Politics

By CHARLES N. WHEELER III

Two myths bite the dust

A TIME-HONORED bugaboo of Illinois politics was all but laid to rest in the March primary, while a dubious hypothesis of more recent vintage once again proved lacking.

The dreaded specter, of course, was a vote for higher income taxes, which conventional political wisdom assumed would do for legislative careers what the North Atlantic ice pack did for the Titanic. That view had held sway for at least a dozen years, since Paul Simon correctly noted a higher income tax might be the trade-off for lower sales taxes and lost the 1972 Democratic gubernatorial nomination. Slick-campaigning Dan Walker twisted Simon's remark into a call for double, even triple, income tax rates, and then went on to win a narrow victory over the father of the Illinois income tax, Republican Gov. Richard B. Ogilvie. A further proof, it appeared, that the subject was taboo.

In fact, the overwhelming income tax paranoia is one of the reasons last year's vote for a temporary 20 percent increase was so memorable. And so, how did those intrepid souls fare who dared to vote "aye" on H.B. 1470? Very well, as it turns out.

Of the 66 senators and representatives who voted for the temporary tax hike and then sought reelection, only 20 faced primary opposition — about 30 percent — and 12 of those, including the only two to lose, were embroiled in the reform v. machine conflict sweeping Chicago's black neighborhoods, a turf and power struggle to which the tax vote was not even a footnote. In the other eight primaries, only Sen. Robert J. Egan (D-7, Chicago) pulled less than 64 percent of his party's ballots, and he won a three-way race by more than 10,000 votes over the runner-up, who tried to make Egan's support for the tax increase an issue. (Interestingly, 56 incumbents who voted against the tax measure are seeking another term, and 10 of them had to survive primary challenges.)

Perhaps even more indicative of the negligible impact of the income tax issue is this statistic: 19 lawmakers who voted for the tax increase were as good as elected at the filing deadline in mid-December because no one filed against them in the primary or general elections. And 13 of the primary survivors are likewise home free because no one filed for the other party's nomination in their district. Of course, rival party leaders may find sacrificial lambs to fill those slots, but don't expect any upsets.

Which brings us to the second bit of political hokum: the competitive renewal the legislative "cutback amendment" was supposed to bring to Illinois House races. First, the numbers. In the primary, 79 of the 107 representatives seeking another term did so without opposition from their party, a 74 percent free-ride ratio. And 34 of them have no fall opponent, either. Add that 34 to the 11 incumbents who survived primary-only challenges — plus five newcomers nominated in March but unopposed in November — and right now 50 of the 84th General Assembly's 118 representatives are as good as elected.

When a similar dearth of competition marked the 1982 House elections — the first after voters approved the purported reform — cutback apologists argued more would-be House challengers didn't surface because they found out too late where district lines would fall, thanks to the prolonged battle over mapmaking. That excuse won't wash in 1984, however, so the reformers blame the partisan nature of the map, which they say discourages the minority party — usually Chicago Republicans or suburban Democrats — from futile campaigns. That's precisely what cutback opponents predicted would happen, knowing that no self-respecting political cartographer would try to draw swing districts.

In fact, if competition is the objective, it's useful to check for any common threads in the few contests which were competitive. Two totally unrelated factors are immediately apparent: the metamorphosis occurring in Chicago's black community and the decision by incumbents not to seek another term.

Mayor Harold Washington's primary victory in 1983 was the catalyst in Chicago, where Democratic House nominations were contested in 11 of the 13 city districts which have black majorities and in two of the four districts in which Hispanics and blacks together form a majority. That meant a choice for voters in three out of every four minority districts: In most cases, the scraps matched machine-produced incumbents against reform-minded independents nurtured by grass-roots community groups, often tied to the civil rights movement.

The other proven stimulant to competition — an open seat at which to shoot — was even more fruitful, percentage-wise, for the primary than Chicago's fledgling reform movement. Of the 12 districts statewide in which incumbents did not seek reelection, 11 had primary competition, including three in which both parties' nominations were contested. In five others, hopefuls vied to be the standard-bearer for the party favored to win in November; in the other two, minority party nominations were at stake with the winner a long-shot in the fall election.

So draw these lessons from the March primary: A vote for an income tax increase is not political suicide, and the chance to run head-to-head for a House seat is no lure to would-be lawmakers.

2/May 1984/Illinois Issues