1988 presidential election: downstate still holds key to Illinois victory

One month before the November election the Chicago Sun-Times called the 1988 presidential race in Illinois a "dead heat." Its statewide poll found the Democratic presidential ticket of Massachusetts Gov. Michael Dukakis and Texas' U.S. Sen. Lloyd Bentsen running exactly even, 44 percent to 44 percent, with the Republican ticket, Vice President George Bush and Indiana's U.S. Sen. Dan Quayle. Not only were 12 percent of Illinoisans undecided, but many of those expressing a presidential preference were labeled "soft" in their support.

The bottom line of Illinois' 1988 presidential politics was that little changed despite the tightness of the race and the all-out statewide blitz put on by both sides during the campaign's last 30 days. Neither candidate generated much voter emotion or political energy. Instead the closest presidential contest in Illinois since the magical 1960 showdown between Richard M. Nixon and John F. Kennedy turned out to be a traditional contest reflecting Illinois' geopolitical makeup.

As has been the case for over a decade Republican vote power growth in collar county Illinois (DuPage, Kane, Lake, McHenry and Will counties adjacent to Cook County) coupled with its longtime strength in suburban Cook County (everything outside Chicago) gave the GOP candidate large enough vote margins to cancel out Democratic margins in the city of Chicago. 1988 Illinois returns were almost a carbon copy of the 1976 Jimmy Carter v. Gerald Ford totals (see table 1). In both cases the candidates came out of the populous Cook and collar counties almost tied. Fully 62 percent of the statewide vote is cast in those six counties in the northeastern corner of the state, but in both elections it was the other 96 counties in downstate Illinois that gave the Republican standard-bearer a narrow plurality. In statewide races in Illinois "downstate holds the key to victory."

Two points must be understood before any detailed analysis of the 1988 election can be undertaken: Reagan's victories and voter turnout.

Ronald Reagan in 1980 and especially in 1984 annihilated the Democratic candidates. His Illinois triumphs were so massive and complete that they obliterated statewide geopolitical trends. In 1980 Reagan would have carried Illinois even if his entire Chicago vote had stayed home. In 1984 his vote in the collar counties and suburban Cook County (together called the suburban 51/2 county region) was almost double Mondale's margin in Chicago.

In 1988 Bush was no Reagan. The Dukakis-Bush race was a return to presidential competitiveness in Illinois, and exaggerating Dukakis' performance must be avoided. Dukakis vote totals were significantly better than Mondale's 1984 numbers, but in plain talk, they were not good enough. He lost. (See tables 2 and 3.) In U.S. electoral politics there is no silver medal; it's either the gold or concession speech time. (Rev. Jesse Jackson attempted to rewrite or at least reinterpret victories in the 1988 Democratic primaries: He called a loss a win if he either ran better than expected or finished ahead of his 1984 primary results.)

As for turnout, much has been written about how it affected the Dukakis-Bush race in Illinois. Special emphasis has been placed on the lower than expected black turnout in Chicago as the reason for Dukakis' losing the state, but the Republican vote fell, too (see tables 3 and 4). Bush's Chicago vote was more than 90,000 less than Reagan's in 1984. Clearly this drop in GOP votes did not come in the black wards; it occurred along Chicago's lakefront and in white ethnic areas where many of the so-called Reagan Democrats and the liberal independents voted as Dukakis Democrats. To be sure, Chicago was the only region where Dukakis's total vote was less than Mondale's 1984 totals. Still Dukakis increased his overall Chicago vote margin over Bush when compared to Mondale-Reagan by 58,783 (see table 3).

In the Chicago black wards where Mondale and Dukakis had 90 percent or more of the vote, the vote differential or drop-off from 1984 to 1988 for all these wards was only 32,658 votes. Thus, though black stay-at-homes hurt Dukakis they did not

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deny him a victory in Illinois. If Dukakis had had a turnout comparable to Mondale in these wards (and black neighborhoods in other wards), it still would not have been enough to put the state in his winning column in 1988.

