in Illinois. Fogel intends to accomplish this by discarding rehabilitation as the philosophy of our correctional process. The philosophy of Fogel's plan is to have convicted persons punished for their crimes by going to prison, but under a system of equitable sentences and with a complete revision of the parole system. Fogel maintains that this can be accomplished by eliminating the gross inequities in the current system, particularly in sentencing and parole. The goal, then, of this proposed Justice Model is to establish a greater degree of certainty in the minds of the public and the criminal that fixed and precise prison terms will be served by those who commit crimes.

Fogel maintains that two different philosophies are operating within our criminal justice system. In the earlier stages of this system including arrest, prosecution, and trial a philosophy exists which holds that an adult offender is responsible for his own actions and, accordingly, ought to be held accountable under the law. Fogel calls this the "volitional model."

Consistent treatment
But during the later stages of the criminal justice process including sentencing, prison confinement, and parole a second philosophy comes into play. It assumes that the individual who goes to prison is in some way "sick" or no longer responsible or volitional, and that the objective of imprisonment is to "cure" or "rehabilitate" that person before he is allowed back into society. Fogel calls this the "rehabilitation" or "medical model."

Fogel's Justice Model accepts as a fact that prisons do not rehabilitate or cure. He argues that in order for the correctional part of the criminal justice process to work, offenders must be treated during the entire process as responsible as well as accountable, that is, volitional. Fogel states this in the following fashion:

The prison sentence should merely represent a deprivation of liberty. All the rights accorded free citizens but consistent with mass living and the execution of a sentence restricting the freedom of movement, should follow a prisoner into prison. The prisoner is volitional and may therefore choose [rehabilitative] programs for his own benefit. The state cannot with any degree of confidence hire one person to rehabilitate another unless the latter senses an inadequacy in himself that he wishes to modify through services he himself seeks.

In order for the proposed Justice Model to be implemented, Fogel maintains that a number of significant changes have to be instituted. The Justice Model involves an entire range of reform measures, touching upon, almost every phase of the criminal justice process. It calls for the reform of: bail bond procedures; the reform of grand jury proceedings; the establishment of a maximum 60-day fair trial rule; the creation of a new unit within the Department of Corrections called the Bureau of Community Safety which would be responsible for supervising adult offenders who are not in prisons the upgrading of court services; revisions within the juvenile parole system; and an upgrading of public defender services. Even so, the most critical elements of the model involve the sentencing process and actual incarceration.

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Indeterminate sentencing
The current criminal justice system in Illinois and elsewhere is based on the principle and practice of indeterminate sentencing. This simply means that a judge possesses a very large degree of discretion when imposing a sentence upon an individual who has been properly convicted of a crime. The General Assembly sets the ranges of possible prison terms according to the type of crime. Under this system (see table) a judge is empowered to selects prison sentence from within a relatively broad range of periods of imprisonment.

14/February 1976/Illinois Issues


Offenders should be treated as responsible persons, he argues. At present, they are considered 'sick' and the system seeks to rehabilitate them often without success

Under exixting statutes, for example, in a non-capital murder case, a judge is empowered to sentence a convicted individual to a prison term of from 14 years to life. This could mean a prison term of 14 years, 15 years, 16 years, 18 1/2 years, and so on, up to and including life. Hence, the discretion of the judge revolves around a rather wide range of time periods from which he may select a specific period of imprisonment.

An illustration
Stating it another way, indeterminate sentencing involves establishing minimal and maximal penalties, usually prison sentences. While the goal of the philosophy underlying this present system is one of insuring that "the punishment fits the crime," the result in practice has been wide disparities in imposing prison sentences even when the crimes involved were of an identical nature and of a similar gravity.

To illustrate, assume that two people have committed the same crime in different parts of the state. The crime involved was burglary, which is a Class 2 felony; the crimes were of a similar gravity. One of the persons is sentenced to two years in prison, the other to 15 years. An obvious question is: "What happens when these [felons] share a cell at Joliet and compare notes? Obviously the lack of sentencing uniformity in addition to being manifestly unjust breeds resentment leading to violence in our prisons." At least this is the conclusion arrived at by Fogel and his staff associates at the Illinois Law Enforcement Commission.

In tackling this problem, Fogel is not proposing that judicial discretion be eliminated. In fact, it is not discretion which is really at issue here. Rather, Fogel is attacking unbridled discretion discretion which is exercised within boundary lines that are so far apart that it becomes unlimited in nature, and for all practical purposes ceases to be discretion at all.

Fogel sees the judiciary playing a crucial and vitally important role in society's effort to deal effectively with crime and criminals. In an effort to assist the courts in fulfilling this role, Fogel would establish a system of determinate or "flat" sentences which would be imposed for specific crimes. The exercise of discretion on the part of the judiciary would remain intact, but it would be of a much narrower nature. The table compares the present statutory ranges of prison terms for specific types of crimes to Fogel's proposed determinant or flat sentences for the same crimes. The flat sentences listed in the table are Fogel's examples of how his proposal could be implemented. The specific numbers would have to be debated and determined by the General Assembly. What is most important to Fogel is that the range of sentences be narrowed.

Assuming an individual is convicted of a Class 2 felony, the judge would be empowered, according to Fogel's "proposed determinate sentences" to impose a sentence of five years in prison (see table). This sentence contrasts starkly with an indeterminate sentence under the current system which could range anywhere from one to 20 years. But Fogel's reform proposal does not stop here. It is much more complex and attempts to address itself to all of the relevant factors that are involved.

Fogel acknowledges that while different crimes might be identical in nature, seriousness. It is here where discretion is called upon to play a role, one which he defines carefully and with precision.

