Judicial Rulings

Illinois Supreme Court

Confiscation of stolen car ruled unconstitutional

UNWITTING owners of stolen automobiles cannot be deprived of their constitutional due process rights through confiscation and sale of their "contraband" vehicles, the Supreme Court ruled March 29. In The People v. One 1979 Pontiac Grand Prix Automobile, a representative of the Secretary of State's Office and the Kankakee police department confiscated the vehicle in question and sought court action to sell it. The person who had purchased the vehicle was not a party to the suit, and no notice was served on him.

Delivering the high court's opinion, Chief Justice Howard C. Ryan found that aspects of the antitheft article of the Illinois Vehicle Code, specifically Section 4-107(i), were unconstitutionally applied in this case. This section of the antitheft article provides that an automobile with a removed manufacturer's identification number — or one that has been altered, defaced or destroyed — is a contraband vehicle, and the person owning, leasing or possessing the automobile has no property rights. The court reasoned that the owner of the Grand Prix could have had no knowledge of the fact that the vehicle identification number which appeared on the title and on the dashboard of the vehicle was, in fact, a false number, or that there was a "secret" registration number on the frame of the car. The number was so badly mutilated as to be illegible, and the original owner could not have been ascertained by the purchaser.

The chief justice concluded: ". . .here we are not talking about intent. [The purchaser of the vehicle] took the necessary steps to assure himself that the vehicle identification number located at the place required by regulations matched the identification number on the title. That is all that this statute could constitutionally require." In rendering this decision the high court affirmed the judgment of the appellate court and reversed the judgment of the circuit court.

Firing suit brought by cancer victim dismissed

CANCER is not defined as a handicap under either the Illinois Constitution or the Equal Opportunities for the Handicapped Act, the state Supreme Court ruled February 17, in the case of Elaine Lyons v. Heritage Restaurants, Inc.

"The sole issue in this case," wrote Justice Seymour Simon in the ruling, "is whether. . .cancer can be considered a 'handicap'. . . . The difficulty that arises here stems from the fact that the Constitution leaves the word 'handicap' undefined, and the Act defined 'handicap' somewhat circularly as 'a handicap unrelated to one's ability to perform jobs or positions available to him for his or promotion.'"

Simon noted that Lyons was dismissed from her job prior to legislative action which replaced the handicapped act with the Illinois Human Rights Act, "which uses a substantially different definition. It is clear that any conduct occurring hereafter will be governed by that act."

"The appellate court based its decision to include cancer in the definition on its behalf that the Federal Rehabilitation Act specifically included cancer as a handicap," Simon wrote. "Contrary to the appellate court's belief, the Federal Rehabilitation Act does not specifically include cancer in its list of handicaps. Rather. . . it includes disabilities which require extra services and which result from blindness, cancer, cerebral palsy or. . .other conditions."

"The plaintiff has not alleged that her cancer has substantially hindered her in any. . .[required] activities. . .or that her employer perceived her condition as causing such a hindrance. In our judgment, she is not handicapped within the meaning of the Illinois Constitution or the Equal Opportunities for the Handicapped Act."

The high court's ruling reversed the appellate court and affirmed the circuit court, which had ruled that Lyons had no standing to file suit.

Multitownship assessment districts

THE General Assembly's power to create a multitownship assessment district for contiguous townships with less than 1,000 population is constitutional and does not require the approval of voters within the townships, the Illinois Supreme Court ruled March 16. In the case, The Township of Appanoose et al. v. County Supervisor of Assessments, 19 townships in Hancock County contended that under Article VII, section 5 of the state Constitution, any proposed "merger" or "consolidation" of townships must be approved by referenda in the townships affected.

The county supervisor of assessments argued that the legislative act providing for multitownship districts would neither merge nor consolidate the townships affected, but would change the structure of township government, a legitimate power of the General Assembly.

The Hancock County townships conceded that the General Assembly had the constitutional power to restructure or even abolish their assessment functions, but argued that consolidation of those functions contravened the purpose of the framers of the 1970 Constitution as expressed by the Committee on Local Government of the constitutional convention: "This decision to require a referendum [to dissolve, divide, merge or consolidate a township] reflects the view that the form of local government should not be radically changed without the approval of those most directly affected by the change."

In delivering the high court's ruling, Justice Joseph C. Goldenhersh reversed a circuit court ruling in favor of the townships, and stated that the inherent and constitutional powers of the General Assembly to raise revenue "includes the specific authority to establish the method of assessment for property tax purposes. To that end the General Assembly created the office of township assessor and, absent a constitutional limitation, may abolish the office, modify its functions, or limit its powers as it sees fit."

June 1982 | Illinois Issues | 33