The most vital statistic concerning Chicago's performance in the 1988 presidential election is its percentage of the statewide vote (see table 4). Since 1948 Chicago's share of the total Illinois vote has been diminishing. When Democrat Harry Truman defeated Republican Tom Dewey nearly 50 percent of all state voters lived in Chicago; 40 years later Illinois' biggest city produced a little over 23 percent of the total vote. (Compared to 1984 the drop-off was 1.3 percent.)

This means that Chicago can still give a solid Democratic candidate like Dukakis a significant landslide margin, but because less and less of the total state vote is from Chicago, a solid Republican candidate like Bush can overcome a Democrat's Chicago landslide by building his own margins among the ever expanding state electorate living outside Chicago. In short, Chicago victory margins for statewide Democratic candidates no longer eat up enough of the total statewide vote to carry the state.

In Chicago the election results show Dukakis winning 42 of the 50 wards (six more than Mondale in 1984). Percentagewise black Chicagoans voted overwhelmingly for the Massachusetts governor. Ten predominantly black wards gave Dukakis at least 97 percent of their vote while eight other mainly black wards delivered over 90 percent of their vote to him. The four largely Hispanic wards (22, 25, 26 and 31) all registered 70 percent or more of their vote for Dukakis. His winning percentages were close only in a couple of southwest side ethnic wards and in a few lakefront and near northwest side wards. In the racially split 10th Ward, home of "new" Republican Ed Vrdolyak on the far southeast side, Dukakis received 58 percent of the vote.

As for Dukakis's Chicago margins, the middle class black wards on the far southside (despite some turnout drop-off from 1984) produced huge margins for him. No. 1 was Mayor Eugene Sawyer's 6th Ward. The mayor's people gave Dukakis a 26,962-vote margin while their neighbors in wards 8, 21 and 34 all registered 20,000-plus margin victories for him. It was the black wards that gave Dukakis his largest victory margins (10,000 votes or more). Nevertheless, when Mondale's 1984 performance throughout Chicago is compared to Dukakis's, Dukakis improved in all parts of the city; in the wards he lost to Bush, Dukakis

Reagan had won six more in 1984

reduced the margin of defeat.

Bush won eight Chicago wards, all on the far northwest or southwest sides. Reagan had won six more in 1984. Bush mamy have lost them because each of those "lost six" wards (12, 14, 30, 35, 40 and 47) has more working-class people than the eight wards that stayed Republican in both elections.

Leading the Bush parade was the far northwest side 41st Ward, the home of the Democratic Pucinskis — Alderman Roman and his daughter Aurelia, who won the Cook County circuit court clerk's office in the same election. Historically the 41st Ward has been the best GOP ward in Chicago. It was the only ward that gave Bush over 60 percent of its vote. Other wards won by Bush were 13, 19, 23, 36, 38, 39 and 45. In each his winning percentage dropped between 5 percent to 9 percent compared to Reagan's in 1984. The same scenario holds true for Bush's victory margins in those eight wards: In each of the eight wards his winning margin was less than Reagan's in 1984, and only wards 41 and 23 gave him margins over 5,000 votes.

In sum Chicago was a 7-to-3 Dukakis landslide. Despite some black apathy the Massachusetts governor put some impressive numbers on the board, and his city victory margin nearly equalled Carter's 1976 figure (see table 1). But with over 75 percent of the state's ballots cast outside Chicago, Bush caught up and won Illinois.

In the rest of the state, the presidential vote story would be the same: Dukakis ran better than Mondale but not well enough to win.

In the suburban Cook County region Bush won a solid 3-to-2 victory, winning 25 of the 30 townships. Yet Dukakis carried five townships, two more than Mondale (Proviso and Niles) and cut the Democratic loss margin by over 135,000 votes. As in past elections the GOP presidential contender

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ran best in the string of upper-middle-class townships in the far northwestern part of the county. In most of these Bush won 2 to 1 and gained significant vote margins. His best township, Wheeling, produced a 21,000-plus vote margin for him. He also had strong support in some western and southwestern heavily ethnic suburbs. Interestingly many of these Bush voters, a good number of whom are Chicago transplants, split their tickets, voting for Democrat Richard M. Daley in the Cook County state's attorney contest.