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It is not only possible, but highly probable, that identical crimes will vary in their seriousness, that the circumstances surrounding these acts will affect how they are judged and weighed. Some circumstances may tend to "mitigate" or lessen the degree of assigned seriousness. In other situations different circumstances may "aggravate" or increase the seriousness of the crime in question. In order to allow for these differences and at the same time insure that sentencing for a similar crime is carried out prudently and equitably, Fogel's plan would provide for a limited modification of his proposed "flat" sentence.

Career criminals
Using the same Class 2 felony as an example, Fogel's plan would permit a judge to impose a base prison sentence of five years, but he could add up to two years for aggravating circumstances or subtract two years for mitigating circumstances. The net result for this one type of crime would be a prison sentence ranging from three to seven years, which varies considerably from the one to 20 year term under the current system. But Fogel's plan goes further to give consideration to "career criminals."

His Justice Model actually proposes two schedules of flat or determinate prison terms. The initial schedule with the lesser, flat prison sentences is intended to apply largely to non-career criminals and individuals who do not constitute a serious threat to society. In

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'A system in which prisoners "con" correctional officers into providing favorable reports to parole boards'

order to deal effectively with those who choose to make crime a career or are genuinely dangerous, the model provides an alternative schedule of "flat" sentences which Fogel calls "proposed enhanced determinate sentences" (see table). Within this category, as in the straight determinate sentences grouping, provision is made for the exercise of judicial discretion to allow for aggravating or mitigating circumstances. Consequently, a career criminal who was convicted of a Class 2 felony would be sentenced to nine years in prison, plus or minus two years.

From all of the preceding discussion it ought to be apparent by now that Fogel is addressing himself almost solely to felony crimes. This is the case simply because it is primarily in this category that the greatest degree of discretion and potential for abuse exists. In terms of murder, the initial sentence options are the death penalty or life imprisonment. With respect to misdemeanors, the length of the prison stay is so minute as to not permit abuses of discretion.

Incarceration
Under our current penal system, a specific sentence set by a judge does not really establish how much actual time an offender will spend in prison. Once a judge imposes a sentence, the authority to determine the precise amount of time spent by an offender in prison is transferred to a parole board and the correctional officials. Once again, this means the current system invests a broad degree of discretion this time with even more criminal justice system officials. As Fogel sees it:

Prison life is largely a product of the anomie of sentencing and paroling. Like both it too is effectively ruleless. How could it be otherwise with 95% of its prisoners unable to calculate when they will be released or even what, with a degree of certainty, is demanded of them for release candidacy by parole authorities?

It is the parole board that determines when and under what conditions an individual is released from custody, and thus it is the parole board that determines how much time an individual actually spends in prison. Correctional officials participate in this decision making process by providing parole boards with reports on prison inmates. and it ought to be noted that these reports are largely subjective in nature. A natural result of this process is a system in which prisoners "con" correctional officers into providing favorable reports to parole boards in order to insure positive actions on requests for early release from prison.

A day for a day
The proposed Justice Model attempts to remedy this situation by providing for a system whereby an offender can reduce his sentence by one day for each day spent in prison without violating established rules. The offender would then begin his prison sentence knowing he could be out of prison in half the time, if he does not violate any rules. In order to encourage continuing lawful and responsible behavior, the offender's earned good time would become "vested," not subject to being taken away, according to Fogel's plan.

If these changes were instituted, parole at least as we know of it today would no longer be necessary. Fogel's plan actually implies the abolition of parole. Fogel and his associates argue that "parole supervision is a medical concept the correctional equivalent to [hospital] outpatient care. Since the justice model revolves around a volitional model of human behavior, parole supervision (not to be confused with access, on a voluntary basis, to human services) is an inappropriate construct."

The proponents of the new system go on to say:

Our proposed system offers the offender a set date for release from "day one" of his incarceration. He knows that he can halve his sentence by good behavior . . . giving him a stake in law- abiding conduct. He can participate in education, training and other service if he chooses to but he will not be released any sooner in either case. Similarly, after release he is considered a free man ... he may choose to go it alone. In short, the proposed system is impartial, non-discretionary, definite, and volitional.

All of this means that when an individual is sentenced to prison, he will knowwith a significant degree of certainty how much time will actually have to be served. The time will be fixed and within certain limits it might be decreased, but in no event will it be increased.

Parole, pardon board
Notwithstanding all of this, the parole (and pardon) board itself would not be done away with. Under the Justice Model the board would take on a new and different, meaning with a series of specific assignments. Firstly, it would be involved in easing the transition from the old to the new system by continuing parole functions for all prison inmates who were indeterminately sentenced. Secondly, the board would continue its traditional decisions for parole of offenders sentenced under the current system so that actual time spent in prison would be compatible with sentences being meted out under the new flat-time sentencing procedures. Thirdly, the board would serve as a certifying agent for days of "good time" earned by offenders so that offenders and the board would know definitely how many. days had been vested by each offender. Finally, it would serve in an advisory, capacity to the governor in matters relating to commutations, reprieves, and pardons.

The key elements
There are still other elements of the criminal justice system which are proposed for changes in Fogel's Justice Model, but the proposed changes for sentencing and imprisonment are the key components of Foge's plan. These are the two elements, more than any others, which attack head-on the twin, flaws of the present system - unbridled discretion and uncertainty which have fostered a multitude of inequities or injustices. These inequities, in turn, have fueled fires of discontent, anguish. despair and rage within our nations prisons in Fogel's view.

In a very genuine sense Fogel is echoing John, Viscount Morley, in his work, On Compromise, when he said. "You have not converted a man because; you have silenced him."

Next month: The Justice Model What are the chances that it will be implement Illinois?

16/February 1976/Illinois Issues


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