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Judicial Rulings




Edgar gets standing on DUI

The Illinois Supreme Court, generally solid in supporting the provisions of the DUI laws, split 4-3 in its July 19 decision to give the secretary of state standing to appeal issuance of Judicial Driving Permits (JDPs) by circuit courts. The high court reversed six appellate court rulings that the secretary lacked standing to appeal. The high court's majority analyzed a lead case and ruled on the issue of standing and not on the details.

The cases involved drivers whose licenses had been suspended under the summary suspension provisions of the Illinois Vehicle Code (see Illinois Revised Statutes 1987, ch. 95 1/2, sec. 11-501.1). Section 6-206.1 allows the circuit court to grant a JDP, under specific circumstances, to a first offender — defined as a driver who has not had a similar conviction within the last five years. The court submits the order to the secretary of state who issues the permit unless he finds that the order "contains insufficient data or fails to comply with [the] code" (sec. 6-206. l(B)(d)), in which case he returns it to the court. In 1988 12,200 JDPs were issued out of 50,199 DUI convictions. Secy. of State Jim Edgar has challenged about two dozen per year.

In the lead case here the driver had had a similar conviction within the five-year period. The secretary of state returned the order with an explanation, but the court reissued it. When the secretary of state sought to appeal this second order, the appellate court ruled that he lacked standing.

The majority observed that, in a case where the court and the secretary of state do not agree, "some party must have authority to determine the propriety of the order through the appellate process." It interpreted broadly: "responsibility and interest in the JDP process and his broad authority in the Illinois Vehicle Code confers [sic] on the Secretary of State standing to appeal the order."

Justice Howard C. Ryan wrote for the majority in People v. Pine (129 Ill. 2d 88). Justices William G. Clark, Horace L. Calvo and John J. Stamos all dissented with Clark and Stamos each writing a dissenting opinion in which all three joined. Both dissents raised the issue of separation of powers and urged a narrower reading of the statute. Clark observed that the majority interpretation would interpose "a sort of intermediate level of review between the circuit and appellate courts" and would allow "a member of the executive branch to exercise an inherently judicial function."

Clark suggested that the secretary of state supply the local state's attorney with any pertinent information about a case. Then the state's attorney, as the adverse party, could appeal a decision to issue a JDP. Calvo suggested that the secretary of state, after receiving an order to issue a JDP, could petition for leave to intervene. If not granted, that decision could be appealed. If granted and the court still ruled that a JDP should be issued, the secretary of state would then have standing to appeal.


New and changed rules

On June 19 the Illinois Supreme Court issued some new rules and changed some others. All took effect August 1, 1989.

New Rule 137 preempts section 2-611 of the Code of Civil Procedure (see. Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 110). It differs from sec. 2-611 in permitting rather than requiring a trial judge to impose sanctions on frivolous proceedings. The statute was modeled on Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

New Rule 375 similarly permits imposition of sanctions for filing frivolous appeals, as well as appeals meant to delay execution of a judgment or harass a party.

New Rule 224 establishes pre-suit procedures to identify persons or entities liable for damages. The Supreme Court Rules Committee comments, "It provides a mechanism for plaintiffs to ascertain the identity of potential defendants in a variety of civil cases. . . . The rule will be of particular benefit in industrial accident cases where the parties responsible may be known to the plaintiffs employer, which may immunize itself from suit."

The court amended Rule 307 in an attempt to save a 1983 rule controlling abortions for pregnant minors (see Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, sec. 81-61 etseq). The law requires girls under age 18 to notify their parents 24 hours before having an abortion, but sec. 81-65 provides for court-ordered waivers under certain conditions. Federal courts found the statute defective because it set no time limits on appeal of denied petitions, and a drawn out appeal could effectively subvert the purpose of the legislation.

The statute itself requested the Supreme Court "to promulgate any rules and regulations necessary to ensure that proceedings under this Act are handled in an expeditious and confidential manner" (sec. 81-65(e)). Among the details added by the court were a requirement that the appellate court make its decision within two days, a prohibition on oral arguments, permission for a girl to use her initials or a pseudonym, permission for court-appointed counsel and provision for appeal to the Supreme Court of an adverse ruling. No time limit is set for an appeal to the high court, however.

Amended Rule 311 allows an appellate court to place a case on an accelerated docket on its own motion or on the motion of one of the parties without securing agreement of all parties. Among others, this might help to expedite appeals on the waiver of notice in cases concerning abortion for minors.

F. Mark Siebert


October 1989 | Illinois Issues | 26



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