The Dukakis township victories in suburban Cook were in those with significant black, liberal and Jewish voters — Calumet, Evanston, Niles, Oak Park and Proviso. Evanston provided Dukakis his biggest township win: 68 percent of its vote and an 11,7l6 vote margin. Both Niles and Oak Park gave him margins of more than 4,000 votes, while Calumet and Proviso gave him 1,600-vote victories.

Despite a slight decrease in turnout, the suburban Cook County share of the statewide vote increased over 1984 (see table 4). The region remains substantially Republican in its presidential voting, but changing demographics have made local Democratic candidates more competitive in recent years. In 1988 for instance, in the south suburban 4th Congressional District the Democratic challenger, former state Sen. George Sangmeister, ousted the Republican freshman incumbent, Jack Davis.

If Illinois Democrats were asked to name a fifth horseman of the Apocalypse, they would call that plague the collar counties. This fast-growing suburbanized region around Cook County (DuPage, Kane, Lake, McHenry and Will counties) has become the backbone of the statewide Republican strength in Illinois. Led by DuPage, which by itself provides almost half of the GOP victory margin in the five counties, this region with its predominantly white and middle- to upper-income residents is producing GOP victories of staggering proportions.

Bush swept all five of these counties, winning nearly two-thirds of the region's vote. Only in Will County did he garner less than 60 percent, while in DuPage and McHenry he won over 70 percent. His overall collar victory margin of 253,856, when combined with his margin in the suburban portion of Cook County, wiped out Dukakis's Chicago advantage. Dukakis had bettered Mondale's 1984 performance in the collar region, but this improvement was less than everywhere else in Illinois (see table 3).

The collars present an ongoing major obstacle to statewide Democratic candidates since their suburban population continues to grow (at a faster and faster rate) while the rest of the state's does not. As the nation's first truly suburban presidential candidate. Dukakis should have had a better reception in the collar counties. His massive defeat there reveals a deep political/philosophical split between Illinois' suburban voters and the national Democratic party.

Downstate Illinois proved once again to be the most competitive voting region in the state. In downstate's 96 counties, Dukakis won 30 (Mondale won five) and cut the GOP's downstate victory margin by over one-quarter million votes compared to 1984. Bush won 66 counties and wound up with 53 percent of the vote, winning downstate with

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a 92,534-vote margin that gave him an Illinois victory.

For Dukakis his downstate victories were in counties located in the financially depressed western part of the state (centering around Rock Island County), in a string of southwest and southern counties (centering on Madison and St. Clair and nearby coal mining counties) and in a few scattered counties that have an older manufacturing city of some size with a measurable black population (Macon County with Decatur, Vermillion County with Danville, LaSalle County with LaSalle-Peru). Dukakis carried no downstate county located north of Interstate 80. Bush won the rest. The so-called "sidestate" part of down-state (counties west of the collar counties) remained totally loyal to Bush. That includes Winnebago County with Rockford, the state's second largest city, but the vote was not quite as loyal, somewhat resembling several of the other big city counties that went for Dukakis.

Dukakis's greatest percentage win was in tiny Gallatin County in southeastern Illinois. It was the only county to give him 60 percent of its vote (Rock Island and Franklin counties were at 59 percent). As for Dukakis's margins mighty St. Clair County in southwestern Illinois (across the Mississippi River from St. Louis) led the way, giving him a 14,000-plus vote margin (Bush never matched this margin in his best counties). Dukakis's second best downstate county margin came from Rock Island, 12,762.

