By REP. ARTHUR A. TELCSER
A native of Chicago, he is serving his
third session in the leadership and
fifth session in the Illinois House. He
is a practicing pharmacist, active in
civic and political organizations.
Rep. Telcser has sponsored bills aiding
the Spanish-speaking citizens of
Illinois, handicapped, corrections,
recreation, election and prison reform.
THE 177 MEMBERS of the Illinois House of Representatives are elected every two years by a unique electoral system called "multi-member districts with cumulative voting." It is called "multi-member districts" because three representatives are elected from each of the 59 legislative districts. It is often called simply the "cumulative voting system," because its unique feature is that every voter has three votes to cast which the voter may divide equally between two candidates (giving each one and one-half votes) or divide equally among three candidates (giving each one vote) or "bullet" for one candidate (giving him all three votes).
The cumulative voting system enables voters not only to support a candidate, but to give strong support to a candidate they feel strongly about. The Illinois system is the only one which allows a strong minority to have a strong voice in government.
Guarantees a contest
This unique system is a product of the
Post-Civil War era in Illinois, when the
overwhelming majority of Illinoisans
voted the straight party ticket. Most of
the southern half of the population
voted for Democratic candidates, and
most of the northern half, including
Cook County, voted for Republicans. To give minority voters in each half of
the state a chance to elect their candidates, and to encourage each party to
develop a statewide, rather than a
sectional outlook, the 1870 Illinois
Constitution provided for a cumulative
voting system with three representatives
from each district. Present arguments
against the system center on the point
that a system created in response to a
condition which fortunately no longer
exists — rabidly sectional partisanship
— cannot have any value today. In
truth, while geographical sectionalism is
no longer as significant as it was a
century ago, there are still other minorities — based on political philosophy,
race, ethnic group or occupation —
which are often very strong. Moreover, the cumulative voting
system which has been in effect since
1972 — thanks to the 1970 Illinois
Constitution — is significantly better
than the original. The most significant
difference is that the "sweetheart deals"
between party leaders have been discouraged as far as possible. The sweetheart deals which opponents are so fond
of pointing to as an abuse were the
informal agreements between party
leaders to run two candidates from one
party, but only one from the other party, in an election. Section 2 of Article IV of the new Constitution virtually eliminates those
"deals" by stating that a party cannot
limit its candidates nominated in March
to fewer than two candidates. This
virtually guarantees a four-way contest
for three seats, since a party which fails
to nominate two or more candidates
allows a "stray" candidate to be written in as a party nominee. Let's look at the 1974 November
election: of the 177 House seats up for
election, there were contests in all the
districts. The only uncontested 1974 legislative race was that for the 22nd district Senate seat — which is elected
on a single-member district basis. The question, therefore, is not whether the old cumulative voting system was
better for the people than a single-member district arrangement, but
whether the new cumulative voting
system is better than a single-member
district system. I think that the answer
is definitely yes. Let's look at the
positive aspects of the new system,
which even ardent opponents find hard to dispute.
In recent years some political scientists and others have attacked this
system, chiefly on the grounds that it is
unrepresentative and encourages "game
playing" or "sweetheart deals" between
political parties to the detriment of the
people. Nothing could be further from
the truth. Whatever problems the
system has are essentially human flaws
which would exist under any other
system as well. The basic structure of the
system remains sound and, I contend,
provides for a more representative government in Illinois.
Minorities represented
There are different kinds of minorities competing for representation in the
In Illinois the mere fact of election from multi-member districts does not
guarantee minority representation
because there are still areas of our state
where party affiliation plays a strong
role in the low-visibility races. The Cook
County Board is divided into two
districts — Chicago and suburban Cook
— for the election of commissioners. In
theory, 10 Chicago Democrats run
against 10 Chicago Republicans and 6
suburban Democrats run against 6
suburban Republicans. In fact, the
Democratic slate always wins in the city
and the Republican slate wins in the
suburbs. In spite of this, there are
Republican representatives in the legislature from Chicago and Democratic
representatives from suburban Cook.
Why? The difference is cumulative voting.
Continued on page 14.
November 1976 / Illinois Issues / 13
House. The first is minority party representation, for which the cumulative voting system was initiated. Although party affiliation is ebbing, there are still areas of Illinois where party labels are strong factors in electoral success. In those areas, the minority's representative to the Illinois House is often the minority's only elected official in that area, and is the nucleus of the party's organization. Without the reasonable hope of gaining one legislative seat, the organization might well collapse.
A situation not often appreciated is that cumulative voting, while virtually guaranteeing contests, also ameliorates severe shifts in House membership in landslide years. Let's compare the House and the Senate in the last two elections. It was a "Republican" year in 1972 at the national level, but there was no landslide at the legislative level in the states. Illinois reflected this mildly Republican trend: each house of the General Assembly was controlled by Republicans with a one-vote majority. In 1974, however, there were Democratic landslides in state legislatures all over the country. In Illinois the Senate reflected the landslide more than the House did — 65 per cent of the Senate and 57 per cent of the House were Democratic. This does not mean that the victorious party was cheated out of the fruits of its victory, however, since the Democrats are clearly the majority in both houses. The point is that the new minority party, the Republicans, has a better chance to be heard in the House than in the Senate.
The modern "minority" is more likely to be a racial, ethnic or religious minority. Such a minority, if it is reasonably well organized around its common identity, can often elect a representative, but almost never a senator. For example, in biracial districts in Chicago, the blacks are often a sizable minority. When the black population is substantial — say, 25 to 30 per cent — it is highly likely that one of the three representatives will be black. There will not be a black senator however, unless the district is predominantly black.
The value of cumulative voting as an aid to electing women legislators can hardly be doubted. Eight districts have at least one woman representative and two districts even have two women representatives. By contrast, only three legislative districts have elected women as senators.
A third type of minority is the philosophical or issue-oriented minority. In this regard, we can see the value of the cumulative voting system as a means of securing minority viewpoint representation within the majority party. I have noticed that a strong majority party often has a liberal wing and a conservative wing, and that the party's two state representatives tend to reflect that division. If you look at the votes on the Equal Rights Amendment, you will find that often one of the majority's representatives votes for the ERA and one against. Each faction of that constituency is represented.
A fourth type of minority representation is the geographical one within each party. For example, Chicago Republican representatives have always supported aid to the Chicago Transit Authority as much as Chicago Democrats have. This support has given the CTA a hearing in the Republican party. On the other side of the aisle, downstate Democrats can speak of agricultural interests in a party dominated by urban Cook County.
Produces better legislators
I am at a loss to understand why some
who profess to be for "good government" support single-member districts
for the House. They seem to follow pure
academic theory without regard to the
realities of Illinois. The Illinois League
of Women Voters, for example, opposes
cumulative voting while giving their
highest ratings to representatives whose
presence in the legislature depends upon
cumulative voting. The question is
simply which system produces better
legislators — not to represent the
parties, but to represent the people.
14 / November 1976 / Illinois Issues