Bush received 60 percent or more of the vote in more than one-fourth of the 66 downstate counties he won. His best counties were generally in the north central and northeastern farming areas (south of Cook and the collar counties), in the region

It was a replay of the Ford-Carter 1976 contest

west of the collars and in the southeastern farming region just north of Illinois' coal mining region. The only big city down-state county to give Bush over 60 percent of its vote was McLean County where Bloomington-Normal is located. But his best victory margins (10,000 or more votes) came in big city counties: McLean and Winnebago and Springfield's Sangamon County. In six other counties he garnered 5,000-plus vote victory margins.

Thus, Bush's downstate triumph was based on several small victories that added up to a narrow win of the region — and the state. His downstate winning margin of 92,534 votes is almost the same as his total state margin: 94,999. It was a replay of the Ford-Carter 1976 contest. Carter's landslide in Democrat-dominated Chicago was cancelled out by Ford's landslide in the Republican-rich suburban 5 1/2 county region. Ford's winning margin downstate of 112,542 votes was within 500 votes of his statewide winning margin.

The 1988 presidential election in Illinois, in short, shows that downstate Illinois remains the key to victory in statewide races. Despite lower than expected black turnout in Chicago or continued GOP strength in the suburban 5 1/2 county region, a better Dukakis performance downstate would have delivered the state to him. Given the personalities, political intrigues and hardening vote patterns in Illinois' other regions, downstate was where Dukakis had his best chance to win. He did far better than Mondale, but with Bush not Reagan as his opponent and with not-so-rosy economic conditions in many downstate areas, Dukakis should have done better.

Will a Democratic presidential candidate ever carry Illinois again? State party chairman and state Sen. Vince Demuzio (D-49, Carlinville) believes that despite some ongoing internal party problems, Dukakis and the Democrats ran a good race in 1988. He argues, "We had, in this campaign, the party's first statewide voter registration drive. Funding-wise, we were competitive with the Republicans, and downstate we had good unity that resulted in a good turnout." Still Demuzio concedes that some Chicago Democratic leaders were more interested in the upcoming mayor's race than in electing Dukakis president. What the shrewd and careful Demuzio did not mention was that the Dukakis campaign with its imported statewide campaign leadership never came to grips with the state's party structure or geopolitical divisions. Moreover, it forgot that Dukakis ran a distant third in the Illinois primary to Illinois' U.S. Sen. Paul Simon and the Rev. Jesse Jackson. Someday a Democratic presidential nominee in Illinois will realize that it's better to have a campaign director who knows the players and perhaps is a player than to bring in a neutral outsider who spends most of the campaign introducing himself to party leaders and learning about the state.

As for Illinois Republicans, they have six victories in a row for their presidential candidates. In 1988 they carried the state for a ticket that did not have Reagan's name but did have Quayle's. According to state Sen. Aldo DeAngelis (R-40, Olympia Fields), an assistant minority leader in the Senate and a real comer in statewide GOP politics, "Bush's victory was no surprise because deep down Illinoisans reflect Republican values."

To be sure, values is an overused and underdefined political term, but DeAngelis is correct if he applies it to the state's changing demographics. As Chicago continues to lose its statewide muscle, its ability to sway statewide races becomes more unlikely. Successful GOP presidential candidates in Illinois can withstand a beating in Chicago as long as they gain votes elsewhere in the state from those same issues which caused them to lose badly in the city. In short, isolating Chicago remains a successful statewide GOP presidential campaigns strategy as long as two things remain the same: 30 to 35 percent of Chicago voters (living mainly in ethnic and lakefront wards) continue to vote Republican, and the Democrats remain unable to bridge their Chicago vote base with one of other state regions — especially downstate.

Paul M. Green is director of the Institute for Public Policy and Administration. Governors State University. One of his first articles of election analysis published in Illinois Issues (February 1978) establishes the context for and the conclusion he reached then and 10 years later: that in Illinois "Downstate holds the key to victory." That article is reprinted, with revisions, in Illinois Elections (3rd edition), published by Illinois Issues in 1986.

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